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FOURTH CIRCUITREVIEW

III.
A.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Postjudgment Intervention in Title VII Class Actions

Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' (Title VII)
to achieve equal employment opportunities by eliminating employment
practices that discriminate against individuals on the basis of race, color,
religion, gender, or national origin.2 Congress recognized that the
elimination of employment discrimination would be an important step in
eradicating the discrimination that permeates all segments of society.3
To achieve the purpose of Title VII, Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEO C) to act as the administrative agency
for Title VII.4 To eliminate discriminatory practices, Title VII authorizes
victims of employment discrimination to bring suit in conjunction with
the EEOC against employers who engage in discriminatory practices.' A
number of courts have held that the class action is the most efficient
method for litigating Title VII grievances.' Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. I-IV 1977-80).
Id. Title VII provides that an employer may not fire or hire an individual, or
discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment on account of the individual's race, color, religion, gender, or national origin. Id. at § 2000e-2.
' See H.R. REP. No. 914, pt. 2, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. 28, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2391, 2488 (views of Rep. McCulloch) (Title VII intended to commit nation to elimination of manifestations of racial prejudice and to achieve goals of freedom,
equality, justice, and opportunity). See generally Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 62 (1965).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
Id. at § 2000e-5 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). As a prerequisite to the right to bring a civil
action, an aggrieved employee alleging discrimination first must file a complaint with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Id. The EEOC then serves notice of
the complaint on the respondent employer. Id. at § 2000e-5(b). If a subsequent investigation
by the EEOC reveals that reasonable cause exists to believe that the charges of discrimination are true, the EEOC will attempt to eliminate the alleged unlawful employment practice
by conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Id. If within 180 days from the filing of the
charge, the EEOC has failed to reach a conciliation agreement between the respondent
employer and the aggrieved individual and neither the EEOC nor the Attorney General has
filed a civil action against the employer, the EEOC or the Attorney General must notify the
victim of the alleged discrimination and that the victim now has the right to sue. Id. at
§ 2000e-5(fl(1). The receipt of the notice of a "right to sue" gives the aggrieved party the
right to bring a civil action against the respondent named in the notice, provided the plaintiff takes action within ninety days of receipt of the notice. Id. See generally Galvin, Handling Title VII Charges Before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 16 ARIZ.
B.J., August 1980, at 16; Sape & Hart, Title VIIReconsidered: The EqualEmployment Act
of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824 (1972); Comment, Certification of EEOC Class Suits
Under Rule 23, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 690 (1979).
6 See, e.g., Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 273 (4th Cir. 1980)
(class actions are appropriate and useful devices for achieving remedial purposes of Title
VII); Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966) (race discrimina-
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of Civil Procedure establishes the requirements for certification of a
class action in federal court. 7 Appellate courts have the power to decertify all or part of a class based on defects in rule 23 certification and to
vacate any judgment that the district court awarded in favor of the
class.' In Hill v. Western Electric Co. (Hill I1), the Fourth Circuit con-

tion is by definition class discrimination); S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1971),
reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92d CONG. 2d SESS.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 at 436 (1972)
(Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare agreeing with courts that Title VII actions
are class complaints, and that any restrictions on class actions would undermine Title VII's
effectiveness); Miller, Class Actions and Employment Discrimination Under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 43 MISS. L.J. 275, 276 (1972) (class action is most effective
device for achieving goal of Title VII); see also Blecher, Is the Class Action Really Doing
the Job? (Plaintiff's View Point) 55 F.R.D. 365, 374 (1973) (class action is only viable procedure to redress series of relatively small injustices, cumulative effect of which is socially
destructive discrimination). But see Simon, Class Actions: Useful Tool or Engine of
Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 377 (1973) (class action fosters unnecessary litigation, reduces
federal courts to small claims courts, and only benefits unethical lawyers).
I FED. R. Civ. P. 23. As a prerequisite to a class action, rule 23(a) requires that the
class be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Additionally, rule 23(a) provides that questions of law or fact common to the class must exist.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). The claims or defenses of the representative parties also must be
typical of the claims and defenses of the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). Finally, rule 23(a) requires that the representative parties must fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(4).
Even if the class meets the prerequisites of rule 23(a), a class is not certifiable unless it
falls within one of the categories of rule 23(b). FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Rule 23(b) attempts to avoid
establishing incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class by stating
that a class action is permissible when the prosecution of separate claims by individual
members of the class would create the risk of inconsistent adjudications with respect to individual members of the class. Id. Rule 23(b)(1) also allows class actions where adjudication
with respect to individual members of the class effectively would dispose of the interests of
other members not party to the adjudications or would impair substantially the absent class
members' ability to protect their interests. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). Courts also will allow
class actions when final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to
the entire class is appropriate because the action that the class seeks to enjoin affects the
entire class. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(2). Finally, a class action is permissible when the court
finds that questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over
any questions affecting only individual class members. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
The court also must determine that a class action is superior to other methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Id. In determining whether questions common to the class predominate and whether a class action is the best method of adjudication,
courts consider the interest of the members of the class in individually controlling their own
prosecution or defense in separate actions. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A). The court also should
consider the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy that already involves members of the class. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(B). Rule 23 also requires the court to
weigh the desirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in a particular forum.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(C). Finally, the court must consider the difficulties that the court will
encounter in the management of a class action. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
' See Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 596 F.2d 99, 102, 107 (4th Cir.) Hill 1) (Fourth Circuit
decertified class and vacated judgment), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 929 (1979).
672 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1982) Hill II), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3340 (U.S. Nov. 2,
1982) (No. 82-393).
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sidered whether a member of a decertified class could intervene after
0
judgment to cure a defect in certification."
The complex Hill litigation began on May 14, 1975, when eight present and former employees at the Western Electric (Western) facility in
Arlington, Virginia, brought a class action against Western.11 The plaintiffs alleged that Western's policies on hiring, job assignments, and promotion to salaried and supervisory positions discriminated against
blacks and women in violation of both Title VII and Section 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.12 On November 21, 1975, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia certified a class consisting of applicants
denied employment and employees claiming discrimination in promotions.13 On April 30, 1976, following a bench trial, the district court issued
a memorandum opinion upholding the plaintiffs' claims of discrimination
in hiring, job placement, and promotional practices.14 The court also
granted extensive relief.1 Western appealed to the Fourth Circuit.16
10Id. at 385.
11 Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 12 Fair Empl.
12 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1177;

Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1175, 1177 (E.D. Va. 1976).
see 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) (Civil Rights Act
of 1866). Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 states that every nonwhite person within
the jurisdiction of the United States enjoys the same right as white citizens to full and equal
benefit of the laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property. Id.
,1 Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 672 F.2d 381, 58 app. (4th Cir. 1982) (order certifying class).
The district court initially refused to certify the entire class on the grounds that the named
plaintiffs, as employees, lacked standing to assert the rights of applicants for employment
because none of the named plaintiffs were aggrieved applicants for employment. Id. at 53
app. On reconsideration of the ability of the named plaintiffs to represent aggrieved hirees,
the district court certified the entire class on the theory that Barnett v. W. T. Grant Co.
allowed across-the-board certification of a class action. 672 F.2d 381, 38 app. (letter from
Judge Bryan explaining inclusion of applicants for employment in the class action); see
Barnett v. W. T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 547 (4th Cir. 1975) (across-the-board attack on all
discriminatory practices permissible in class action). The district court then certified the
class consisting of all black and female individuals that had worked or were working at the
Western facility at Arlington, Virginia, since July 2, 1965.12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
1177. Additionally, the class, as certified, included all blacks and females who had applied
for employment at the Arlington facility since July 2, 1965. Id.
14 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1180-83. The Hill district court found that no
discrimination had occurred in promotions within the hourly positions since the company
based promotions solely on seniority. Id. at 1182. The district court judge deferred any decision regarding discrimination with respect to maternity benefits. Id. at 1183.
"s See 672 F.2d 381, 275 app. (district court decree for relief of aggrieved class). The
district court entered a decree appointing a special master pursuant to rule 53 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to handle the claims of identified members of the certified
class for back pay and future damages. 672 F.2d 381, 284 app.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 53 (district
court's appointment of master). The district court also ordered Western to establish priority
hiring and promotion of blacks and females to counteract past discriminatory practices and
to institute nondiscriminatory job-related employment and promotion guidelines to prevent
future discrimination. 672 F.2d 381, 288-93 app.
The district court also sought to prevent Western's noncompliance with the order
through corporate reorganization. 672 F.2d at 384. The court therefore noted that for the
purposes of the decree, the Arlington facility included any functional successor to that
plant. 672 F.2d 381, app. 276. (district court decree for relief of aggrieved class).
11596 F.2d at 99 (Hill 1).
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On appeal in Hill v. Western Electric Co. (Hill1,A7 the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding that Western had discriminated
against blacks and females. 8 The Hill I court, however, also considered
whether named plaintiffs who suffered discrimination in promotions
could represent the unnamed portion of the class alleging hiring
discrimination. 9 The Fourth Circuit considered the Supreme Court's
decision in East Texas Motor FreightSystem, Inc. v. Rodriguez" to be
controlling in deciding whether a named plaintiff who has not suffered
the exact same injury as other class members is a proper class representative.2' In Rodriguez plaintiff employees claimed that the defendant company's refusal to promote the plaintiffs was racially discriminatory in
violation of Title VII.22 The Supreme Court held that the named plaintiffs
were not qualified for the positions that they sought through promotion
and therefore were inadequate to serve as representatives of a class
comprised of employees denied promotion.23
17

Id.

"SId. at 107; see 12 Fair Emp. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1183 (district court finding of
discrimination against blacks and females in hiring and promotions).
," 596 F.2d at 101-02.
20

431 U.S. 375 (1977).

"

596 F.2d at 101; see East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395,

403 (1977) (plaintiff must suffer same injury as class that plaintiff purports to represent).
431 U.S. at 398-99.
Id. at 403-04. In considering the adequacy of the named representatives, the
Supreme Court in Rodriguez found that the representatives' failure to move for class certification before trial indicated that the representatives might fail adequately to protect the
interests of the class under rule 23(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 405;
see supra note 7 (rule 23). A large portion of the union that the Rodriguez plaintiffs claimed
to represent also rejected a plan for the merger of city-driver and line-driver collective
bargaining units that the plaintiff sought as a remedy. 431 U.S. at 405. The division in interests between members of the class and the named plaintiffs raised the issue of adequacy
of the plaintiffs' representation of the class since the plaintiffs had not suffered the same injury as the class and therefore failed to meet the commonality requirement of rule 23(a). Id.
at 403; see supra note 7 (rule 23 requirements for certification). The Court also found that
the defendant corporation had denied two of the applicants jobs as over-the-road drivers
because they had been involved in three driving accidents each, injuring five and seven individuals respectively. 431 U.S. at 403 n.9. In addition several customers warned the company that the customers would refuse any freight that the third plaintiff delivered. Id. The
Rodriguez Court held that the plaintiffs had not suffered discrimination and therefore were
ineligible to represent the class members who had suffered discriminatory injury. Id. at 404.
Because the named plaintiffs in Rodriguez were inadequate for many reasons, and
because the named plaintiffs suffered no discrimination, one commentator has suggested
that Rodriguez merely stands for the proposition that named representatives must have
suffered some discriminatory injury in common with class members. Comment, The Proper
Scope of Representation in Title VII Class Actions, A Comment on East Texas Motor
Freight Systems, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 175, 199 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as ProperScope]; see Fourth CircuitReview- Class Action Certificationin Title VII
Litigation,39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 652, 663 (1982) (Rodriguez "same injury, same interest"
language provides an analytical framework for determination of proper scope of class
representation) [hereinafter cited as Fourth Circuit Review]. See generally Slover, Appeal
of Class Certification Denia Reconciling United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty
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The Hill I court interpreted Rodriguez as requiring that class
representatives must possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members whom the plaintiffs purport to represent.24
Since the class in Hill I did not contain any named plaintiffs who
represented the victims of alleged discrimination in hiring, the Fourth
Circuit decertified the portion of the class comprised of frustrated job
applicants.' The Hill I court also vacated all findings of discrimination
regarding Western's hiring practices. 6 The Hill I court then remanded
the case to the district court with directions that the lower court
reframe a decree consistent with the Fourth Circuit's holding." The
plaintiffs then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme
Court denied on October 29, 1979.8 Upon the Supreme Court's refusal to
hear the appeal, three new plaintiffs representing the victims of
Western's hiring discrimination attempted to intervene. 9 Considering
the plaintiffs' motion to intervene, the district court reasoned that the
Fourth Circuit's remand did not preclude automatically the possibility of
intervention." The district court, however, exercised its discretion by
denying the motion to intervene.2 1 The plaintiffs again appealed to the
with East Texas Motor Freight Systems, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 1 REv. LITIGATION 231 (1981);
Note, How Far Across the Board. The Permissible Breadth of Title VII Class Actions, 24
AIz. L. REv. 61 (1982); Note, The Importance of Being Adequate: Due Process Requirements on Class Actions Under FederalRule 23, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1217 (1975).
24 596 F.2d at 101.
Id. at 102, 107; see supra text accompanying note 11 (class representatives in Hill
were employees rather than applicants for employment positions).
596 F.2d at 107.
SId.
See Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 444 U.S. 929 (1979) (Supreme Court denying appeal of
Hill I's decertification of class).
2 See 672 F.2d 381, 386 app. (motions for intervention or, alternatively, motion for
joinder of new plaintiffs). The plaintiffs filed motions to intervene or to amend the complaint
to add three new plaintiffs to the action. 672 F.2d at 385. The three plaintiffs who sought intervention were two black females, Darlene Johnson and Betty Bailey, and a black male,
Victor L. Furr. Id. at 385. Both Johnson and Furr claimed that in the autumn of 1979
Western had rejected on discriminatory grounds their applications for employment as installers. Id. Although both intervenors had applied for employment at Western's facility at
Landover, Maryland, both contended that the Landover facility was a successor to the Arlington plant. Id.; see supra note 15 (to avoid Western's noncompliance with order demanding
priority hiring and promotional practices, district court determined that for purposes of
decree, "Arlington facility" included any functional successor to Arlington plant). Bailey
alleged that Western had denied her employment as a result of discriminatory hiring practices. 672 F.2d at 385.
672 F.2d 381, 421 app. (transcript of Hill district court proceedings).
"1Id. (transcript of Hill district court proceedings). The district court noted that the
original plaintiffs had filed the complaint over four years earlier and expressed a desire to
speedily conclude the case; see FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (commending just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every trial). The Hill district court also reasoned that allowing intervention would require a hearing on the hiring claims that inevitably would delay relief on the
job assignment claims that the Fourth Circuit had affirmed in Hill L 672 F.2d 381, 422 app.
The district court concluded that the task of bifurcating the proceedings and conducting the
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Fourth Circuit, which in Hill H1 considered the propriety of the district
court's refusal to allow the intervention of the three new plaintiffs
representing the victims of employment discrimination.2
On May 28, 1980, the named plaintiffs and Western reached a settlement covering all claims mentioned in the complaint except the claims
that related to hiring discrimination.3 The agreement resolved all claims
relating to job assignments by providing back pay and other relief to
class members. 4 On September 19, 1980, after the litigants had submitted the settlement agreement to the district court, the district court
entered a final judgment approving the agreement.35
The Fourth Circuit in Hill II considered the sole issue on appeal to
be whether the district court's denial of the plaintiffs motion for permissive intervention under rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure constituted an abuse of discretion. In determining whether the
district court had abused its discretion, the Hill 11 court weighed various
factors regarding the propriety of intervention." The Fourth Circuit
held that the plaintiffs' motion to intervene must be timely. 8 In considering timeliness, the Hill 11 court noted that a court must consider not only
duration of litigation but also other circumstances as well. 9 The Fourth
Circuit determined that one fundamental consideration concerning the
timeliness of plaintiffs' proposed intervention was whether the motion
to intervene occurred immediately after the proposed intervenors realized that the named class representatives no longer could protect the un-

action simultaneously between the district court and the master reviewing the job assignment claims was not only impractical but also nearly impossible. Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(4) (subclassification in class action).
' 672 F.2d 381, 426 app. (notice of appeal). The plaintiffs and proposed intervenors appealed from the district court's order denying the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend and
the intervenors' motion to intervene as named plaintiffs. 672 F.2d 381, 426 app.
' See Brief for Appellants at 13-14, Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 672 F.2d 381 (4th Cir.
1982).
" 672 F.2d at 381. By providing back pay and other relief to class members, the settlement eliminated the need for further proceedings before the special master or the district
court. Id. The class representative sent notice of the proposed settlement to all class
members. Id.
Id. at 385.
Id.; see FED. R. CIv. P. 24(b). Rule 24(b) states that upon timely application the
district court may allow anyone to intervene provided that the intervenor's claim and the
main action involve common questions of law or fact. Id. Rule 24(b) also requires the court,
in exercising its discretion whether to allow intervention, to consider whether intervention
would cause undue delay in the adjudication or would prejudice the rights of the original
parties. Id.
672 F.2d at 386-87; see SpringConstr. Co. v. Harris, 614 F.2d 374, 377 (4th Cir. 1980)
(in determining timeliness of intervention mere passage of time is only one factor that court
must consider in light of all circumstances); infra note 43 (facts of Spring).
672 F.2d at 386.
Id.; see supra note 37 (passage of time is only one factor in determining whether motion to intervene is timely).
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named class members claiming hiring discrimination." The Fourth Circuit ruled that the named plaintiffs ceased representing the rejected job
applicants only when the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' motion
for certiorari on October 29, 1979.1 The Hill 11 court held that by filing
the motion to intervene on January 17, 1980, the proposed intervenors
sought intervention within the ninety-day period that the Title VII
statute of limitations establishes.2
1o672 F.2d at 386. The Hill II court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in United
Airlines,Inc. v. McDonald.Id.; see United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977). In
McDonald the Court allowed a putative member of a class to intervene after judgment for
the purpose of appealing the district court's refusal to certify the class. 432 U.S. at 394, 396.
The proposed class consisted of all United Airlines stewardesses discharged under a no
marriage rule that allegedly violated Title VII. Id. at 387. The Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court's holding that the postjudgment motion to intervene was untimely. Romasanta
v. United Airlines, Inc., 537 F.2d 915, 917-19 (7th Cir.), affd sub nom. United Airlines, Inc. v.
McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977), cert. denied sub nom. 442 U.S. 939 (1979). The Seventh Circuit also reversed the district court's order denying class certification. 537 F.2d at 919-20.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit, holding that the intervenor's motion was
timely because the intervenor moved to intervene as soon as the intervenor was aware that
named class representatives no longer would protect the interests of the unnamed class
members. 432 U.S. at 394. Critical to the Supreme Court's reasoning was the fact that in the
Seventh Circuit a denial of class certification is an interlocutory order that an appellate
court cannot review as of right until after final judgment. Id. at 389 n.4. The Court reasoned
that intervention at any point before judgment would have made the intervenor a
superfluous spectator because the intervenor could not have appealed denial of certification
until after final judgment. Id. at 394 n.15.; see Note, Class Actions in the Seventh Circuit.
Appealability of an Interlocutory Order Denying Class Status, 53 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 462,
473 (1976) (interlocutory appeal of denial of class certification preferable to Seventh Circuit
procedure which allows appeal of class certification denial only after judgment). See
generally Note, Federal Courts-Rules of Civil ProcedurePostjudgment Motion to Intervene to Appeal Denial of Class Certificationis Timely, United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,
435 U.S. 385 (1977), 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 189.
11672 F.2d at 386. In Hill 1I, Western argued that the putative intervenors should
have moved for intervention no later than April, 1979, when the court of appeals issued an
order decertifying the class on grounds of inadequacy of representation. Id. Since the proposed plaintiffs did not file a motion to intervene until months after that date, Western
argued that the district court had not abused its discretion in determining that the motion
was untimely. Id.
42Id. The Hill II court held that the named class representatives actively were pursuing the interests of the decertified portion of the class until the Supreme Court denied the
class' motion for certiorari on October 29, 1979. Id. See Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 444 U.S.
929 (1979) (Supreme Court denying appeal of Hill Ts decertification of class). By the time the
Supreme Court denied certiorari, two of the proposed intervenors, Johnson and Furr,
already had begun the administrative prerequisite to intervention by filing charges with the
EEOC. 672 F.2d at 386. Johnson filed on October 2, 1979, and Furr filed on October 17, 1979.
Id. at 385; see supra note 5 (procedure for bringing suit under Title VII). Bailey filed on
November 6, 1979, eight days after the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari. 672 F.2d at
386. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the proposed intervenors attempted to intervene as
soon as the intervenors realized that the class representatives no longer could protect the
intervenors' interests. Id. The Fourth Circuit concluded that by filing a motion on January
17, 1980, the putative intervenors sought intervention within the 90 day statute of limitations. Id.; see supra note 5 (procedure for bringing civil action under Title VII).
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The Fourth Circuit stated that the district court, in ruling on the
proposed intervention, must determine whether the delay in intervention was prejudicial to any of the parties.43 The Hill 11 court determined
that the filing of the initial complaint gave Western notice of the
possibility of liability to the entire class and that Western was not prejudiced by the claim itself.44 The Fourth Circuit therefore refused to
dismiss the motion as untimely on the basis of prejudice to Western. 5
In addition to the court's conclusion that intervention was not prejudicial to Western, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the proposed intervention would not prejudice the portion of the plaintiff class whose
claims the Hill I court had affirmed on appeal." The Hill I1 court agreed
with the district court that allowing intervention would compel the trial
court to conduct a hearing concerning the intervening plaintiffs' adequacy to represent the class and that the hearing would involve some
relitigation on the merits.4" The majority disagreed with the district
,1 672 F.2d at 386. The Hill II court relied on Spring Constr. Co. v. Harris,in which the
Fourth Circuit held that the most important consideration regarding timeliness of intervention is whether the delay in intervention has prejudiced the other parties. Id.; see Spring
Constr. Co. v. Harris, 614 F.2d 374, 377 (4th Cir. 1980). In Spring, the plaintiff construction
company won a judgment in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia against the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and a housing
development corporation (Owners). 614 F.2d at 376. Spring sought equitable relief arising
from a breach of contract between Spring as general contractor and the Owners for construction of two federally financed housing projects. Id. at 376. On remand the district court
allowed an insurance company to intervene in the action. Id. The insurance company had
issued mortgage title insurance policies on the projects to the construction lender, a mortgage corporation, and had to pay the claims of subcontractors. Id. Despite Spring's opposition, the Fourth Circuit allowed the intervention. Id. at 377. The Fourth Circuit determined
that the passage of time is only one of several factors the court must consider in determining the timeliness of intervention. Id. The Spring court held that since the insurance company's intervention did not prejudice the other parties to the action, the insurance
company's intervention was permissible. Id.
" 672 F.2d at 386. The Fourth Circuit relied on United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald. Id.;
see United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1977). In McDonald, the
Supreme Court held that the original complaint of the United Airlines stewardesses provided United Airlines with the information necessary to anticipate the size of the litigation. 432
U.S. at 392-93 (citing American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, at 555 (1974); see
Note, Resurrecting Claims Through PostjudgmentAppeal of Class CertificationDenial, 64
IOWA L. REV. 964, 971 (1979) (United Airlines reasonably should have expected postjudgment denial of certification and therefore intervention was not prejudicial); supra note 40
(facts of McDonald).
'" 672 F.2d at 386.
41 Id.
at 387; see supra text accompanying note 18 (Hill I finding in favor of Western
employees suffering from discrimination in promotions).
41 672 F.2d at 387; see Simmons v. Brown, 611 F.2d 65, 67 (4th
Cir. 1979). In Brown, the
Fourth Circuit ordered the district court to retain a class action on the docket, although the
named plaintiff's inadequate representation precluded certification of the class, to allow an
appropriate class representative the opportunity to come forward. 611 F.2d at 67. The
Fourth Circuit held that if a suitable plaintiff should appear, the district court must conduct
a hearing to determine whether the class action was maintainable and whether the new

19831

FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

court's determination that a hearing and relitigation would delay unnecessarily relief for the portion of the class that prevailed on the
merits."
Western argued that, even if the court considered the proposed intervention timely, postjudgment intervention was so unusual that a
court should grant intervention only in exceptional circumstances.49 The
Fourth Circuit, however, held that a court could justify a more stringent
standard for intervention following judgment only upon a showing of
heightened prejudice to the parties and an indication that intervention
would interfere substantially with the orderly process of the court." The
Hill H court held that without some indication that prejudicial effects

plaintiff was a proper representative of the class. Id.; see Goodman v. Schlesinger, 584 F.2d
1325, 1332 (4th Cir. 1978) (after Fourth Circuit determined named plaintiff of certified class
was inadequate representative, court remanded case to district court with instructions to
retain case on docket until appropriate named plaintiff appeared); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 471 F.2d 13, 16 (4th Cir. 1972) (same).
48 672 F.2d at 387. The Fourth Circuit in Hill 11 noted that the claims of victims of hiring discrimination focused on the issue of liability, while claims of individuals claiming
discrimination in job assignments focused only on the issue of damages. Id. The Hill H majority also noted that the relative simplicity of bifurcating the proceedings and of structuring the plaintiff class into subclasses minimized the risk of prejudice and made intervention
permissible. Id. The Fourth Circuit concluded that rule 23(c)(4)(B) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure allowed for bifurcation of the class with the court differentiating subclasses
on the basis of separate claims. Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Rule 23(c)(4) states that when
appropriate, a court may divide a class into subclasses with each subclass treated as a
separate class. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4); see Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass
Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 462 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (class action appropriate for each of three subclasses).
'9 672 F.2d at 387; see Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods, 572 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir.) (only exceptional cases permit intervention after entry of consent decree), cert. denied, Beaver v.
Alaniz, 439 U.S. 837 (1978); United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 534 F.2d 113,
116 (8th Cir.) (courts generally will grant postjudgment intervention only upon strong showing of both necessity and justification for failure to intervene sooner), cert. denied, National
Farmer's Org. Inc. v. United States, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); Sohappy v. Smith, 529 F.2d 570, 574
(9th Cir. 1976) (district court properly denied postjudgment motion of non-Indian commercial fisherman to intervene in suit of Indian treaty fishermen in absence of showing of any
extraordinary or unusual circumstances); United States v. Carroll County Bd. of Educ., 427
F.2d 141, 141 (5th Cir. 1970) (motion to intervene in school desegregation case, filed after
district court ordered judicially approved school desegregation plan into effect, was not
timely); see also 3B J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 24.13 at 24-154 (2d ed. 1982) (intervention after judgment unusual and infrequently granted); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1916, at 577-80 (1972) (courts are extremely reluctant
to allow postjudgment intervention after action has gone to judgment, and courts require
strong showing of need for intervention from applicant) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT &
MILLER].
0 672 F.2d at 387; see 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 49, § 1916 at 582 (mere fact
that court has entered judgment is not sufficient reason to deny application for intervention); Jones, Litigation Without Representation"The Need for Intervention to Affirm Affirmative Action, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 31, 80 (1979) (due to economic necessity, minority
groups frequently intervene only after final judgment and must rely on representation of
litigants until then) [hereinafter cited as Jones].
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would occur, a court should not deny an application for intervention
5
simply because a court already had rendered judgment in the case. 1
The Fourth Circuit noted that the possibility of the district court's
reinstatement of the original findings of discrimination in hiring was an
additional factor supporting intervention.," The Fourth Circuit reasoned
that before permitting intervention, and as a prerequisite to reinstatement of the original findings, the district court first must determine
whether the prospective intervenors would be suitable representatives
of the victims of hiring discrimination.5 The Fourth Circuit determined
that the district court's reinstatement of the original findings and conclusions would achieve the benefit of conserving judicial resources.' The
Hill 11 court further stated that reinstatement of the verdict would avoid
the danger of inconsistent sequential adjudications of the issues because
the intervenors, if unsuccessful, probably would pursue the class claim
in a new action."
Western argued that reinstatement following the Fourth Circuit's
vacation of judgment was impossible because the Fourth Circuit's action
rendered the vacated findings void. 6 The Hill 11 majority rejected
Western's argument, concluding that the cases Western cited as authori-

1' 672 F.2d at 387. The Fourth Circuit relied on the reasoning of McDonald v. E. J.
Lavino Co. Id.; see McDonald v. E. J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1970). Lavino involved an injured employee's action against a third-party tort-feasor. 430 F.2d at 1066. The
workmen's compensation carrier of the employer attempted to enter the action by filing a motion for intervention. Id. The trial court denied the motion because the compensation carrier
filed the motion one day after judgment.Id. On appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that intervention after judgment is permissible unless intervention would prejudice the rights of
the existing parties to the litigation or substantially interfere with the orderly process of
the court. Id. at 1072. The McDonald court also noted that courts did not intend the timely
application requirement of rule 24(b) to punish intervenors for failing to act promptly,
reasoning that the requirement was designed to insure that an intervenor's failure to intervene earlier would not prejudice the original parties. Id. at 1074; see FED. R. CIv. P. 24(a)
(necessity of timeliness of intervention); supra note 50 (court's entering of judgment is not
sufficient reason alone to deny application for intervention).
672 F.2d at 387.
Id.; see supra note 7 (rule 23's adequacy requirement).
672 F.2d at 387.
Id. The Fourth Circuit in Hill 11 was concerned that failure to allow intervention
would lead to a new action by the rejected intervenors. Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1}(A).
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) allows class certification when separate trials by individual members of the
class could establish incompatible standards for the party opposing the class. FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(1)(A); see supra note 7 (rule 23).
' 672 F.2d at 387-88; see, e.g., Simpson v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 850, 854
(7th Cir. 1974) (district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in declaratory action inadmissible in later case in which appellate court reversed judgment and dismissed case for
lack of jurisdiction), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 901 (1974); Troy State Univ. v. Dickey, 402 F.2d
515, 516 (5th Cir. 1963) (effect of vacating lower court's judgment is to void precedential effect). But cf. Dunlop v. Rhode Island, 398 F. Supp. 1269, 1273 (D.R.I. 1975) (although court
may not give collateral estoppel effect in subsequent case to vacated holding of earlier case,
court may adopt earlier case's findings of fact if no new evidence emerges).
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ty were inappropriate since the cases held only that vacated findings
have no power or authority in unrelated litigation." The majority considered the Fifth Circuit's decision in Finn v. American Fire and Casualty Co.58 controlling precedent." In Finn the jury returned a verdict in
favor of a policy holder against one of two defendant insurance companies."5 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the district
court judgment for lack of complete diversity between the parties."
Although the plaintiff in Finn later cured the jurisdictional defect by
dropping the claim against the in-state defendant, on remand the district
court nevertheless refused to reinstate the vacated judgment in favor of
the policy holder." The Finn district court reasoned that the initial judgment was void without proper jurisdiction. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
reversed. 4 Noting that jurisdiction, although defective, initially did exist, the Fifth Circuit held that once the plaintiff had cured the jurisdictional defect, reinstatement of the original judgment was within the
district court's discretion."5 The Hill II majority relied on Finn to hold
that the reinstatement of the holding and supporting conclusions was
permissible.6 The Fourth Circuit, however, cautioned that prior to
reinstatement the prevailing party must cure minor jurisdictional
defects on remand and that the defects must have had no influence over
the merits that the winning party wished to reinstate.
Beyond holding that the proposed intervention was timely and that
reinstatement of the judgment was possible, the Fourth Circuit also
developed guidelines for the district court to employ in determining the

672 F.2d at 387-88; see supra note 56 (cases holding effect of vacating lower court's
judgment is to void precedential effect).
207 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1953). In Finn a plaintiff brought an action in a state court
against two foreign insurance companies and one resident insurance agent, alleging that the
defendants had failed to pay compensation for property lost in fire. Id. at 114.
5 672 F.2d at 388.
207 F.2d at 114.
6' Id. In Finn, the resident insurance agent was the source of the defect in diversity
jurisdiction. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976) (for section 1332 jurisdiction to exist, case must
be between citizens of different states, and no defendant may be from same state as any
plaintiff).
' 207 F.2d at 115.
61 Id.; see supra note 61 (defect in diversity).
207 F.2d at 116.
Id. at 115. The Finn court determined from reading the testimony of the district
court trial that the presence of the in-state defendant in a federal case under diversity
jurisdiction did not prejudice the insurance company that lost on the merits. Id. The Fifth
Circuit therefore granted a new judgment on the old verdict. Id. The Fifth Circuit noted
that because the litigation had involved the same issues and the same claim for five years,
considerations of judicial economy demanded that the appellate court preserve the holding
of the first district court decision since the joinder of the resident defendant did not prejudice the defendant insurance company. Id.
' 672 F.2d at 388.
67 Id.
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propriety of intervention. 8 The Fourth Circuit first recommended
reinstatement of the judgment in favor of the applicants if the proposed
intervenors desired the district court to reinstate the findings of hiring
discrimination. 9 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that an independent choice
on the part of the intervenors would indicate that the class felt that the
named plaintiffs representation of the class in the prior litigation of the
hiring claim had been "fair" and "adequate" under Federal Rule of Civil
70
Procedure 23(a)(4).
In addition, the Fourth Circuit recommended that the district court
reconsider the Hill I court's original determination that the named plaintiffs inadequately represented the class. 71 The Fourth Circuit noted that
the Hill I court's determination focused on the formal lack of common interests between the named class representatives and the class of
frustrated applicants rather than on the actual effectiveness of representation."' The Hill 1I majority concluded that the named plaintiffs' actual
representation demonstrated diligence and effectiveness."' The Hill II
court also noted that since the district court determined in a normal
adversary context that Western had discriminated against job applicants, later reinstatement of the findings could not prejudice
Western. 74 The Hill 11 court remanded the case to the district court for
proceedings consistent with the Fourth Circuit's opinion .
In his dissent to Hill II, Judge Widener disagreed with the
majority's holding that the trial court erred in denying the appellants'
motion to intervene.78 Judge Widener argued that an appellate court
should disturb a trial court's rulings only if the trial court abused its
discretion.7 7 The dissent noted that a trial court's failure to consider
68

Id.

69

Id. at 391.
1d.
Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 19-28 (Hill I held named representatives in-

70
71

adequate because named plaintiffs did not suffer same injury as victims of hiring discrimination).
,, 672 F.2d at 391; see supra text accompanying notes 19-28 (Hill district court's rationale for dismissing judgment in favor of aggrieved applicants).
"' 672 F.2d at 391. The Fourth Circuit noted that the class representatives' early pursuit of certification of the victims of hiring discrimination as members of the class and the
plaintiffs' defense of the class on appeal indicated plaintiffs' effectiveness as adequate
representatives of the applicants. Id. at n.8. The Fourth Circuit further stated that the
district court's verdict in favor of the entire class also evidenced the quality of the representation. Id. at 391; see 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1183 (district court judgment on
behalf of entire class).
"' 672 F.2d at 391. The Hill 11 court noted that the Fourth Circuit could review for error any reinstated findings appearing in any appealable order. Id. The Fourth Circuit also
noted that if Western had relevant evidence of events occurring before the date of the finding, reinstatement would not preclude consideration of that evidence. Id. at 391-92.
75 Id. at 392.
76 Id. (Widener, J., dissenting).
7' Id.; see NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973). In NAACP v. New York, the
NAACP appealed a district court denial of postjudgment intervention in a suit that New
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whether intervention would delay or prejudice the rights of the original
parties constitutes the principal form of abuse of discretion. 8 Judge
Widener argued that the district judge had considered the issue of prejudice to the parties when he denied intervention.79
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the filing of the original complaint put Western on notice of the potential for
classwide liability and therefore intervention was not prejudicial to
Western." Judge Widener suggested that intervention could prejudice
Western since the Hill 1I majority opinion provided for the possibility of
reinstatement in the district court of adverse findings that the Hill I
court previously had vacated.8 The dissent also reasoned that the decertification of the class members who were victims of hiring discrimination
and the vacation of the district court's judgment demonstrated that the
York State, representing three New York counties, brought against the United States seeking exoneration from the Attorney General's finding that the counties had imposed a
literacy test on voters in violation of the Voter's Rights Act of 1965. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1973
(1976) (no political subdivision of state may impose a voting qualification to deny or abridge
the rights of individuals on account of race or color). The United States Justice Department
already had assented to a declaratory judgment in favor of New York at the time of the
NAACP's attempted intervention. 413 U.S. at 360. The NAACP Court applied a four part
test to determine whether intervention was timely. Id. at 364-69. First, the court considered
the length of time that the prospective intervenors knew or should have known that suit
was pending. Id. at 365. The Supreme Court also considered the promptness with which the
prospective intervenors acted once they became aware of the suit. Id. at 366. The Court
then considered whether any unusual circumstances existed warranting intervention. Id. at
368. Finally, the NAACP Court considered whether any unusual circumstances existed that
militates against intervention. Id. In affirming the district court's denial of intervention, the
NAACP Court noted that a district court determines the timeliness of proposed intervention in the exercise of its discretion. Id. at 366. The Court also noted that unless the district
court abuses its discretion, the appellate court will not review the district court's ruling. Id.
But see Jones, supra note 50, at 380-84 (NAACP Court should have allowed intervention
because intervention is only economical method for minorities to protect their rights).
78 672 F.2d at 392 (Widener, J., dissenting); see EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 515 F.2d
946, 949 (7th Cir. 1975) (appropriateness of court's denial of intervention depends on harm or
prejudice, including trial delay, to parties); McDonald v. E. J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065,
1073 (5th Cir. 1970) (most important consideration in determining timeliness of intervention
is whether intervention will harm or prejudice existing parties); Diaz v. Southern Drilling
Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1126 (5th Cir.) (prejudice to existing parties is main consideration in
determining timeliness of intervention), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970).
"' 672 F.2d at 392 (Widener, J., dissenting); see supra note 31 (district court's reasoning
for denial of motion for intervention).
672 F.2d at 393 (Widener, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes 43-45
(majority's analysis that intervention was not prejudicial to Western).
SI 672 F.2d at 393 (Widener, J., dissenting). The Hill II dissent also distinguished
United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, a case upon which the majority relied to demonstrate
the nonprejudicial nature of intervention. 672 F.2d at 393; see United Airlines, Inc. v.
McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1977) (postjudgment intervention to appeal denial of class
certification permissible); supra note 40 (majority relied on McDonald to permit intervention). The dissent noted that in McDonald the intervenors alleged the same type of
discriminatory injury as that of the original plaintiffs. 672 F.2d at 393; see McDonald, 432
U.S. at 388 (all members of class challenged no-marriage rule). The only difference between
the original plaintiffs and the intervenors in McDonald was that only the original plaintiffs
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Hill I court had determined that the original certification was prejudicial
to Western.82 Because the dissent believed the district court had
weighed the possibility of prejudice, Judge Widener concluded that the
trial court had not abused its discretion in denying intervention. 3
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's opinion that intervention could allow the district court to reinstate its prior findings.84 The
dissent reasoned that since the Hill I court determined that the certification of a class including victims of alleged hiring discrimination was
erroneous, any subsequent intervention also would be in error. 5 The dissent argued that the Hill 11 court should have disposed of the reinstatement issue by holding that vacated judgments are not res judicata and
therefore have no precedential value in subsequent litigation.8
The Hill 11 court's holding that the district court's denial of the appellant's motion for intervention was an abuse of discretion is inconsistent with the state of the law in circuits that have considered the
problem. Although postjudgment intervention is unusual, circuit courts
had filed letters of protest with the EEOC. 672 F.2d at 393 (Widener, J., dissenting); see
supra note 5 (requirements for filing suit under Title VII). In contrast to the McDonald class
in which all plaintiffs suffered the same injury, the Hill I court concluded that the Hill class
was overbroad and that the district court's adjudication of classwide liability was void as
without jurisdiction. 672 F.2d at 393 (Widener, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying
notes 19-28 Hill I court's explanation for decertifying portion of class).
672 F.2d at 393 (Widener, J., dissenting).
" Id.; see supra note 31 (district court's rationale for denying intervention).
672 F.2d at 395 (Widener, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes 48-64
(majority's determination of permissibility of reinstatement of judgment).
672 F.2d at 396 (Widener, J., dissenting). Judge Widener pointed out that under the
Supreme Court's decision in East Tex. MotorFreightSys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, courts will not
allow improperly certified classes in Title VII actions. 672 F.2d at 396-97; see East Tex.
Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977) (close attention to requirements of rule 23 indispensable in determining Title VII class action); supra note 23
(discussion of Rbdriguez). The dissent conceded that Rodriguez might permit the continued
vitality of a class after a trial court had certified the class and subsequently discovered that
the named plaintiffs were inadequate class representatives. 672 F.2d at 396; see supra note
47 (appellate court determined named plaintiff inadequate to represent class but remanded
with orders to keep case on docket until proper new plaintiff could intervene). The dissent
also noted that Rodriguez would allow certification following intervention only if the initial
certification were proper. Id. (Widener, J., dissenting); see 431 U.S. at 406 n.12 (certification
proper in situation in which district court certified class and later discovered named plaintiffs were not class members). The Hill II dissent concluded that Rodriguez precluded recertification and reinstatement in favor of the aggrieved applicants because the district court
erroneously certified the portion of the class made up of applicants. 672 F.2d at 395; see
supra text accompanying notes 19-28 Hill I court's determination to decertify victims of hiring discrimination).
88 672 F.2d at 401 (Widener, J., dissenting). Judge Widener contended that Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord overruldd the Hill II majority's holding that reinstatement of
the court's findings of facts was permissible. 672 F.2d at 397; see Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379 (1981). In Firestone the Supreme Court held that a court
has no discretion to consider the merits of a case over which the court lacks jurisdiction. Id.
But see supra text accompanying notes 53-71 (majority's analysis allowing reinstatement).
I See supra note 49 (courts hold intervention proper only under unusual circumstances).
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have been willing to grant postjudgment intervention in exceptional circumstances.' Absent exceptional circumstances, circuit courts have been
reluctant to overturn a district court's denial of postjudgment intervention as an abuse of discretion! 9
Despite the contrary rulings of other circuits Fourth Circuit precedent supports the Hill II decision.9" In Brink v. DaLesio,9" the Fourth Circuit permitted the postjudgment intervention of a putative class
representative after the district court had denied the intervention motion.92 In DaLesio, members of a Teamsters Union local brought suit
against the local's union officers for violations of the fiduciary duties as
trustees of employee benefit funds.93 The district court held that the
defendants had violated fiduciary standards that Congress imposed upon
union officers and fiduciaries94 of union trust funds.95 The district court,
See Howse v. S/V Canada Goose I, 641 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1981) (postjudgment intervention, though approved reluctantly, was not an abuse of district court's discretion);
Legal Aid Soc. of Alameda Cty. v. Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319, 1328 (9th Cir. 1979) (postjudgment intervention for purposes of appeal may be appropriate if intervenors act promptly
after judgment and meet traditional standing requirements), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921
(1980); see also Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978). In Coopers, the
Supreme Court refused to allow prejudgment appeal of class certification denial since under
McDonald an order denying class certification is subject to effective review only after final
judgment through a motion by the named plaintiff or by intervening class members. Id.; see
United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 394 (1977) (since plaintiff could appeal denial
of class certification only after judgment, postjudgment intervention was permissible);
supra note 40 (facts of McDonald).
I See supra note 47 (cases holding that district courts did not abuse discretion by denying postjudgment intervention).
I See Brink v. DaLesio, 667 F.2d 420, 429 (4th Cir. 1981) (Fourth Circuit held that
district court's denial of postjudgment intervention was abuse of discretion). The Fourth
Circuit only recently recognized the utility of postjudgment intervention. See Black v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 500 F.2d 407, 408 (4th Cir. 1974) (intervention is ancillary and subordinate to main cause and whenever action is terminated, action in which there can be intervention no longer exists) (citing Becton v. Greene County Bd. of Educ., 32 F.R.D. 220
(E.D.N.C. 1963)).
91 667 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 429.
' Brink v. DaLesio, 496 F. Supp. 1350, 1356 (D. Md. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 667 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1981). In DaLesio plaintiff teamsters alleged that DaLesio had
received excessive compensation and prerequisites from his position as trustee of the Local
311 Health and Welfare Fund, the Local 311 Pension Fund, the Affiliated Health and
Welfare Fund (Affiliated), and the Allied Pension Fund (Allied). Id. The plaintiffs also claimed
that DaLesio breached his fiduciary duties in negotiating a lease for the local. Id. The
Teamsters also charged DaLesio with receiving gratuities in the course of transactions with
individuals doing business with the Union. Id. A third charge involved allegedly
unreasonably high commissions to a second defendant, Bell, or to Bell's personally owned
company. Id.
I See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1976). Section 1002 states that a person is a fiduciary to
the extent that the person exercises any discretionary authority or control of management
of a fund or disposition of its assets. Id. Anyone who renders investment advice for a fee or
other compensation also qualifies as a fiduciary. Id. See gener.zlly Little & Thrailkill,
Fiduciaries Under ERISA: A Narrow Path to Tread, 30 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1977).
496 F. Supp. at 1368, 1370-71.
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however, held that the plaintiff union members lacked standing to
remedy fiduciary violations on behalf of the members of the two
employee benefit funds because neither was a participant, a beneficiary,
or a fiduciary of the funds." The district court refused to award the full
monetary relief that the plaintiffs sought." The district court also
refused to permit postjudgment intervention by employees representing
the benefit funds.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit in DaLesio held that one of the plaintiffs had standing to represent the interests of one of the employee
benefit funds becuase the plaintiff had been a participant in the fund at
the time of the proposed intervention.9 The DaLesio court also held that
the district court erred in refusing to allow representatives of the second fund to intervene. 10 The Fourth Circuit noted that in a class action,
class members have a right to rely on the representative members of the
class until the court rules otherwise.' Since the district court raised and
resolved the standing issue against the named plaintiffs only when
deciding the case on the merits, the Fourth Circuit held that proper
representatives of the funds could not have known of the necessity of intervention until the district court rendered its judgment.' Further, the
DaLesio court held that intervention would not prejudice the defendant
and would protect the intervenors from prejudice.' The Fourth Circuit
therefore concluded that despite the general policy among courts
discouraging postjudgment intervention, the district court abused its
discretion in denying intervention. 4
" Id. at 1374. The DaLesio district court held that under Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), standing to bring suit for breach of a trustee's duty to a
fund is limited to the Secretary of Labor, and the participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries
of the fund. Id. at 1373; see 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1976) (ERISA standing requirements).
496 F. Supp. at 1374.
Brink v. DaLesio, 88 F.R.D. 610 (D. Md. 1980). After the DaLesio district court determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing to represent Allied Fund and Affiliated Fund, both
Allied Fund and Affiliated Fund as well as Allen R. Holland in his capacity as trustee,
beneficiary, and participant in both funds moved to intervene in the DaLesio action. Id. at
611. In a second judgment the district court denied the trust fund applicants' postjudgment
motions as untimely. Id. at 612.
" 667 F.2d at 423; see Brink v. DaLesio, 496 F. Supp. 1350, 1374 (D. Md. 1980) (district
court determination that plaintiffs lacked standing to represent Allied and Affiliated
Funds).
667 F.2d at 423.
101 Id. at 428; see Brink v. DaLesio, 88 F.R.D. 610, 611 (D. Md. 1980) (district court's
denial of trust fund applicants' motions to intervene).
"' 667 F.2d at 428; see Brink v. DaLesio, 496 F. Supp. 1350, 1374 (D. Md. 1980) (district
court ruling that plaintiffs had no standing to represent class).
" 667 F.2d at 428-29. The Fourth Circuit determined that denial of intervention would
prejudice Allied Fund members because denial would force fund members to file a new
lawsuit and retry issues already thoroughly litigated. Id. at 429. The Fourth Circuit also
was concerned that Allied fund members might not be able to defend themselves against
pleas of limitation or laches if forced to file a new suit. Id.
104 Id. at 429; see 88 F.R.D. at 611-12 (district court's denial of trust fund applicant's motion to intervene).
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The Seventh Circuit made a similar determination in reversing a
district court's denial of postremand intervention. ' In F. W. Woolworth
Co. v. Miscellaneous Warehouseman's, 6 the plaintiff company's
discharge of three employees became an issue in arbitration between
plaintiff and the local of the Miscellaneous Warehouseman's Union,
which represented the three employees." 7 The arbitrator ordered the
rehiring of the employees, and Woolworth brought an action in federal
district court to vacate the arbitrator's decision.' °' The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Woolworth and denied as untimely attempted postjudgment intervention by the three employees." 9 The
Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the district court abused its
discretion by holding the proposed intervention untimely." ' The Seventh
Circuit reasoned that the employees had no reason to intervene until
summary judgment, when the Union decided not to appeal."' The
Seventh Circuit reasoned that since the Union was the employees'
representative, the employees did not have to intervene until the Union
indicated it no longer would pursue the employees' claims.'
Although the Hill II majority stated that the only issue on appeal
was whether the district court abused its discretion in denying postremand intervention, the court nonetheless considered whether a court
could reinstate a vacated order."' The Fourth Circuit's recommendation
that the district court reinstate the judgment is difficult to reconcile
with the Supreme Court's holding in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Risjord. The Supreme Court in Firestone held that any jurisdictional
defect, which would include inadequate representation, renders any
judgment of the court lacking jurisdiction a nullity."5 Postjudgment
cures to jurisdictional defects seem insufficient to justify the reinstatement of a judgment on the merits that under the Firestone rule was a
nullity from the start."'
The Hill II decision was a departure from the Fourth Circuit's deci1"5 See F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Miscellaneous Warehouseman's, 629 F.2d 1204, 1214
(7th Cir. 1980) (district court's denial of postjudgment intervention was abuse of discretion),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 937 (1981).

' Id. at 1204.
10

Id. at 1206. Woolworth discharged the employees for excessive absences. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

ICR
Il
110

at 1207.
at 1208.
at 1213-14.

Id. at 1213.
Id.; see Romasanta v. United Airlines, Inc., 537 F.2d 915, 918 (7th Cir. 1976) (application for intervention is timely if intervenor acts immediately after class representatives indicate they will not appeal order denying class status), aff'd sub nom. United Airlines v.
McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977); supra notes 40 & 44 (facts of McDonald).
"1 672 F.2d at 387; see supra text accompanying notes 52-67 (Hill II majority's determination that reinstatement of vacated judgment could be permissible).
12

1

449 U.S. 368 (1981).

1

Id. at 379; see supra note 86 (Hill I dissent's discussion of Firestone'soverruling of

Finn).
116

See 449 U.S. at 379.
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sion in Hill I in which the court relied on the language of East Texas
Motor FreightSystems, Inc. v. Rodriguez."' The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the reasoning and holding of Rodriguez in General
Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon."' In Falcon, General
Telephone Company (General) denied a promotion to Falcon, a MexicanAmerican."' Falcon brought a class action against the company in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas."'
Without conducting a hearing, the district court certified a class consisting of all General's Mexican-American employees, as well as all
Mexican-Americans who had applied at General or would have applied
had General not practiced discrimination in hiring."' The district court
held that General had discriminated against the named plaintiff in the
company's promotion practices but not in the company's hiring
practices."' Conversely, the district court held that General had
discriminated against the class in hiring practices but not in promotion
practices." Both parties appealed, and the Fifth Circuit held that the
class certification was proper under Fifth Circuit precedent, which permits victims of racial discrimination to maintain "across-the-board" attacks on employers' discriminatory practices."4
The Fifth Circuit upheld on the merits the district court's finding of
discrimination in General's promotion policies but dismissed the district
court's finding of discrimination in General's hiring practices." The
1'

See supra text accompanying notes 19-28 (Hill I court's rationale for decertification

of frustrated applicant class); supra note 23 (discussion of Rodriguez).
U.S. -,
102 S. Ct. 2364 (1982).
U.S. at -.
102 S. Ct. at 2367.
120 Id.
121 U.S. at
, 102 S. Ct. at 2367-68. The FalconCourt certified a class comprised
of all hourly Mexican-American employees who have worked or may work at the General
plant and all Mexican-Americans who had applied or would have applied for employment if
General had not practiced racial discrimination. Id.
'" Falcon v. General Tel. Co., 463 F. Supp. 315, 316 (N.D. Tex. 1978), modified, 626 F.2d
369 (5th Cir. 1980).
123 Id.
124626 F.2d 369, 376 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981). The Fifth Circuit rejected the respondent Mexican-American's contention that the class should have included
employees from all of General's operations in Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Arkansas.
Id. at 376. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court had not abused its discretion in
localizing the class to a specific plant since each of General's divisions conducted its own hiring and since management of the broader class action would be difficult. Id. The Fifth Circuit held that the class was not too broad since under a Fifth Circuit policy allowing named
plaintiffs to meet liberal standing requirements in Title VII class actions, an employee
complaining of one discriminatory employment practice may represent another party
allegedly harmed by a different practice providing both have suffered essentially the same
injury. Id. at 375. The Fifth Circuit held that the Falcon class met identity requirements
since all claims involved discrimination due to national origin. Id.
'" Id. at 380, 383. In affirming the district court's finding of promotional discrimination,
the Fifth Circuit in Falcon determined that the district court had not been clearly erroneous
in finding in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 379. The Fifth Circuit held the district court
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Supreme Court granted General's petition for certiorari to decide
whether the district court and the Fifth Circuit properly certified a class
comprised of both victims of promotional discrimination and victims of
hiring discrimination.126 The Falcon Court noted that although Title VII
allows the EEOC to sue in its own name for relief of victims of
discrimination, the class representative under Title VII must meet the
requirements of commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation
that rule 23(a) specifies." The Falcon Court noted that the requirements
of commonality and typicality tend to operate as guideposts that allow
courts to determine whether a class action is economical." The requirements also allow courts to determine whether the plaintiffs' claims
and the class' claims are so interrelated that the plaintiffs will adequately protect the interests of the class members."9 The Court also noted the
high potential for conflict between employees and aggrieved applicants,
who would compete with employees for fringe benefits or seniority if the
Court granted the frustrated applicants relief.30 The Supreme Court
concluded that the district court erred in failing to investigate the
named plaintiffs adequacy as a class representative prior to certification. 3' Since the Falcon Court found no evidence indicating common
questions of law and fact between the plaintiff and the class, the Court
decertified the class. 32
The Falcon holding does not represent a complete refutation of
across-the-board class actions since the Supreme Court acknowledged

legitimately had based its holding on an EEOC investigator's testimonial evidence that
General had failed to promote Falcon on account of his Mexican-American heritage, as well
as on Falcon's testimony. Id. Regarding hiring discrimination, the Fifth Circuit held that
once a plaintiff offers a prima facie case of discrimination by offering evidence that proves a
significant disparity between the composition of the employer's work force and the general
community, the employer must introduce evidence to rebut the presumption of discrimination. Id. at 380-81. Since the district court based its findings of discrimination on evidence
reflecting the relevant work force for only a two year period, the Fifth Circuit remanded
the hiring claim to the district court for an analysis based on a broader spectrum of time. Id.
at 382.
- U.S. at _
102 S. Ct. at 2366.
122Id.; see supra note 7 (rule 23).
-

U.S. at

-

, 102 S. Ct. at 2371 n.13.

129 Id.

" Id. The Supreme Court concluded that under rule 23, the same plaintiff could not
represent both a class of aggrieved applicants and employees suffering promotional
discrimination. Id.
"
- U.S. at
, 102 S. Ct. at 2372. The Supreme Court held that the district court
erred in presuming that respondent's claim was typical of other claims against General by
Mexican-American employees and applicants. Id. at 2371; see 463 F. Supp. at 316 (district
court's certification of class). The Falcon Court noted that if one allegation of specific
discriminatory treatment was sufficient to support an across-the-board attack, every Title
VH case potentially could result in a Title VII class action, resulting in a massive expansion
of class action litigation. 102 S. Ct. at 2371.
- U.S. at , 102 S. Ct. at 2373.
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that a court might allow certification of a class of both applicants and
employees upon a showing of significant proof that an employer
operated under a general policy of discrimination that was applicable to
both applicants and employees.'33 The Supreme Court's vacation of the
Fourth Circuit's judgment in Brown v. Eckerd Drugs13 4 nonetheless
reflects the narrowness of the Falcon exception allowing a plaintiff suffering one type of discriminatory injury to represent members of a class
suffering other types of discriminatory injuries.'35
In Eckerd Drugs, a group of female employees brought an action
against Eckerd Drugs, the defendant employer, charging discrimination
in hiring, firing, promotion, job assignment, and geographical assignment.'36 The United States District Court for the Western District of
North Carolina certified a class consisting of all employees working at
the defendant's main office, warehouse, and retail stores and claiming injury from Eckerd's allegedly discriminatory policies toward promotions
or transfers into management and supervisory jobs.137 Although the class
initially included rejected applicants for employment, the district court
excluded applicants from the class on the basis of the Hill I decision."
The district court found that the employer had discriminated against
two of the named plaintiffs and the class and granted broad relief.'39 The
Eckerd Drugs court granted back pay to the two successful plaintiffs
and enjoined the company from all promotion and practices found to
discriminate against minorities.' On appeal the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's judgment, noting that Hill I did not preclude an
employee claiming injury from some particular discriminatory practice of
the employer from representing other employees with factually different grievances.' The Supreme Court granted Eckerd's motion for
certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Fourth
Circuit for reevaluation in light of Falcon.
1- - U.S. at -. , 102 S. Ct. at 2371-72 n.15. The Supreme Court in Falconnoted that
if an employer operated under a general policy of discrimination, such as through an entirely
subjective decision making process, a court conceivably could justify a class of both applicants and employees. __
U.S. at
, 102 S. Ct. at 2371-72. The Falcon Court also noted
that Title VII prohibits discriminatory employment practices not an abstract policy of
discrimination. U.S. -,
102 S. Ct. at 2372 n.15; see supra note 2 (Title VII).
13' 663 F.2d 1268 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated, U.S. , 102 S. Ct. 2952 (1982).
'1 See infra text accompanying note 142 (Supreme Court's rationale for vacating
Eckerd Drugs); U.S. -,
102 S. Ct. 2952 (1982).
663 F.2d at 1269.
'n Id. at 1269-70.
'8 Id. at 1269; see supra text accompanying notes 19-27 (Hill I coirt's reasoning in
decertifying applicant portion of class).
11 663 F.2d at 1269-70.
o Id.

Id. at 1275. The Eckerd court noted that when claims arise out of the same legal or
remedial theory, the presence of factual variations normally is not sufficient to preclude
class action treatment. Id.
142
U.S. _
, 102 S. Ct. 2952 (1982) (Supreme Court's vacating of Eckerd
judgment).
"
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Since the Supreme Court's holding in Rodriguez, Fourth Circuit
employment discrimination cases have reflected a narrowing of the
scope of Title VII class actions."' In Stastny v. Southern Bell Telephone
& Telegraph Co., 144 the Fourth Circuit gave practical effect to the
Rodriguez "same interest, same injury" language and foreshadowed
Falcon by emphasizing rule 23(a) prerequisites of commonality of issues
and typicality of claims between the named plaintiff and the class that
the plaintiff purports to represent.' By regarding specific and uniform
discriminatory practices and uniformity of occupation as underlying
bases for determining whether commonality is present,'46 the Stastny
court narrowed the scope of employment discrimination class actions
from a tool to redress injuries sustained as a result of a generalized
policy of discrimination by an employer to a tool to redress injuries sustained due to specific discriminatory practices.'47 The Stastny court also
provided the Fourth Circuit with a method for determining whether a
class meets the rule 23 certification requirements, which the Supreme
Court in Rodriguez held indispensable in determining the permissibility
41 8
of class actions.'
'
See Abron v. Black & Decker, Inc., 654 F.2d 951, 954-55 (4th Cir. 1981) (class
representative must have suffered same injury and must share same interests as class
members); United Black Fire Fighters of Norfolk v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 846 (4th Cir. 1979)
(Fourth Circuit refused to certify class of black firefighters because plaintiffs failed to show
personal stake in remedying conduct under attack). See generally Fourth Circuit Review,
supra note 23 (discussion of Abron).
" 628 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1980).
' Id. at 273. The-Stastny court noted that under Rodriguez, the remedial purposes of
Title VII and the fitness of class actions in employment discrimination litigation do not
supercede the court's obligation under rule 23(a) and (b) to inquire into the specific fitness
for certification of each Title VII case in which the plaintiff seeks a class action. Id.; see East
Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977) (careful attention to requirements of rule 23 remains indispensable in Title VII actions); supra note 7 (rule 23);
supra note 23 (discussion of Rodriguez).
"1 628 F.2d at 277. The Stastny court noted that a court must consider other factors in
determining commonality. Id. The court required an inquiry into the degree of centralization of the employer's management organization. Id. The court also noted that courts should
consider the time span that the allegations cover as the time span relates to the degree of
probability that similar conditions prevailed throughout the period. Id.
" See id. (Stastny court's restrictive definition of rule 23 commonality requirement).
Compare General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, U.S. , 102 S. Ct. 2364, 2372 n.15 (1982)
(Supreme Court noted Title VII prohibits discriminatory practices, not abstract policy of
discrimination) with Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th
Cir. 1969) (claim attacking system-wide policy of racial discrimination is permissible) and
Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966) (threat of racially
discriminatory policy hangs over racial class and is a question of fact common to all
members of class).
"' See East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. Co. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977) (requirements of rule 23 indispensable in determining permissibility of Title VII class action);
Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d at 277 (analysis for finding rule 23 commonality in class actions); Fourth Circuit Review, supra note 23, at 663 (Stastny court
established sound analytical framework for determining proper scope of class representation).
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Although Hill II is consistent with the congressional intent of Title
VII litigation, which is to eradicate broad policies of discrimination by an
employer, 49 Hill 11 is difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court's
holding in Falcon that allows for class certification only if the members
have typical and common claims. 10 While the Hill 1I court's conclusion
that intervening named plaintiffs representing the victims of hiring
discrimination might meet rule 23(a) adequacy of representation considerations, the Hill I1 court disregarded the rule 23(a) prerequisite of
commonality which the Fourth Circuit in Stastny51 and the Supreme
Court in Rodriguez5 ' and Falcon"' have held are indispensable in determining the permissible scope of class actions.'54 Moreover, under the
Stastny court's restricted definition of rule 23(a) commonality, the
named plaintiffs in the initial Hill litigation did not possess the same interests or suffer the same injury as the class that the plaintiffs sought to
represent. 5 ' Since no common questions of law existed under the
restricted definition of commonality between the named plaintiffs who
were employees and the victims of hiring discrimination, the original
plaintiffs lacked standing to represent the class. "8 The original district
court judgment in favor of the aggrieved applicants therefore was a
nullity under Article III of the Constitution.157 Although later intervention by victims of hiring discrimination might cure the adequacy of
representation defect by providing appropriate named plaintiffs for that
149
ISo

See supra text accompanying note 3 (congressional intent underlying Title VII).
See General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, __
U.S. -_, 102 S. Ct. 2364, 2370 (1982) (individual

litigant seeking to maintain class action under Title VII must meet prerequisites of
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation, which rule 23(a)
specifies).
"' See 672 F.2d at 391 (Hill II court's determination that Hill plaintiffs were only
technically inadequate); supra note 145 (Stastny court holds Title VII class actions must
meet rule 23(a) prerequisites).
15" East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977); see supra
note 23 (RodriguezCourt holding that observation of rule 23 prerequisites is indispensable
in determining permissibility of class action).
153 See General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, U.S. -,
102 S. Ct. 2364, 2373 (1982) (court can
certify class in Title VII class action only if members meet rule 23 prerequisites).
" See supra notes 151-53 (Supreme Court holdings and Fourth Circuit holdings that
emphasize rule 23 commonality requirements); infra text accompanying note 161 (Falcon
holding restricts liberal case authority in which courts allow plaintiffs to represent class on
basis of common threat of discrimination).
"5 Hall v. Western Elec. Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1177 (district court certifies employee to represent class comprised of both employees and applicants); see supra
text accompanying notes 144-48 (Stastny analysis for determining commonality).
1
See 12 Fair EmpI. Pract. Cas. (BNA) at 1177 (Hill district court grants employees
standing to represent applicant class). But see Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208, 216 (1974) (to have standing to sue as class representative, plaintiff must
be part of class, possessing same interests and suffering same injury as all other members
of class).
"' See supra note 153 (to have standing to sue as member of class, plaintiff must
possess same interest and suffer same injury as all other members of class).
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portion of the class, the district court still would have difficulty certifying a class on the ground that the class failed to meet restrictive commonality requirements."
In Rodriguez and Falcon the Supreme Court has severly limited
across-the-board Title VII class actions because those actions have
resulted in multiplication of claims, endless litigation, and a drain on
resources of the judiciary and of the litigants.' By stressing the rule
23(a) prerequisites to class actions in employment discrimination cases,
the Supreme Court in Rodriguez and Falcon has attempted to promote
judicial economy by allowing only class actions involving common questions of law and fact. 6 ' The two Supreme Court rulings also effectively
restrict a line of liberal case authority in which courts have allowed
named plaintiffs to represent entire classes on the basis of a common
threat of discrimination.' Under the holding of Falcon, a class representative's complaint must specifically identify the questions of law and fact
common to the claims of the class representatives and the members of
the class that the plaintiffs seek to represent. 612 Unless the representative can designate a specific practice of discrimination common to all
members of the class, the representative has failed to meet the commonality requirements of rule 23(a), and the class action will fail.'
In Hill II, the Fourth Circuit reverted to a pre-Rodriguez perspective on the permissable scope of class actions by recommending to the
district court certification of a class comprised of victims of either hiring
" See supra text accompanying notes 144-48 (Stastny court restricts scope of class action in Fourth Circuit through narrowly determined commonality requirement).
"5'See General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, U.S. , 102 S. Ct. 2364, 2374 (1982) (Burger,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Title VII cases are typically a drain on
judicial resources and only promote endless litigation).
" See id. at 2373 (purpose of rule 23 is to promote judicial economy); supra note 7 (rule
23).
161See, e.g., Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1976) (white plaintiff
has standing under Title VII to sue employer who discriminates against minorities because
white plaintiff has right to work in environment free of racial prejudice), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 915 (1977); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (black
employee may challenge discriminatory hiring policies on grounds that policies violate Title
VII right to nondiscriminatory work environment); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d
333, 341 (10th Cir. 1975) (limitation on scope of class would render rule 23 void); Rogers v.
EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1971) (Hispanic employee has standing to challenge
employer's discriminatory service to Hispanic patients because discriminatory service
violates employee's right to discrimination-free work place), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972); Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 446-47 (3d Cir. 1971) (courts may not
frustrate public policy of Title VII and § 1981 by development of overly technical judicial
doctrines of standing); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1126 (5th
Cir. 1969) (overtechnical limitations on representative status will drain life out of Title VII);
Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966) (whether threat of
racially discriminatory policy hangs over racial class is a question of fact common to all class
members).
"2U.S. -,
102 S. Ct. 2364, 2371 (1982).
"

-

U.S. at

-

, 102 S. Ct. at 2371.
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or promotional discrimination."' The Fourth Circuit analysis focused on
the inequity of denying relief to a group of frustrated applicants that the
court perceived as proven victims of hiring discrimination.165 The Falcon
holding and the need for establishing precedent that would allow for
long term judicial economy should have compelled the Fourth Cicuit to
invalidate the Hill district court holding in favor of the victims of hiring
discrimination. 6 ' Although invalidation of the finding in favor of the job
applicants would force the applicants to pursue a second suit to gain
redress on the discrimination claim, the Hill II court would have
established precedent that effectively would introduce judicial economy
into class actions in the Fourth Circuit by demanding a stricter showing
of common questions of law and fact between the named plaintiffs and
the class which the plaintiffs seek to represent.'67 The Fourth Circuit's
permitting of postjudgment intervention of an adequate named plaintiff
fails to address the immediate issue of the proper scope of class
actions.'68 In light of the restrictions placed on Title VII class actions,
postjudgment intervention of an adequate plaintiff to remedy a defect in
representation appears inadequate as a means of achieving certification
of a class alleging across-the-board discrimination.'
ROBERT S. PARKER

B.

Virginia Nonsuit Venue Restriction

Nonsuit is a procedural device that terminates a judicial proceeding
without adjudicating issues on the merits.' In Virginia, the plaintiff may
'" See supra text accompanying note 24 (Hill II interpretation that Rodriguez does not
abolish across-the-board discrimination class actions but merely requires that at least one
named plaintiff adequately represent each portion of the class by suffering same injury as
that portion).
" See Hill v. Western Electric Co. (Hill I1), 672 F.2d 381, 391 (4th Cir. 1982). The Hill II
court considered that one reason to allow intervention of adequate representatives of applicants was that the entire class had been successful on merits in the district court. Id.
' See supra text accompanying notes 159-60 (Rodriguez and Falcon holdings promote
judicial economy by allowing only class actions involving common questions of law and fact);
supra text accompanying notes 56-67 (HillII majority found reinstatement of vacated finding
in favor of discriminated applicants permissible).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 159-60 (stricter commonality requirements will
solve class action problems of endless litigation and multiplication of claims); supra text accompanying note 55 (denied intervenors could pursue class claim in separate class action); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (initiation of a grievance by a class member suspends statute of limitations
under equal opportunity statutes).
'" See supra text accompanying notes 149-52 (Hill II court failed to address all rule 23
prerequisites to class action); supra note 7 (rule 23).
"69
See supra notes 149-52 (Hill II court failed to address all rule 23 requirements to
class actions).
, 78 P.2d 1010,
' McColgan v. Jones, Hubbard, & Donnell, Inc., 11 Cal.2d 243, __
1011 (1938). The term "nonsuit" applies to a dismissal of an action due to the plaintiffs
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take one nonsuit as a matter of right' before the fact-finder retires to

failure to move forward with his case. See BURKS, PLEADING & PRACTICE, § 336, at 64 (4th
ed. 1952). At common law, the plaintiff could take a nonsuit at any time before the verdict.
See Barret v. Virginia Ry. Co., 250 U.S. 473, 476 (1919). A plaintiff suffers a nonsuit when he
finds himself unprepared to maintain his cause. See Mallory v. Taylor, 90 Va. 348, 349, 18
S.E. 438, 439 (1893). This inability to maintain his cause results when court action or
witness' testimony surprises the plaintiff. See Cahoon v. McCulloch, 92 Va. 177, 180, 23 S.E.
225, 226 (1894).
A nonsuit is either voluntary or involuntary. See Washburn v. Allen, 77 Me. 344, 346
(1885). A nonsuit is voluntary when granted upon the plaintiffs own motion. Id. A nonsuit is
involuntary when demanded by order of the court. Id. A nonsuit, voluntary or involuntary,
is any judgment of dismissal when the court has left the merits of the case untouched.
Anderson v. Asphalt Distrib. Co., 55 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Mo. 1932).
The common-law nonsuit was similar to several other procedural orders by which the
plaintiffs action came to an end before judgment. See generally Head, The History and
Development of Nonsuit, 27 W. VA. L.Q. 20 (1920). A non prosequitur is a dismissal judgment that a court enters against a plaintiff because of his failure to continue with the suit.
See Steele v. Beaty, 215 N.C. 680, 683, 2 S.E.2d 854, 856 (1939). A non prosequituris like a
, 148
nonsuit in its practical effect. See Hewitt v. International Shoe Co., 110 Fla. 37, __
So. 533, 536 (1933). A nolle prosequi is an agreement not to proceed further in the action in
reference to a person or a cause of action. See Steele, 215 N.C. at 682, 2 S.E.2d at 856. The
voluntary nonsuit generally has superceded the nolle prosequi. Id. A retraxit,alternatively,
is an open and voluntary renunciation of a claim in court. See Virginia Concrete Co. v. Board
of Supervisors, 197 Va. 821, 826, 91 S.E.2d 415, 419 (1956). A retraxitoperates as a dismissal
of the cause with prejudice. See Savery v. Mosely, 182 Okla. 133, -,
76 P.2d 902, 904
(1938).
State legislators statutorily have recognized the nonsuit or similar dismissal procedures. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 52 (Smith-Hurd 1976); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. R. 3211.1
(McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1982); TEx. CIv. PRO. R. 164 (1981). Although states now have
codified common-law nonsuit, the application and effect of the different nonsuit procedures
vary. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 581 (1976 & Supp. 1981) (plaintiff may not take nonsuit once trail has commenced) and OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 683 (West 1978) (plaintiff may
not take nonsuit after submission of case to jury) with VA. CODE § 8.01-380(A) (1977) (plaintiff may not take nonsuit after court sustains motion to strike or before jury retires to
deliberate). See generally Sweeney, Nonsuit in Virginia, 52 VA. L. REv. 751 (1966); Note,
The Voluntary Nonsuit in Virginia, 7 WM. & MARY L. REV. 357 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Voluntary Nonsuit].
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also recognize a variation of the common-law nonsuit privilege. FED. R. CIV. P. 41. The term "dismissal" replaces nonsuit in the federal court
system. Id. Under rule 41, the plaintiff may move for a voluntary dismissal, which, if
granted, is generally without prejudice. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). The district judge has the
power to order an involuntary dismissal for want of prosecution by the plaintiff, or for the
failure of the plaintiff to comply with the rules of the court. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). An order of
involuntary dismissal normally precludes further adjudication. Id. An involuntary dismissal
is a drastic sanction that a court should exercise only in extreme situations. See Mann v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 488 F.2d 75, 76 (5th Cir. 1973); Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1959). See generally 5 J. MOORE, J.
LUCAS, & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
41.01-41.17 (2d. 1982) [hereinafter cited
as MOORE]; 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2361-2376
(1971) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]; Comment, The Demise (Hopefully) of an
Abuse: The Sanction of Dismissal, 7 CAL. W. L. REV. 438 (1971).
' See VA. CODE § 8.01-380(B) (1977). Under the Virginia nonsuit statute, the plaintiffs
right to nonsuit is absolute. See Joseph v. Blair, 488 F.2d 403, 404 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 955 (1974). Virginia, however, has retained the common-law rule that for-
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consider the verdict.' A Virginia nonsuit judgment does not preclude a
subsequent action for the same cause so long as the applicable statute of
limitation has not run.4 Virginia law recognizes that statutes of limitation are obstacles to the free exercise of the nonsuit privilege.' To
guarantee the availability of the nonsuit privilege in the face of applicable statutes of limitation, the Virginia legislature has enacted a tollbids a nonsuit if prejudicial to the defendant. Thomas Gemmell, Inc. v. Svea Fire & Life Ins.
Co., 166 Va. 95, 98, 184 S.E. 457, 458 (1936); Kemper v. Calhoun, 111 Va. 428, 431, 69 S.E. 358,
359 (1910). Further, a plaintiff cannot suffer a nonsuit after the court has granted a motion
to strike the evidence or after the jury retires to consider its verdict. VA. CODE § 8.01-380(A)
(1977). Similarly, a plaintiff may not nonsuit an action without the consent of any adverse
party who has filed a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence. VA. CODE § 8.01-380(C) (1977).
' The Virginia nonsuit statute provides in part:
A party shall not be allowed to suffer a nonsuit as to any cause of action or claim,
or any other party to the proceeding, unless he does so before a motion to strike
the evidence has been sustained or before the jury retires from the bar or before
the action has been submitted to the court for decision. After a nonsuit, no new
proceeding on the same cause of action or against the same party shall be had in
any court other than that in which the nonsuit was taken, unless that court is
without jurisdiction, or other good cause be shown for proceeding in another.
VA. CODE § 8.01-380(A) (1977). See generally Sweeney, supra note 1, at 751; Voluntary Nonsuit, supra note 1, at 357.
The nonsuit privilege lies exclusively in the plaintiffs control and is entirely voluntary. See BURKS, supra note 1, § 336, at 646. Virginia, therefore, has no compulsory nonsuit
for situations in which the plaintiff fails to present a prima facie case. Id. The voluntary
nature of the Virginia nonsuit procedure evolved from the common-law belief that although
a court could encourage a nonsuit, a court could not force a plaintiff to accept a nonsuit. See
Ross v. Gill, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 114, 116-17 (1792). See generally, Sweeney supra note 1, at
755-58.
, See Alderman v. Chrysler Corp., 480 F. Supp. 600, 603 (E.D. Va. 1979) (effect of nonsuit is to end pending litigation without prejudice to either party). In Alderman, the plaintiff brought an action in state court for the wrongful death of her husband resulting from a
car accident. Id. at 602. During the state trial, the plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit pursuant to the Virginia nonsuit procedure. Id. The plaintiff then brought suit in federal court
for the same cause of action. Id. at 603. The Alderman court concluded that a judgment of
nonsuit does not operate as a bar to subsequent action between the same parties on the
same cause of action. Id. (dicta); see also Popp v. Archbell, 203 F.2d 287, 289 (4th Cir. 1953)
(later suit in federal diversity action is not precluded by nonsuit judgment in state court);
Thomas Gemmell, Inc. v. Svea Fire & Life Ins. Co., 166 Va. 95, 97, 184 S.E. 457, 458 (1936)
(later suit in state court is not precluded by earlier nonsuit judgment in state court).
' See VA. CODE § 8.01-229(E(3) (1977). In order to defeat the potentially severe effect
statutes of limitation could have upon the nonsuit privilege, the Virginia statute tolls the
running of the statute of limitation if the plaintiff recommences his action within six
months. See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 56-58 (effect of unrestrained statute
of limitation on Virginia nonsuit procedure). The remedial character of the statute requires
a liberal construction to effectuate its purpose. See Woodson v. Commonwealth Util., Inc.,
209 Va. 72, 74-75, 161 S.E.2d 669, 670 (1968) (tolling provision operates to defeat statute of
limitation defense). The tolling provision protects the rights of action for plaintiffs who have
been unable to adjudicate on the merits. See Atkins v. Schmultz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527, 530
(4th Cir. 1970) (equitable considerations behind tolling provision permit litigation in face of
statute of limitation defense), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971).
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ing provision.' This statutory provision tolls the running of the statute of
limitation if a nonsuited plaintiff recommences his action within six
months of the original nonsuit' At the same time, the Virginia nonsuit
statute seeks to minimize the risks of abuse that accompany the nonsuit
procedure by restricting the venue of subsequent actions on the same
cause to the court that granted the nonsuit 8
Soon after the Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins,' federal courts sitting in diversity actions generally applied
state substantive law and federal procedural law."° Categorization of
state limitations statutes as either substantive or procedural, however,
has been a difficult task for federal courts." The Supreme Court
See VA. CODE § 8.01-229E)(3) (1977) (Virginia nonsuit tolling provision).
7 See id.
See id. § 8.01-380(A) (1977); see also supra note 3 (citing statute). The statutory
scheme is consistent with the common-law rule forbidding nonsuits that would be prejudicial to the rights of the defendant. See supra note 2 (common-law prohibition against
nonsuit orders prejudicial to defendants).
9 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Erie, the plaintiff, Tomkins, sustained injuries when struck by
an attachment of a train while he was walking alongside railroad tracks. Id. at 69. Tompkins
brought a negligence action against the railroad, basing jurisdiction upon diversity of
citizenship. Id. Tompkins prevailed in the district court and upon appeal. Id. at 70. The issue
before the Supreme Court was whether to apply state or federal law in determining the
railroad's liability. Id. at 71. State law would absolve the railroad, while federal law would
impose liability. Id. at 70. The Supreme Court held that state law determined the substantive question of the standard of care owed to Tompkins. Id. at 79-80. See generally Younger,
Observation: What Happened in Erie, 56 TEX. L. REv. 1011 (1978).
" See Mayer v. Puryear, 115 F.2d 675, 678 (4th Cir. 1940) (Erie required application of
Virginia automobile negligence standard in federal diversity action); Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y v. MacDonald, 96 F.2d 437, 438 (9th Cir. 1938) (federal district court applied
Washington substantive law in diversity action). But see infra notes 11, 12, 35, 37 & 38
(evolution of Erie doctrine away from substantive-procedural distinction); note 76 (application of automatic test does not determine application of state law in diversity cases).
In Erie, the Supreme Court concluded that the unwritten common law of a state controlled in diversity cases. Id. at 78. Federal district courts have diversity jurisdiction over
controversies between citizens of different states and between a state or its citizens and
foreign states or their citizens. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976). Prior to Erie, federal courts were
free to determine state diversity cases by using federal common law. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 166, 170-71 (1842). The Erie holding expressly overturned the rule enunciated in
Swift. 304 U.S. at 79-80. The Erie Court determined that the Swift Court incorrectly interpreted the Rules of Decision Act by unconstitutionally invading states' rights. Id. at 80.
The Rules of Decision Act requires federal courts to apply state law except when the Constitution or any act of Congress requires otherwise. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976). See generally
Clark, State Law in Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55
YALE L. J. 267 (1946); Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974);
Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-And of the New FederalCommon Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383
(1964).
" See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). In Guaranty Trust, the
Supreme Court first considered the Erie analysis in'reference to state statutes of limitation.
See id. The Court held that federal diversity courts must apply state law if the application
of federal law would lead to a substantially different result from the application of state law.
Id. at 109. This outcome-determinative test required the application of a state statute of
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therefore has instructed federal courts sitting in diversity actions to apply state statutes that are integral parts of the policies that state
statutes of limitation serve.2 In Yarber v. Allstate Insurance Co.,13 the
Fourth Circuit considered whether the Virginia venue restriction was
applicable in a federal diversity action. 4
In Yarber, Regina Yarber brought a state action in a Virginia court
against Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate).5 The action resulted
from a physical examination conducted by Robert Miller."8 Upon
discovering that Miller was not a licensed practitioner, the plaintiff
brought charges of assault, battery, and gross negligence resulting in
personal injury. The Virginia court granted the plaintiff's motion for a
nonsuit in the state action. 8 The plaintiff then filed a complaint in the
limitation in Guaranty Trust. Id. at 108-09. The Court noted that the characterization of
state statutes of limitation as substantive or procedural was immaterial. Id. at 109. The proper analysis turned upon the existence or nonexistence of decisional variation between a
federal and state approach. Id. See generally Note, Commencement Rules and Tolling
Statutes of Limitation in Federal Court, 66 CORNELL L. Rsv. 842 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Commencement Rules and Tolling Statutes].
Following Guaranty Trust, the Supreme Court considered the applicability of tolling
provisions to state limitation doctrine in federal diversity cases. See Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). In Ragan, the Court considered whether a
Kansas commencement provision was applicable in federal diversity action. Id. at 531-34.
Since the commencement provision would have worked with the statute of limitation to bar
an action in state court, the Supreme Court affirmed a circuit court order dismissing the
federal action as time-barred. Id. at 532-34. The Court concluded that a statute providing
that an action is commenced when summons is served on the defendant is an integral part of
the Kansas statute of limitation. Id.
Mild controversy existed concerning the continued validity of Ragan in the face of
subsequent Supreme Court decisions. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-78 (1965)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (Ragan is no longer good law); see also Sylvestri v. Warner &
Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598, 605 (2d Cir. 1968) (status of Ragan is far from certain). The
Supreme Court, however, recently reaffirmed Ragan. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446
U.S. 740, 748-53 (1980). In Walker, the Court upheld an Oklahoma statute similar to the Kansas statute in Ragan, and concluded that Walker and Ragan were indistinguishable. Id. at
748, 753.
12 See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 748, 751-52 (Oklahoma commencement
statute deemed to be integral part of policies served by state statute of limitations by circuit court and then applied by Supreme Court). Since the federal courts are more familiar
with state law than the Supreme Court, the Walker Court implied that a federal court's conclusion that a state statute is an integral part of the policies served by the statute of limitation creates a presumption for that statute's application. See id. at 748.
13 674 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1982).
" Id. at 234-37.
" Id. at 233. Yarber was among four plaintiffs who sought damages from Allstate in
the state action. Id.
16Id. Miller was a named defendant along with Allstate Insurance Company and
Physical Measurements, Inc. Id. The physical examination was a prerequisite to employment with the firm, and the examinati6n was part of the employment application process.
Id.

I17Id.

18Id.
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.'9
Allstate moved to dismiss the federal court action on two grounds. 0
First, Allstate contended that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the case.2 Allstate claimed that the venue restriction operated to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction of any nonsuited claim.22 Second, Allstate argued that the applicable statute of
limitation on Yarber's claim had run, precluding adjudication in federal
court.' Yarber responded that the Virginia tolling provision, in conjunction with the six-month grace period provided by Virginia statute, allowed
the federal action.24 The six-month extension operates only if the statute
of limitation has run in the interim.' According to Yarber, the commencement of the state action tolled the running of the state statute of
limitation.26 Yarber argued that because she filed the action in federal
court within six months of the nonsuit, Allstate's statute of limitation
argument was invalid.' Allstate, however, argued that the operation of
the six-month extension was available only in the court in which the
state judge granted the nonsuit.' Without the benefit of the six-month
grace period, the running of the statute of limitation prohibited the
federal action.29 The federal district court rejected Allstate's jurisdictional and statute of limitation defenses.2 Allstate appealed the interlocutory order denying its motion to dismiss the action to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals.'
In Yarber, the Fourth Circuit discussed several decisions by the
19 Id. at 233-34. The plaintiff based jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. Id.; see
supra note 10 (discussion grant of federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship).
1 674 F.2d at 234.
21 Id.
Id. at 234 n.3.
Id. at 234. The Virginia statute of limitation requires the commencement of an action
for personal injury within two years after the cause of action accrues. VA. CODE §
8.01-243(A) (1977).
2 674 F.2d at 234; see also supra notes 5 & 6 (citing and discussing tolling provision
and six-month extension).
2 VA. CODE § 8.01-229E3) (1977); see also supra note 6 (citing statute that grants extension).
674 F.2d at 234.

27 Id.

Id.; see also supra note 3 (venue restriction).
674 F.2d at 234.
Id. at 234 n.3. The district court rejected the jurisdictional argument because state
venue restrictions cannot deprive a federal court of its diversity jurisdiction. Id.; see Popp
v. Archbell, 203 F.2d 287, 288 (4th Cir. 1953) (venue restriction cannot defeat federal
jurisdiction). The district court denied the statute of limitation defense, noting that the sixmonth grace period provided by Virginia statute had not expired when the plaintiff filed the
federal action. 674 F.2d at 234. According to the district court, the venue restriction did not
operate in the diversity action. Id.
" 674 F.2d at 234. An interlocutory order determines an immediate issue arising during the course of a pending litigation that does not dispose of the case, but requires further
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United States Supreme Court considering the applicability of state
statutes in federal diversity actions.2 Relying on these Supreme Court
decisions, the Yarber court developed a three-step analysis for determining whether the state nonsuit limitations apply in federal diversity actions.3 First, the Yarber court noted that under the Supreme Court's
decision in Hanna v. Plumer 4 state law canno't prevail if the state law
conflicts with a federal rule of civil procedure. 5 The Hanna displacement
court action resolving the entire controversy. See Witt v. Witt, 204 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947).
The Interlocutory Appeals Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1976), permitted the defendant's appeal. 674 F.2d at 234. The Interlocutory Appeals Act grants discretion to the courts of appeal to review an interlocutory order if the federal district court notes that the order involves a controlled question of law that presents substantial ground for differing opinions.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). An immediate appeal from the order may promote judicial
economy by advancing the termination of the proceeding. See id.
674 F.2d at 234-37; (citing Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980); Hanna
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. 356 U.S. 525 (1958);
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)). The Fourth Circuit summarily dismissed
the defendant's jurisdictional objection. 674 F.2d at 234 n.3. The Yarber court decided that
the district court correctly rejected the defendant's jurisdictional challenge. Id. The court
concluded that the Fourth Circuit's decision in Popp v. Archbell, 203 F.2d 287 (4th Cir.
1953), effectively dismissed the defendant's jurisdictional objection. 674 F.2d at 234 n.3; see
203 F.2d at 288 (venue restriction could not defeat federal diversity jurisdiction); see also
supratext accompanying notes 21 & 22 (describing Allstate's contention that venue restriction
prevented Fourth Circuit from asserting jurisdiction); infra notes 118-23 and accompanying
text (extended discussion of Popp).
1 674 F.2d at 235. The test that the Yarber court announced is actually a two-part inquiry. Id. Part one presents two questions. Id. The first question is whether a federal procedural rule requires pre-emption of the state statute. Id. The second question is whether a
countervailing federal interest necessitates the displacement of the state statute. Id. The
second part of the Yarber analysis considers the relationship between the state statute and
the policies that the state statute of limitation serves. Id. The Yarber court, however,
presented the analysis in three parts. Id.
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
674 F.2d at 235. In Hanna v. Plumer, the plaintiff brought a diversity action for injuries received in an automobile accident. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 461 (1965). The
plaintiff served process by leaving the complaint and summons with the defendant's spouse
at the defendant's home. Id. The service was effected pursuant to federal procedure. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1). The relevant state procedure require in-hand service of process. 380
U.S. at 462. The issue in Hanna was the validity of rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Id. at 461; see FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1) (service of process permitted by leaving
copy of summons and complaint at party's dwelling with person of suitable age and discretion).
The Hannacourt distinguished between federal judge-made rules and federal statutory
rules. Id. at 470. In determining the validity of federal judge-made rules, courts should consider Erie's twin aims of avoidance of forum shopping and inequitable administration of the
laws in light of Guaranty Trust's outcome-determinative test. Id. at 468 (modified outcomedeterminative test); see supre notes 9-11 (discussing development of Erie doctrine including
Guaranty Trust's outcome-determinative test). The Supreme Court, however, determined
that the Constitution and the Rules Enabling Act controlled the applicability of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in federal diversity cases. 380 U.S. at 470-71.
The Rules Enabling Act (the Act) empowers the Supreme Court to prescribe general
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principle will operate only when a state statute directly conflicts with a
federal rule." Second, state law cannot control if the statute conflicts
with a powerful countervailing federal interest." Third, once the nonsuit
procedure satisfies the first two conditions, the nonsuit procedure
should apply if the statute has an integral relationship to the policies
that the Virginia statute of limitation serves."
rules for the practice and procedure of federal courts in civil actions. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
The Act authorizes the Rules Advisory Committee to promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Edmunds, The New FederalRules of Civil Procedure,4 J. MAR. L. Q. 291,
292 (1939). If a rule regulates procedure, then the rule falls within the scope of the Rules
Enabling Act. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (procedure is judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law). The Hanna Court
concluded that rule 4(d)(1) did fall within the scope of the Act. 380 U.S. at 463-64. The Court
further determined that the federal rule did not transgress federal constitutional bounds.
Id. When a valid federal rule of procedure directly conflicts with a state statute, the federal
procedural rule therefore will prevail. Id. at 460, 474. See generally McCoid, Hanna v.
Plumer: The Erie Doctrine ChangesShape, 51 VA. L. REV. 884 (1965); Stason, Choice of Law
Within the FederalSystem: Erie v. Hanna, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 377 (1967).
1 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 470, 474. The displacement principle refers to the preemptory power the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enjoy when a rule conflicts directly
with a state statute. Id. at 473-74; see supra note 35 (basis for Hanna displacement
principle).
' 674 F.2d at 235. In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958),
the Supreme Court adopted a balancing test to decide between conflicting state and federal
interests in the absence of an applicable procedural rule. Id. at 538. In Byrd, a South
Carolina state rule required that the judge determine a significant factual issue concerning
the defendant's negligence in a workmen's compensation action. Id. at 534. The Supreme
court held that such a determination necessarily fell within the confines of the jury's factfinding function in federal diversity cases. Id. at 538. The Court determined that the state
rule could not disrupt "the essential character or function of a federal court of the federal
court system." Id. at 539. The Court further concluded that strong federal policy considerations argue against allowing state rules to alter the relationship between the judge and jury
in the federal courts. Id. at 538.
1 674 F.2d at 235; see Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530,
534 (1949). In Ragan, the Court suggested that for the purposes of initiating the running of
the statute of limitation, state commencement rules and not rule 3 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, control in federal actions based on diversity of citizenship. Id. at 533; see
FED. R. Civ. P. 3 (manner of commencing and filing federal action). In Ragan, the plaintiff
brought his action within the Kansas two-year statute of limitation. 337 U.S. at 531. The
defendant contended that the statute of limitation precluded the diversity action. Id. Under
the Kansas statute, an action commenced for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitation
when the defendant was served. Id. The plaintiff failed to serve the defendant until after
the statute of limitation had run. Id. Since the statute was an integral part of the policies
that the state statute of limitation served, the Court applied the Kansas statute, consequently precluding plaintiff's cause of action. Id. at 534.
After Ragan, courts followed one of two courses. First, courts uniformly applied state
commencement procedure. See, e.g., Murphy v. Citizens Bank, 244 F.2d 511, 512 (10th Cir.
1957) (application of New Mexico statute recognizing need for good faith in filing of action
and due diligence in issuance of process in order to toll statute of limitation); Hagy v. Allen,
153 F. Supp. 302, 305 (E.D. Ky. 1957) (application of Kentucky statute recognizing need for
good faith in issuance of process). Second, courts distinguished Ragan by finding that the
procedure was not an integral part of state limitation policy. See, e.g., Wright v.
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In applying this three-part test to the facts in Yarber, the Fourth
Circuit first considered whether the Hanna displacement principle applied.39 The Yarber court observed that the Virginia venue restriction
and tolling provision do not conflict directly with any federal procedural
rule." In a recent decision, Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,4 the Supreme
Court held that commencing a federal action alone does not displace
state statutes of limitation or tolling provisions."2 Relying on Walker and
the absence of any conflicting rules of procedure, the Yarber court held
that the Hanna displacement principle did not apply to displace the
Virginia venue restriction or tolling provision.43
Having established that the state law did not conflict with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Yarber court next considered
whether a powerful countervailing federal interest existed. 4' The Fourth
Circuit noted that a pressing countervailing concern could require the
pre-emption of a state statutory provision even though the state law did
not conflict directly with a federal procedural rule.45 These federal concerns evolved in part from Erie's twin aims of avoidance of forum shopping and inequitable administration of the law. 46 After the identification
of such a federal interest, federal courts must weigh competing federal
Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 242 F.2d 1, 2-3 (5th Cir.) (Louisiana statute declaring suit abandoned if no steps are taken to prosecute within five years is not integral part of policy served
by statute of limitation), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 939 (1957); Glebus v. Filmore, 104 F. Supp.
902, 903 (D. Conn. 1952) (rule 3 applies for tolling of statute of limitation when no statute
specifies point at which action commences); see Commencement Rules and Tolling Statutes,
supra note 11, at 844; see also Walker.v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 748-53 (1980) (reaffirming Ragan); Alonzo v. ACF Property Management, Inc., 643 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1981)
(federal rule 6(a) deemed inapplicable under Ragan rule); supra note 11 (further discussion of
Ragan).
9 674 F.2d at 235; see supra note 36 (defining Hanna displacement principle).
40 674 F.2d at 235.
4 446 U.S. 740 (1980). In Walker, the Court addressed the claim that rule 3 is a
generally pre-emptive federal tolling statute. Id. at 741; see FED. R. Civ. P. 3. See generally
2 MOORE, supra note 1, at
3.01-3.07; 1 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, at §§ 41-50.
4" 446 U.S. at 750-51. The Walker Court conditioned the application of the Hanna
analysis on a direct collision between the federal rule and state law. Id. at 749. In Hanna,the
collision between rule 4(d)(1) and the state service requirement was unavoidable. Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. at 470; see supra notes 35 & 36 (discussing Hanna). In Walker, however,
rule 3 did not collide directly with the Oklahoma commencement statute. 446 U.S. at 752;
see FED. R. Civ. P. 3. In determining that rule 3 was insufficiently broad to amount to a
federal tolling provision, the Walker Court also found the Hanna displacement principle inapplicable. 446 U.S. at 749-50.
" 674 F.2d at 235-36.
" Id. at 235.
" Id. at 235-36; see supra note 37 (Byrd balancing test determines applicability of state
statutes when no federal procedural rule directly conflicts).
"s See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-78 (1938). The Erie goals of avoidance
of forum shopping and inequitable administration of the laws are based on the theory that
the application of federal common law would infringe upon state sovereignty, and the application of state procedural law would discourage uniformity in the federal judicial system.
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and state policies to determine which will prevail.47 The Fourth Circuit
determined that state forum shopping concerns were not a factor in
Yarber. 8 The court reasoned that forum shopping based solely upon the
Virginia venue restriction was unlikely.49 The Yarber court concluded
that no other countervailing federal interest required the pre-emption of
the Virginia venue restriction."
After concluding that neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
nor pressing federal interests precluded the court from applying the
Virginia nonsuit statute, the Yarber court examined the policies
underlying Virginia's voluntary nonsuit procedure to determine whether
the nonsuit provisions are integral parts of the policies that the Virginia
statute of limitation serves." The court noted that the Virginia nonsuit
procedure protects the interests of the parties in litigation for several
reasons.2 First, the nonsuit procedure protects the plaintiff from many
of the mischances of litigation." Second, the nonsuit procedure protects
the defendant from any undue prejudice that may result from an unreId. The Supreme Court has determined that the preservation of the relationship between
judge and jury is a significant federal concern that pre-empts state statutes that operate
against the federal concern. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538
(1958); see supra note 37 (discussion of Byrd). The Fourth Circuit has noted that the federal
courts place great emphasis on the functioning of the federal system as a whole. Atkins v.
Schmultz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527, 533 (4th Cir. 1970), cerL denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1972). In Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965), the Fourth Circuit concluded that
countervailing federal considerations are explicit and numerous. Id. at 65. Included among
these interests is a nonresident's right to adjudicate any cause in a convenient forum, free
from any local bias. Id.
" Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958); see supranote 46
(court-mandated federal concerns).
"8674 F.2d at 236. Forum shopping occurs when a party seeks a forum that is
charitable to his cause of action or unfavorable to the adverse party's position. Rayco Mfg.
v. Chicopee Mfg., 148 F. Supp. 588, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). The Yarber court noted that federal
forum shopping concerns militate against the displacement of the Virginia statutes in question. 674 F.2d at 236. The court observed that the failure to apply the venue restriction in
the federal courts would make the existence of different rules in the state and federal
jurisdictions a forum shopping factor. Id. at 236 n.7. This disparity would arise only after
the plaintiff had suffered a nonsuit in the original state action. Id. The application of the
Virginia venue restriction therefore would avoid what the Yarber court called secondary
forum shopping. Id. at 237.
'" 674 F.2d at 236 n.7. Forum shopping based upon the venue restriction after a nonsuit
is unlikely because, before a party suffers a nonsuit, the venue restriction is too tenuous a
factor to affect forum choice. Id.
Id. at 236.
S, Id. at 235-36; see supra notes 11 & 38 (significance of Ragan and Walker when determining applicability of state statutes of limitation).
' 674 F.2d at 236; see supra note 1 (Virginia nonsuit procedure protects plaintiff from
mischances of litigation); note 2 (plaintiff may not take nonsuit if prejudicial to rights of
defendant); notes 3 & 6 (statutes outlining Virginia nonsuit procedure).
1 674 F.2d at 236; see supra note 1 (mischance can occur when plaintiff is surprised by
court action or witness' testimony).
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stricted nonsuit privilege. 4 Finally, Virginia nonsuit procedure promotes
judicial efficiency.'The Yarber court noted that an unrestrained statute of limitation
would frustrate the free exercise of the nonsuit privilege. Generally,
the statute of limitation has run by the time the need for a voluntary
nonsuit arises. 7 Without some statutory scheme to offset a situation
when statutes of limitation defeat the nonsuit privilege, the nonsuit procedure becomes a practical nullity. The tolling and savings provisions are
Virginia's response to the barrier that an unrestrained statute of limitation presents. 9 Speaking specifically to the venue restriction, the Yarber
court reasoned that the restriction served to minimize the risk of abuse
inherent in the tolling and savings provisions." In Yarber, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the tolling and savings provisions and the venue
restriction are integral parts of the policy that the statute of limitation
serves, and therefore are binding on a federal court in a diversity case.6
A failure to apply the venue restriction would circumvent the aims
outlined in Erie.6 ' The Fourth Circuit, therefore, held that the state
statute of limitation applied and that nonsuiting plaintiffs in Virginia
could avoid the running of the statute of limitation only by recommencing their actions in the same court and within the six-month grace
period.' Applying these restrictions to the case before it, the Yarber
court reversed the district court and remanded the case for dismissal on
the grounds that Yarber's claims were time-barred.'
' 674 F.2d at 236; see supra note 2 (plaintiffs right to nonsuit is absolute as long as
nonsuit is not prejudicial to defendant).
674 F.2d at 236. The Virginia venue restriction limiting subsequent action on a
previously nonsuited cause of action avoids secondary forum shopping. Id. at 236 n.7; see
supra notes 48 & 49 (manner in which venue restriction minimizes secondary forum shopping). Since the venue restriction discourages forum shopping, the forum court may adjudicate efficiently a case with which the court is familiar. 674 F.2d at 236 n.7.
' 674 F.2d at 236.
57 Id.
Id. at 236-37.
5 Id.; see supra note 5 (remedial function of nonsuit tolling provision and six-month
grace period).
' 674 F.2d at 237; see VA. CODE § 8.01-380(A) (1977) (nonsuit venue restriction). The
Yarber court concluded that the venue restriction minimizes the benefits of bringing a second action for the same cause. 674 F.2d at 237. The operation of the restriction prevents undue prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 236; see supra note 2 (nonsuit is prohibited if prejudicial to the defendant). The operation of the venue restriction prevents secondary forum
shopping and consequently promotes judicial efficiency. 674 F.2d at 237.
674 F.2d at 237.
62 Id. The Yarber court determined that the Virginia venue restriction is a statement
of substantive law by the Virginia legislature. Id. In Erie, the Supreme Court required that
federal courts apply state substantive law. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80
(1938); see supra notes 9-11, 38 (application of Erie doctrine to state statutes of limitation).
674 F.2d at 237.
4Id.
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Relying on Popp v. Archbell,6" the dissent claimed that the Virginia
venue restriction could not limit federal diversity jurisdiction." In Popp,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that the intent of the Virginia nonsuit
statute was to regulate practice and procedure in the court's of the
state." The Virginia legislature, however, did not intend the statute to
defeat federal jurisdiction. The Yarber dissent found the majority's
distinction of Popp unpersuasive. 9 The Yarber dissent contended that
the expeditious labelling of an issue as substantive rather than jurisdictional could not overcome the supremacy of federal legislation over a
contrary state enactment."° The dissent concluded that the operation of
the venue restriction has the practical effect of defeating federal
jurisdiction, a result that Popp forbids."'
In Yarber, the Fourth Circuit presented an Erie analysis that was
consistent with the dictates of Erie and other Supreme Court cases." An
Erie analysis, however, is not appropriate to determine the breadth of
203 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1953); see infra note 118. (background of Popp).
674 F.2d at 238-39 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The Virginia nonsuit venue restriction cannot operate to divest a federal court of its jurisdiction. Popp v. Archbell, 203 F.2d at
290; see Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711, 716 (4th Cir. 1961) (state law cannot restrict or enlarge federal jurisdiction).
1 203 F.2d at 288. In Popp, the Fourth Circuit noted that the Virginia nonsuit statute
merely limits the venue of any new action brought on any nonsuited cause of action. Id. The
Fourth Circuit concluded that a venue statute can have no application to the federal courts.
Id.
, Id.
674 F.2d at 234 n.3. The Yarber majority distinguished Popp in a single footnote. Id.
After noting that Popp disposed of the jurisdictional objection, the Yarber court then attempted to distinguish Popp on the ground that no statute of limitation defense was at issue
in Popp.Id. The majority contended that Popp was persuasive in dismissing the defendant's
jurisdictional objection. Id. According to Yarber, the substantive statute of limitation
defense should not fail, however, because the defendant's jurisdictional defense failed. Id.
" Id. at 239-41 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The Yarber dissent stated that the venue
restriction directly conflicts with the grant of federal diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 239. A
plaintiff can invoke federal diversity as long as the plaintiff meets the federal diversity requirements. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976); see also supra note 10. (federal diversity jurisdiction). Since the Yarber majority concluded that the venue restriction was applicable in
diversity actions, the dissent argued that the majority's treatment of the venue restriction
was inconsistent with Popp. Id. at 239.
71 674 F.2d at 239 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
71 See supra notes 32-64 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit's analysis for determining applicability of Virginia nonsuit venue restriction). The Fourth Circuit correctly applied Supreme Court standards by which federal courts must determine the applicability of
state statutes in federal diversity actions. Id. The Fourth Circuit properly determined that
the Hanna displacement principle was inapplicable to the facts in Yarber. See supra notes
34-36, 39-43 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit's Hanna analysis in Yarber). In Yarber,
the court determined that no federal rule was broad enough to pre-empt the Virginia
statute. Yarber, 674 F.2d at 235. The Yarber court's reliance on Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980), for the proposition that filing an action in federal court was not
sufficiently broad to constitute a pre-dmptive tolling provision disposed of the analysis re-
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federal jurisdiction." In determining jurisdiction, federal courts must
look to the sources of their judicial power, which are contained in article
III of the Constitution and congressional grants of jurisdiction. 4 State
legislatures clearly have extensive power to create and define substantive rights,75 and Erie generally ensures the application of state substan-

quired by Hanna. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit's approach
consistent with Walker).
The Fourth Circuit in Yarber is also faithful to the modified outcome-determinative
test. See supra notes 44-64 (Fourth Circuit's analysis in Yarber). The Rules of Decision Act
is the basis for the outcome-determinative test. Kanouse v. Westwood Obstetrical & Gynecological Assoc., 505 F. Supp. 129, 130 (D.N.J. 1981); see 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976) (laws of states
shall be regarded as rules of decision in actions in federal courts except when Constitution
or acts of Congress provide otherwise). The modified outcome-determinative test enunciated in Hanna v. Plumer is the prevailing test that courts utilize today. 505 F. Supp. at
130; see also supra note 11 (GuarantyTrust outcome-determinative test); note 35 (Erie doctrine aims to avoid forum shopping and inequitable administration of laws). In Yarber, the
Fourth Circuit properly determined that no countervailing federal interest required
displacement of the venue restriction and deemed the venue restriction integral to the
policies that the state statute of limitation serves. See supra notes 44-64 and accompanying
text (Fourth Circuit analysis in Yarber). But see infra text accompanying notes 113-16 (application of venue restriction in Yarber is against basic philosophy behind Erie that adjudication in federal court should lead to same result as adjudication in state court).
" See Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711, 718 (4th Cir. 1961) (application
of state statutes limiting venue to state courts would operate against basic tenet behind
Erie that result should be the same whether action was brought in state or federal court);
see also Grand Bahama Petroleum Co., Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 550 F.2d 1320, 1325
(2d Cir. 1977) (federal jurisdiction based upon source of judicial power is basic to principle of
federalism and not affected by Erie doctrine); Poitra v. DeMarrias, 502 F.2d 23, 27 (8th Cir.
1974) (citing Markham) (Markham language suggests that courts have obligation to exercise
jurisdiction when statutory requisites are present), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 934 (1975);
Stephenson v. Grant Trunk W. R.R. Co., 110 F.2d 401, 405 (7th Cir. 1940) (Erie does not
govern jurisdictional matters).
In one respect, however, Erie does give the states a means of indirectly limiting federal
jurisdiction. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 46 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
FEDERAL COURTS]. If a state closes its courts to a particular class of claim or litigant, a
federal court, in a diversity case, cannot entertain a suit on such a claim or by such a
litigant. Meisner v. Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co., 273 F.2d 49, 50 (9th Cir. 1959); see
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949) (federal court in Mississippi has no
jurisdiction to hear suit brought by foreign corporation when Mississippi statute bars suit
in state court by corporation that has not qualified to do business in Mississippi); Angel v.
Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1947) (federal court sitting in North Carolina could not
entertain suit for deficiency judgment arising out of Virginia mortgage when North
Carolina statute precluded deficiency judgments). See generally Stewart, The Federal
'Door Closing" Doctrine, 11 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 154 (1954).
" See Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d at 713; see also infra text accompanying notes 109-15 (discussion of Markham decision). Under article III of the Constitution,
Congress determines the manner and conditions upon which judicial power shall be exercised.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Congress has granted the courts of the United States original
jurisidiction over specific causes of action. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)
(federal courts have jurisdiction over civil actions arising under Constitution); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1976) (federal diversity jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (removal
jurisdiction).
11See U.S. CONST. amend. X. The tenth amendment provides:
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tive law in federal diversity actions." State statutes, however, cannot
limit or extend federal jurisdiction." Similarly, state courts cannot enjoin a pending or impending federal action if the federal court properly
could assert jurisdiction over the cause of action." The Fourth Circuit,
therefore, improperly applied the Virginia nonsuit venue restriction
because the venue restriction had the practical effect of defeating
federal jurisdiction."
The supremacy clause of the Constitution recognizes the supremacy
of the Constitution and the laws of the United States over state statutes
and state constitutions."0 The Constitution also grants the federal courts
jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of different states while
providing Congress with wide power to extend or to limit the scope of
federal jurisdiction.8' In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress required
that actions brought under diversity of citizenship jurisdiction also
satisfy a minimum amount in controversy requirement before federal
courts can assume jurisdiction.2 In Yarber, the plaintiff satisfied the

Id.

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.

76 See supra notes 9 & 10 (Erie instructs that federal courts sitting in diversity are to
apply state substantive law and federal procedural law). In Hanna v. Plumer, however, the
Supreme Court noted that the application of an automatic, "litmus paper criterion" does not
determine the applicability of state statutes in federal diversity actions. Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965). The Court concluded that federal courts sitting in diversity must
decide between federal and state law by referring to the policies behind the Erie doctrine.
Id.
7 See infra notes 89-129 and accompanying text (Supreme Court and federal court
cases that have refused to apply state statutes that limit federal jurisdiction).
78 See Donnovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1964) (state courts are without
power to restrain in personam actions pending in federal court); see also General Atomic
Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12, 17 (1977) (reaffirming Donovan) (in personam actions in federal
courts are not subject to abridgement by state court injunction regardless whether federal
action is pending or prospective). See generally Hornstein & Nagle, State Court Power to
Enjoin FederalJudicialProceedings:Donovan v. City of Dallas Revisited, 60 WASH. U.L.Q.
1 (1982).
"8See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text; infra notes 80-129 and accompanying
text (Constitution and case law indicate that state statutes cannot divest federal courts of
their jurisdiction).
" U.S. CONST. art. VI. The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every
state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any state to
the contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
81 See U.S. CONST. art. III § 2. Article III enumerates instances in which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction over a controversy and provides Congress with the right to determine the extent of judicial power. See id.
' See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976) (district courts have original jurisdiction over civil ac-
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statutory requirements the congressional grant of jurisdiction
demands. 3 According to Yarber, jurisdiction was proper in the federal
court, but the state venue restriction required an immediate dismissal. 4
As a practical matter, therefore, the venue restriction operated to
defeat federal jurisdiction.8 5 The substance of a state statute determines
its constitutionality.88 Since the Judiciary Act is a constitutionally valid
extension of congressional power, the supremacy clause of the Constitution requires the pre-emption of the Virginia nonsuit venue restriction. 7
In Yarber, therefore, the Fourth Circuit should have asserted effective
jurisdiction and then decided the case on its merits.'
The Supreme Court long has recognized that state statutes cannot
enlarge or contract the limits of federal jurisdiction. In Railway Co. v.
Whitton,"° the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action in Wisconsin
state court against the defendant railroad company." The plaintiff subsequently sought to remove his action to federal court pursuant to a
federal statute and based on diversity of citizenship. 2 The defendant
tions when amount in controversy exceeds $10,000 and is between citizens of different
states).
' See Yarber, 674 F.2d at 233. Since the district court in Yarber assumed subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, the requisites of diversity jurisdiction
must have been present. See id.
" See id. at 234 n.3, 237 (jurisdiction was proper but venue restriction operated to require dismissal of plaintiff's cause of action).
674 F.2d at 239-40 n.5 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
8 See Robinson v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 441 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th Cir. 1971)
(substance of statute governs its constitutionality); Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d
14, 24 (3d Cir.) (choice of law governed by substance of action, not form of pleading), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 979 (1968).
" See supra note 80 (supremacy clause of Constitution declares the supremacy of Constitution and laws of United States over conflicting state enactments); supra notes 74 & 81
(Congress determines extent of judicial power under article III of Constitution); see also
Gordon v. Longest, 14 U.S. (16 Pet.) 198, 200 (1842) (under Judiciary Act party can remove
action to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction if amount in controversy and diversity
of citizenship requirements are satisfied); Wood v. Wagnon, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 9, 9 (1804)
(courts of United States shall not have jurisdiction over actions between different states
unless record indicates that parties are of diverse citizenship).
" See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text (supremacy clause requires preemption of nonsuit venue restriction since restriction has practical effect of defeating
federal diversity jurisdiction).
" See infra notes 90-107 and accompanying text (analysis of Supreme Court cases that
have held ineffective state efforts to limit jurisdiction of federal courts).
o 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (1871).
9 Id. at 272. In Whitton, the wrongful death action arose when the defendant's
locomotive struck the plaintiff's decedent. Id. at 275. The plaintiff alleged that the
carelessness and culpable mismanagement of the railroad caused the death of the plaintiff's
decedent. Id. at 272.
' Id. at 273. In Whitton, while the state action was pending, Congress passed an act
allowing the removal of certain causes from state courts to the courts of the United States.
Id. at 272. The act permitted either party to remove to federal court any state action as long
as the requisites for federal diversity jurisdiction were present. Id. at 273.
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claimed that the federal court did not have jurisdiction to hear this action because the applicable Wisconsin statute recognizing the remedy
for the tort action also limited such actions to the state courts of Wisconsin. 3 In upholding federal removal jurisdiction, the Whitton Court held
that any federal court within the same state having jurisdiction over the
parties can. enforce general rights recognized by state statutes. 4 The
Court concluded that state legislation cannot limit the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. 5
Similarly, the Supreme Court has held ineffective state statutes that
require foreign corporations"' to forfeit their right to diversity jurisdiction as a prerequisite of conducting business in that state. In Insurance
Co. v. Morse, 8 the defendant insurance company sought to remove a
Wisconsin state action to federal court." In order to qualify as a foreign
corporation for the purpose of conducting business in Wisconsin, a
Wisconsin statute required that foreign corporations waive their right of
removal to federal court any state action arising from the corporation's
business within the state. ' The Supreme Court of Wisconsin determined
that the state statute precluded the removal of the state action."' The
United States Supreme Court however reversed that determination."'
Under article III of the Constitution, the Morse Court noted that Congress is largely responsible for regulating the jurisdiction of the federal
courts."3 In the Judiciary Act, Congress provided litigants the right to
"3Id. at 279-80.

9 Id. at 286.
"5Id.; see also Tennessee Coal Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 359-60 (1914) (state statute
limiting cause of action to state court may not limit jurisdiction of sister state unless
enforcement of cause of action depends on adjudication in specified tribunal); Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55, 67, 70 (1909) (New Mexico statutory
provision restricting venue of personal injury actions to its courts was held ineffective since
personal injury actions are transitory and maintainable if court can assume jurisdiction over
subject matter and persons).
" See In re Grand Lodge A.O.U.W., 110 Pa. 613, 1 A. 582 (1885). A foreign corporation,
when used in a state statute, is a business organization not created by the laws of such
state. Id. at 616-17, 1 A., at 584-85.
, See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text (discussing Insurance Co. v. Morse);
see also Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532 (1922) (Supreme Court held ineffective Arkansas statute that provided for revocation of foreign corporation's license to do
business in state because corporation resorts to federal courts); Barron v. Burnside, 121 U.S.
186, 200 (1887) (Supreme Court held void Iowa statute that required foreign corporation to
stipulate that foreign corporation would not remove actions into federal court as condition
of transacting business in state).
'8 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874).
Id. at 446. In Morse, the defendant sought to remove the cause of action pursuant to
§ 12 of the Judiciary Act. Id. Under § 12, either party may remove a state action to federal
court as long as the requisites of diversity are present. Id. at 446-47.
" Id. at 445-56.
..
,Id. at 447.
"°

Id. at 458.
Id. at 453; see supra notes 74, 81 (article III of Constitution).
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remove state actions to federal court as long as the requisites of diversity
jurisdiction are present."4 In Morse, the defendant insurance company
met the requirements necessary to invoke federal jurisdiction."5 The
Morse Court concluded that while Wisconsin is free to regulate its own
affairs, its statutes are subordinate to the Constitution and laws of the
United States."'8 Accordingly, the Morse Court concluded that the
Wisconsin statute could not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the
federal courts." 7
The Yarber decision is inconsistent with Fourth Circuit cases that
have considered state venue restrictions in the context of federal diversity jurisdiction." 8 In Markham v. City of Newport News,"' the Fourth
10.Id. at 454. Today, a defendant can remove a state action to federal court if that

federal court has original jurisdiction over the controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1976). Since
the district courts of the United States have jurisdiction over civil actions when the matter
in controversy exceeds $10,000 and is between citizens of different states, the removal of
state actions to federal courts based on diversity of citizenship is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1332(a)(1), 1441(a) (1976).
" 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 454-55. In Morse, the defendant insurance company was a corporation organized under the laws of New York State. Id. at 446. The Morse Court noted
that a corporation is a citizen of the state in which the corporation is incorporated. Id. at
453. The defendant insurance company therefore was a citizen of New York State for the
purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction. See id. at 453-54. Since the plaintiff was a
Wisconsin citizen, the diversity requirement was present in Morse. See id. at 446-47; see
also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (original jurisdiction of courts of United States includes controversies between citizens of different states). In addition, the cause of action satisfied the
minimum amount in controversy requirement of $500. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 454. Under the
terms of the Judiciary Act, therefore, the defendant could remove the state action to
federal court since the federal diversity requisites were present. Id. at 454-55.
Id. at 455; see supra notes "74& 80 (supremacy clause).
"0 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 458. Since the Wisconsin statute precluded the removal of the
state action to federal court when the requisites of federal diversity were present, the
Supreme Court deemed the statute void and unconstitution. Id. at 458. The Morse Court
stated that the Wisconsin statute, in requiring a corporation to waive its right to remove
state actions to federal court, is inconsistent with the proposition that a man may not barter
away his freedom or any substantial rights. Id. at 451 (dictum). The Court explained that advance agreements to oust the courts of the United States of the jurisdiction conferred by
law are illegal. Id.
The Supreme Court also has refused to apply state statutes that require creditors to
bring claims against the estates of insolvents and decedents in the court of the state having
jurisdiction over administration of the estate when the requisites of federal diversity are
present. See, e.g., Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U.S. 73, 76-79 (1885); Hyde v. Stone, 61 U.S. (20
How.) 170, 175 (1856); Suydam v. Broadnax, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 67, 75-76 (1840). Similarly, the
Court has held ineffective statutes limiting to state courts jurisdiction over actions for the
collection or enforcement of a securities obligation owed by a state subdivision. See, e.g.,
Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529,
531 (1890); Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 118, 121-22 (1868).
" See infra notes 109-25 and accompanying text (analysis of Fourth Circuit decisions
considering applicability of venue restrictions in federal diversity actions).
'" 292 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1961). In Markham, a California resident sustained injuries
when she drove her car into an uncovered manhole in the city of Newport News, Virginia.
Id. at 712. The plaintiff brought a diversity action in federal district court against the city.
Id. The district court dismissed the action on the basis of a Virginia statute that limits tort
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Circuit addressed the issue of whether a statute restricting the venue of
a tort action to a state court was applicable to a federal court sitting in
diversity. 0 The Fourth Circuit in Markham concluded that state
statutes could not enlarge or restrict federal jurisdiction."' The
Markham court, therefore, held that the venue restriction was inapplicable." 2
The Markham court noted that the Erie doctrine does not extend to
matters of procedure or jurisdiction."' According to Markham, the basic
philosophy behind Erie is that a federal court exercising diversity
jurisdiction to adjudicate state rights sits as another court of that
state."' The Markham court noted that adjudication in federal court
should reach the same result as a state court when adjudicating an identical issue."' The application of the venue restriction in Yarber ignores
the Fourth Circuit's earlier pronouncement on the philosophy behind
Erie."' The Fourth Circuit consequently treated Yarber's federal diversity action as time-barred, while adjudication of the same cause of action
was available in Virginia state court."7
In Popp v. Archbell,"8 the Fourth Circuit determined that the
Virginia nonsuit venue restriction could not defeat federal diversity
actions against a city to the courts of Virginia. Id. See generally Note, Federal Courts:
Jurisdiction over Municipalities: State Statutes Limiting Tort Actions Against
Municipalities to State Courts: Markham v. City of Newport News, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 192
(1962) (discussion of Markham); Note, Recent Cases, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1433 (1962) (same).
,, 292 F.2d at 712.
" Id.
at 713. The Markham court noted that Congress fixed the jurisdiction of the
district courts of the United States pursuant to article III of the Constitution. Id. The Constitution provides that the judicial power of the federal courts extends to controversies between citizens of different states. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Congress authorizes the exercise
of that power if the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976). States
have the right to create substantive rights and the means to enforce those rights. See U.S.
CONST. amend. X (states' rights amendment). According to Markham, however, states may
not deny federal courts their judicial power. 292 F.2d at 713. In Markham, the Fourth Circuit concluded that federal courts must look to the sources of their power when determining
their own jurisdiction. Id.
"' 292 F.2d at 716-18. In Markham, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's
dismissal and remanded the case for adjudication on the merits. Id. at 718.
1 Id.; see supra note 73 (Erie does not extend to jurisdiction).
1
292 F.2d at 718; see supra notes 9 & 10 (Erie holds that federal courts are to apply
state substantive law and federal procedural law).
' 292 F.2d at 718.
m See infra note 117 (application of venue restriction is inconsistent with Fourth Circuit's earlier pronouncement on philosophy behind Erie).
"1 674 F.2d at 237. The application of the venue restriction in Yarber is not consistent
with the proposition that adjudication in federal court will lead to the same result as adjudication in state court. See supra text accompanying note 115 (basic philosophy behind
Erie is that adjudication in federal court should reach identical result as adjudication in
state court).
" 203 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1953). In Popp, the plaintiff suffered a voluntary nonsuit pursuant to the Virginia nonsuit statute. Id. at 288. The plaintiff then brought a second action
for the same cause in federal court based on diversity of citizenship. Id. The district court
dismissed the federal action as precluded by the nonsuit venue restriction. Id.
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jurisdiction.'19 The Fourth circuit in Popp noted that the nonsuit statute
serves to regulate practice and procedure in the Virginia state courts."0
Explaining that the venue restriction merely limits the venue of any
new action brought upon a previously nonsuited cause of action, 2' the
Fourth Circuit concluded that a state venue statute has no application to
the federal courts." According to Popp, state law determines remedies
and substantive rights."3 When a remedy exists for a cause of action in
state court, however, federal courts also can assume jurisdiction over
the action if the requisites of federal diversity are present."4 Yarber is
irreconcileable with Popp because the Fourth Circuit in Yarber applied
the venue restriction and effectively defeated federal jurisdiction over
the controversy when a remedy existed in Virginia state court and the
requisites of federal diversity jurisdiction were present."'
The Fourth Circuit's application of the venue restriction in Yarber is
inconsistent with other federal courts that have considered state law or
state statutes that limit the venue of a specified cause of action to a state
court."6 In Kanouse v. Westwood Obsterical & Gynecological
1,9 Id. at 290.
122
121

Id. at 288.
Id.

" Id.; see also Steel Motor Serv., Inc. v. Zalke, 212 F.2d 856, 858 (6th Cir. 1954) (dictum) (state law cannot control venue of federal court); Buffington v. Vulcan Furniture Mfg.
Co., 94 F. Supp. 13, 15 (W.D. Ark. 1950) (same); supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text
(application of state statutes limiting venue to state courts operates against basic tenet
behind Erie that result should be the same regardless of chosen forum).
"3 203 F.2d at 288.
12, Id. at 289; see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (states' rights amendment); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(1) (requisites for diversity jurisdiction are parties of diverse citizenship and
minimum amount in controversy).
" See Yarber, 674 F.2d at 239. In Yarber, the Fourth Circuit did not overrule Popp.
See id. at 232-39.
12 See United States v. Estate of Slate, 304 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. Tex.), affd, 425 F.2d
1208 (5th Cir. 1969). In Slate, the United States brought a state probate action against the
estate of Slate to recover a judgment for unpaid taxes. Id. at 381. Under Texas law, the
failure of the administratrix of the estate to act upon the claim constituted a rejection of the
Government's claim. Id. The Government then filed suit in federal court. Id. The defendant
argued that the Texas Probate Code required the Government to seek redress in state
court after the rejection of the claim in the state probate court. Id. at 381-82. The Slate
court concluded that a provision of the Texas Probate Code could not defeat federal jurisdiction based on a congressional grant of jurisdiction. Id. at 382-83; see 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1976)
(district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil suits brought by United States);
see also Knighton v. Johnston County, 330 F. Supp. 652, 654 (E.D.N.C. 1971) (state statute
limiting malpractice actions against county to courts sitting therein was deemed inoperative
to prevent plaintiff's federal diversity action); Prendergast v. Long Island State Park
Comm'n, 330 F. Supp. 438, 440 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (state statute limiting actions against
parkway authority to state courts cannot divest federal court of admiralty jurisdiction);
Baton Rouge Contracting Co. v. West Hatchie Drainage Dist., 279 F. Supp. 430, 432 (N.D.
Miss. 1968) (Mississippi statute limiting jurisdiction of all actions against drainage district to
chancery court held ineffective to preclude Louisiana corporation's resort to federal diversity
jurisdiction); Schultz v. Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm'n, 250 F. Supp. 89, 93-94
(E.D. La. 1966) (state constitution cannot defeat diversity jurisdiction of federal courts); St.
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Associates,"u the defendant medical group objected to federal jurisdiction over a medical malpractice dispute.128 The defendant argued that the
action was justiciable only in a state malpractice tribunal provided for in
the New Jersey Court Rules."u Since the requisites of federal diversity
jurisdiction were present, the court assumed jurisdiction over the controversy.' According to Kanouse, state statutes cannot divest federal
courts of their recognized jurisdiction.2 '
In Yarber, the Fourth Circuit's analysis for determining applicable
law in federal diversity cases is consistent with Erie and subsequent
Supreme Court cases. 2 An Erie analysis, however, is not appropriate to
determine the scope of federal jurisdiction."n Federal courts must look
to the sources of their judicial power when determining the extent of
federal jurisdiction." In setting the requirements for federal diversity
jurisdiction, Congress granted the federal courts jurisdiction over any
action whenever the federal diversity requisites are present. 15 The application of the venue restriction in Yarber had the practical effect of
defeating federal diversity jurisdiction and, consequently, ran afoul of
the supremacy clause of the Constitution.' The Fourth Circuit's holding
in Yarber also is inconsistent with Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit
cases that have recognized that state statutes cannot divest federal
courts of their congressionally mandated jurisdiction." 7 The Fourth Circuit should treat Yarber as a judicial anomaly and reaffirm Popp at the
earliest opportunity.
JAMES FITZSIMMONS POWERS

John v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 225 F. Supp. 74, 75 (W.D. Mo. 1964) (federal
court has jurisdiction to hear diversity action notwithstanding state statute limiting antitrust claims to courts of state); Moss v. Calumet Paving Co., 201 F. Supp. 426, 430 (S.D.
Ind. 1962) (Indiana statutory provision requiring plaintiffs to bring actions against highway
commission in designated state courts was inapplicable in federal court). See generally
FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 73, § 46 (discussing state attempts to limit federal jurisdiction).
11 505 F. Supp. 129 (D.N.J. 1981).
'
Id. at 129.
Id.; see N.J. CT. R. 4:21-1-4:21-10 (procedure for personal liability claims against
members of medical profession).
11 505 F. Supp. at 129. Having established that the court had jurisdiction to hear the
malpractice action, the Kanouse court then determined that Erie required the application of
the New Jersey malpractice procedures in federal court. Id. at 130-32.
Id. at 129.
,.'
"' See supra notes 32-64, 72 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit's Erie analysis in
Yarber).
"' See supra notes 73, 113-15 and accompanying text (discussion of cases that have held
that Erie does not extend to matters of jurisdiction).
1 See supranotes 74, 81, 82 and accompanying text (sources of judicial power are article II of Constitution and congressional grants of jurisdiction).
"1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1976) (diversity jurisdiction).
"uSee supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text (supremacy clause analysis).
'" See supra notes 89-125 and accompanying text (discussion of Supreme Court and
Fourth Circuit cases that have held ineffectual state attempts to limit federal jurisdiction).
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C. Rule 60(b): Fraud on the Court
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' sets forth
grounds upon which a party may obtain relief from the operation of a
judgment. Rule 60(b) attempts to balance the principles of judicial
finality2 and substantial justice in judgments.3 In order to achieve this
goal, rule 60(b)(3) permits a party to file within one year of judgment a
motion alleging intrinsic or extrinsic fraud,4 misrepresentation, or other
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following
reasons: . . . (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; ... or (6) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be
made within a reasonable time, and for reasons ... (3) not more than one year
after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken .... This rule does
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party
from a judgment, order or proceeding . . . or to set aside a judgment for fraud
upon the court.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
2 See Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-54 (1897). Respect for the
finality of judgments is a fundamental principle of judicial systems. Id. at 49; see Baldwin v.
Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n., 283 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1931) (public policy dictates an end
to litigation); Mitchell v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 180 U.S. 471, 480 & n.1 (1901) (finality
of judgments essential to maintenance of societal peace). Through the prevention of
repetitive litigation, the principle of finality protects individual litigants from harrassment.
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 126, comment c, at 613-14 (1942). Respect for the finality of
judgments also lends stability and predictability to judicial activity. Moore & Rogers,
FederalRelieffrom Civil Judgments, 55 YALE L.J. 623, 626 (1946). See generally Comment,
Rule 60b): Survey and Proposal for General Reform, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 513, 533 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as ProposalFor GeneralReform].
' Bankers Mortgage Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 927 (1970). In determining whether to relieve a litigant from a final judgment or order
under rule 60(b), courts must balance the sanctity of final judgments with the "incessant
command of the court's conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts." Id. at 77; accord Compton v. Alton S.S. Co., 608 F.2d 96, 102 & n.8 (4th Cir. 1979); see also Boughner v.
Secretary of HEW, 572 F.2d 976, 977 (3d Cir. 1978) (rule 60(b) strikes balance between
judicial finality and substantial justice); New York State Health Facilities Ass'n v. Carey, 76
F.R.D. 128, 132-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (rule 60(b) balances finality of judgments and effectuation
of justice). See generally J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
60.27[1] (2d ed. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as MOORE]; 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE:
Civil § 2851 (1973) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]; Kane, Relief from Federal
Judgments: A Morass Unrelieved by a Rule, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 41, 68-70 (1978); Note,
History and Interpretationof FederalRule 60(b) of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,25
TEMP. L.Q. 77, 78 (1951).
See United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 68 (1878) (difference between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud). Extrinsic fraud is fraud present in the act of obtaining a judgment
which denies the opposing party a fair hearing on the merits. Independence Lead Mines v.
Kingsbury, 175 F.2d 983, 987-88 (9th Cir. 1949); see, e.g., Aldrich v. Aldrich, 203 Cal. 433,
435, 264 P. 754, 756 (1928) (complaining party's failure to-receive proper notice of suit constituted extrinsic fraud); Flood v. Templeton, 152 Cal. 148, 152, 92 P. 78, 81 (1907)
(fraudulent promise of compromise, preventing complaining party from asserting defense,
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misconduct of an adverse party.' Rule 60(b) also preserves a court's inherent power to adjudicate independent actions for relief from
fraudulent judgments." Rule 60(b), in addition, permits a party to bring
an action to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.7 Neither an
independent action nor an action based on fraud upon the court is subconstitutes extrinsic fraud); People v. Perris Irrigation Dist., 142 Cal. 601, 603, 76 P. 381,
382-83 (1904) (attorney involvement in fraud constitutes extrinsic fraud). See generally
MOORE, supra note 3, 69.371], at 613.
Intrinsic fraud, on the other hand, is fraud involving issues already presented and
litigated in the judgment assailed. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 207 (1895); see, e.g., Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Abbott, 130 F.2d 40, 43-44 (4th Cir. 1942) (perjury constitutes intrinsic fraud); Lockwood v. Bowles, 46 F.R.D. 625, 630 (D.D.C. 1969) (same); Eaton v. Koontz, 138
Kan. 267, 269, 25 P.2d 351, 353 (1933) (forged instruments constitute intrinsic fraud).
I See MOORE, supra note 3, 60.25[5]. Any type of fraud, misrepresentation, or other
wrongful acts committed by a prevailing party in the attainment of an inequitable judgment
constitutes grounds for rule 60(b)(3) relief. Id. at 287-88; see, e.g., Conerly v. Flower, 410
F.2d 941, 945 (8th Cir. 1969) (misrepresentation of amount of liability coverage in personal
injury suit constitutes rule 60(b)(3) fraud between parties); Peacock Records, Inc. v. Checker
Records, Inc., 365 F.2d 145, 147-48 (7th Cir. 1966) (perjured testimony constitutes grounds
for 60(b)(3) relief), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967). But cf. Walker v. Bank of America Nat'l
Trust & Say. Ass'n, 268 F.2d 16, 26 (9th Cir. 1959) (opposing counsel's statement during trial
that plaintiff had no cause of action constitutes an opinion of law and not 60(b)(3) fraud).
See Throckmorton v. United States, 98 U.S. 61, 65-71 (1878) (independent action to
set aside judicial decree confirming a land grant). The independent action doctrine rests
upon a court's equitable jurisdiction. See Sayers v. Burkhardt, 85 F. 246, 248 (4th Cir. 1898)
(independent action to set aside fraudulent judgment which created cloud upon title to land),
cert. denied, 172 U.S. 649 (1899). Throckmorton is the seminal case on independent actions
for relief from fraudulent judgments. See generally MOORE, supranote 3, 60.371]; Proposalfor GeneralReform, supra note 2, at 531-44; Note, Attacking Fraudulently Obtained
Judgments in the Federal Courts, 48 IowA L. REv. 398, 398-02 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Attacking Fraudulently Obtained Judgments]. In Throckmorton, the United States
Supreme Court recognized the right of a litigant to attack a fraudulently obtained judgment
in an independent action. 98 U.S. at 61. Throckmorton involved an original action brought
by the United States to declare null and void a decree rendered by a district court twenty
years earlier. Id. at 63. The government alleged that the petitioner in the original action
procured the judgment by means of a fraudulent instrument and perjured testimony. Id.
The Court dismissed the case on the merits, holding that perjured testimony and fraudulent
instruments were insufficient grounds to support an independent action for relief from a
judgment rendered twenty years earlier. Id. at 66. The Court classified perjured testimony
and fraudulent instruments as intrinsic frauds. Id. at .63; see supra note 4 (intrinsic fraud is
fraud already presented and considered in judgment assailed). The Court concluded that only
extrinsic fraud supports equitable relief by independent action. 98 U.S. at 66; see supra note
4 (extrinsic fraud is fraud preventing litigant a hearing on merits).
' See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944) (scheme to obtain a patent by means of a fraudulent publication constituted fraud on court). See generally
Note, FederalRules 52(a) and 60(b)-A Chinese Puzzle, 21 S.W.L.J. 339 (1967); Proposalfor
General Reform, supra note 2, at 531; Note, Federal Rule 60(b): Relief From Civil
Judgments, 61 YALE L. J. 76 (1952) [hereinafter cited as ReliefFrom Civil Judgments].For
a definition of fraud upon the court, see MOORE, supra note 3, 60.22. According to Professor Moore, fraud upon the court consists of fraud which defiles or attempts to defile the
court itself, or is fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery
cannot perform its impartial task of adjudging cases. Id.; see Keys v. Dunbar, 405 F.2d 955,
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ject to the one-year limitation applicable to rule 60(b)(3) motions.' Courts,
therefore, scrutinize rule 60(b) motions for relief from fraudulent
judgments in order to distinguish rule 60(b)(3) actions from fraud on the
court or independent actions for relief. In Great CoastalExpress,Inc. v.
957-58 (9th Cir.) (fraud must have prevented losing party from presenting case or defense in
order to constitute fraud on court), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 880 (1969); Kenner v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 689, 691 (7th Cir.) (unconscionable plan or scheme directed at influencing a
court's decision constitutes fraud upon court), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 841 (1968); Hawkins v.
Lindsley, 327 F.2d 356, 359 (2nd Cir. 1964) (fraud involving officer of court constitutes fraud
on court); England v. Doyle, 281 F.2d 304, 309 (9th Cir. 1960) (unconscionable plan or scheme
to improperly influence court's decision constitutes fraud on court); Lockwood v. Bowles, 46
F.R.D. 625, 631-32 (D.D.C. 1969) (fraud which attempts to defile court or improperly influence court by means of an unconscionable plan or scheme constitutes fraud on court); see,
e.g., Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944) (involvement of
an attorney in fraud constitutes fraud on court); Root Ref. Co. v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 169
F.2d 514, 541 (3rd Cir. 1948) (involvement of attorney to improperly influence judge constitutes fraud on court), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 912 (1949). See generally MOORE, supra note 3,
60.33.
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), supra note 1. Rule 60(b)(3) motions must be made within a
reasonable time and no later than one-year after judgment. Id.; see Taft v. Donellan Jerome,
Inc., 407 F.2d 807, 809 n.5 (7th Cir. 1969) (16 years that passed between entry of judgment
and motion for relief precluded rule 60(b)(3) relief); Kathe v. United States, 284 F.2d 713, 715
(9th Cir. 1960) (expiration of one year forecloses rule 60(b)(3) relief in suit to vacate judgment in condemnation proceeding); Prickett v. Duke Power Co., 49 F.R.D. 116, 117 (D.S.C.)
(rule 60(b)(3) relief denied two years after entry of summary judgment order), affd, 429 F.2d
984 (5th Cir. 1970); Williard C. Beach Air Brush Co. v. General Motors Corp., 88 F. Supp.
849, 851-52 (D.N.J. 1950) (even though one year had not expired rule 60(b)(3) relief denied
since reasonable time limitation of rule had expired). See generally MOORE, supra note 3,
60.24[4].
Only a litigant's laches, however, will foreclose independent actions for relief from
fraudulent judgments. See West Virginia Oil & Gas Co. v. George E. Breece Lumber Co.,
213 F.2d 702, 706-07 (5th Cir. 1954) (litigant's laches or an applicable state statute of limitations are only time limits for initiating independent action); Fiske v. Buder, 125 F.2d 841,
845 (8th Cir. 1942) (laches represent only limit on appellant's independent action for relief
from fraudulent judgment). The doctrine of laches forecloses relief when the party seeking
relief has not exercised due diligence in presenting his claim or defense, and the opposing
party has been prejudiced by such delay. Abraham v. Ordway, 158 U.S. 416, 420 (1895).
Finally, fraud on the court motions for relief are not subject to any time limitation. See
Lockwood v. Bowles, 46 F.R.D. 625, 631 (D.D.C. 1969) (neither rule 60(b)'s one-year limitation
nor doctrine of laches bars relief for fraud on court). But see Simons v. United States, 452
F.2d 1110, 1112 (2d Cir. 1971) (movant's prejudicial delay precludes relief from fraud on
court); Seismograph Serv. Corp. v. Offshore Raydist, Inc., 263 F.2d 5, 23 (5th Cir. 1958) (appellant's laches influential in court's denial of relief from fraud on court). See generally
Report of ProposedAmendments to Rules of Civil Procedurefor the District Courts of the
United States, 5 F.R.D. 477, 478 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Amendments] (rule
60(b) time limitation).
' See Kupferman v. Consolidated Research & Mfg. Corp., 459 F.2d 1072, 1078-81 (2d
Cir. 1972) (attorney's failure to produce relevant document during trial did not constitute
fraud on court). The rule 60(b) provision for granting relief for fraud on the court does not
embrace all conduct of an adverse party of which the court disapproves, since to do so would
render meaningless the one-year limitation applicable to rule 60(b)(3) motions. Id. at 1078;
see also MOORE, supra note 3, 60.33 (if fraud on court provision of rule 60(b) is not kept
within proper limits then one-year time limitation of rule 60(b)(3) motions will become meaningless). See generally Relief From Civil Judgments, supra note 7, at 79-80.
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InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters,"° the Fourth Circuit addressed
the issue of whether perjury and fabricated evidence constituted either
fraud upon the court or adequate grounds for an independent action for
relief from a fraudulent judgment pursuant to rule 60(b).
The controversy 1 in Great Coastal arose out of a strike against
Great Coastal Express Inc. (Great Coastal or the company) by Local 592
(the union) an affiliate of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. 2
Great Coastal, the employer, brought an action in December 1970 for
damages caused by union violence and illegal secondary boycotting."
Although witnesses for the company testified to widespread violence by
the union against the company's employees and property,'4 the district
court granted a directed verdict in favor of the union on the violence
claim. 5 The jury, however, returned a verdict for the Great Coastal on
the secondary boycott claim."
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed on all issues."7 The court
ruled that the evidence supported the jury's finding that the union had
committed illegal secondary boycotting of Great Coastal's customers.'"
, 675 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1982).
" Id. at 1351. Contract negotiations between Great Coastal and the union broke down
and Local 592 went on strike August, 1970. Id. On December 10, 1970, Great Coastal filed
suit in Virginia state court. Id. The union removed the action to the Eastern District Court
of Virginia. Id.; see Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 350 F.
Supp. 1377, 1378 (E.D. Va. 1972) (district court opinion of original suit), aff'd on other
grounds, 511 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1975).
12 675 F.2d at 1351.
13 Id. An illegal secondary boycott exists when a labor organization having a labor

dispute with an employer exercises coercive pressure on the employer's customers actual
or prospective, to cause the customers to withdraw their patronage from the employer
through fear of loss or damage to themselves if they continue to deal with the employer.
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 446 (1921); see Truax v. Corrigan, 257
U.S. 312, 318 (1921) (illegal secondary boycott exists when conspiracy of striking employees
coerce employer's patrons to stop dealing with employer).
14 675 F.2d at 1351. Great Coastal alleged that the union was responsible for throwing
a brick through the windshield of a company truck and firing a handgun through the trailer
of the same truck. Id. Great Coastal also asserted that the union was responsible for the
slashing of tires and airhoses on company trucks. Id.
'5 Id.
, Id. at 1352; see supra note 13 (secondary boycott defined); Great Coastal Express,
Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 350 F. Supp. 1377, 1378-80 (E.D. Va. 1972). Great
Coastal had alleged damages resulting from secondary boycotting totaling only $942,005. Id.
at 1378. The jury, however, returned a verdict for $1,300,000. Id. On the union's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the district court concluded that the damage award
was substantially greater than the damages actually, proven by Great Coastal. Id. at 1380.
The court wrote that the excessive verdict resulted from the jury's being influenced by the
widespread acts of violence allegedly committed against Great Coastal by the union. Id.; see
supra note 14 (violent acts attributed to union). The court, therefore, granted a retrial on
damages alone. 350 F. Supp. at 1382. The second jury, on retrial, returned a verdict of
$806,093 and the court entered judgment on the secondary boycott claim in that amount.
675 F.2d at 1352.
17 511 F.2d 839, 848 (4th Cir.
1975).
,"Id. at 844. The jury had complete dominion over the issue of whether the union had
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The court also concluded that the evidence supported the jury's final
liability verdict. 9 The court, therefore, held that the union had failed to
overcome the verdict's presumption of validity 0 and affirmed Great
Coastal's liability verdict." The union eventually paid Great Coastal a
total of $961,653.67, representing the judgment plus interest and costs.2
After the Fourth Circuit affirmed Great Coastal's money damages
award, the union discovered that Great Coastal was responsible for
several of the violent acts attributed to the union.23 The union filed a
motion to set aside the judgment in district court on December 14,
1978.24 The court granted post-judgment discovery and conducted and
evidentiary hearing.25
committed illegal secondary boycotting. Id. The Fourth Circuit found that the district court
had charged the jury properly on secondary boycotting. Id. The Fourth Circuit also found
abundant evidence in support of the jury's conclusions that the union had induced, encouraged, threatened, or coerced employees of Great Coastal customers to withhold labor
from their employers for the sole purpose of achieving the unlawful objectives set out in the
National Labor Relations Act. Id.; see National Labor Relations Act, § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (unfair labor practices). The Fourth Circuit deferred to the
jury's conclusions, noting that the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses is within the sole province of the jury. 511 F.2d at 844; see Atlantic & Gulf
Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 359-61 (1962) (jury assesses credibility
of witnesses); Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 648 (1946) (same).
11511 F.2d at 847. The Fourth Circuit failed to find any evidence that the alleged acts
of violence had influenced the second jury's liability verdict. Id.; see supra note 16 (district
court had granted second trial on damages alone in which jury returned a verdict for
$806,093).
1 511 F.2d at 846-47. The Fourth Circuit noted that a presumption exists in favor of a
verdict's validity, provided the verdict is the result of honest judgment. Id. at 846; see Richmond v. Atlantic Co., 273 F.2d 902, 916 (4th Cir. 1960) (presumption in favor of validity of a
verdict always exists if verdict is result of honest judgment). The court held that the union's
failure to allege any error in the evidence, jury charges, or other relevant proceedings and
the existence of abundant evidence establishing the union's culpability for illegal secondary
boycotting dispositive of the union's failure to overcome the validity accorded the district
court's verdict. 511 F.2d at 847.
21 511 F.2d at 847. After losing in the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court denied the
union's writ of certiorari to overturn the liability verdict. Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 350 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. Va.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 975 (1976).
675 F.2d at 1352.
Id. at 1352; see Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 86
F.R.D. 131, 135 (E.D. Va. 1980) (union's appeal to district court after discovering fraud).
Testimony and evidence presented at an evidentiary hearing established Great Coastal's
responsibility for the incident in which a brick had been pitched through the windshield and
bullets fired through the trailer of a company truck. Id. at 135. The hearing also established
Great Coastal's responsibility for other vandalism to company property. Id.; see supra note
14 (violent acts attributed to union in first trial).
2 86 F.R.D. at 134. Only the forum that rendered the original judgment has jurisdiction over rule 60(b)(3) motions. Aigner v. Shaughnessy, 175 F.2d 211, 212 (2d Cir. 1949)
(jurisdiction over 60(b)(3) motions for relief limited to court which granted original judgment
or order). The union, therefore, directed its motion for relief to the district court which had
adjudicated the case originally. Compare 86 F.R.D. at 131 with 350 F. Supp. at 1377 (both
cases heard in Eastern District Court of Virginia).
86 F.R.D. at 135.
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At the hearing, two of Great Coastal's witnesses from the first trial
admitted that part or all of their testimony had been false. 6 The district
court held that, but for the union's failure to file its motion for relief
from the judgment within the one-year limitation of rule 60(b)(3), relief
from Great Coastal's judgment would have been forthcoming.2 The
court also held that the union could not evade the one-year limitation of
rule 60(b)(3) through a rule 60(b)(6) motion.'
In addition to denying the union's rule 60(b)(3) motion, the district
court denied the union's appeal for relief under the fraud on the court or
independent action for relief provisions of rule 60(b).1 The district court
held that perjury and fabricated evidence do not rise to the level of
fraud upon the court under the savings provisions of rule 60(b). The
district court also noted that the union had failed to allege attorney involvement in the fraud. 1 Finally, the district court concluded that per.1

Id. One company witness from the first trial admitted at the evidentiary hearing
that Great Coastal's terminal manager had ordered the witness to get a brick and destroy a
company truck. Id. The same witness testified that he had thrown a brick through the windshield of the truck and fired shots from a revolver into the trailer of the truck. Id. The
witness further admitted to having lied about this incident in the first trial. Id. The hearing
also disclosed that another Great Coastal witness in the first trial had failed to tell the complete truth concerning the vandalism to the company truck. Id. The district court found as a
fact that a substantial amount of Great Coastal's testimony regarding acts of violence in the
first trial amounted to perjury. Id.
2 Id. at 35; see supra note 8 (rule 60(b)(3) motions limited to within one-year of original
judgment).
1 86 F.R.D. at 135-36. Rule 60(b)(6) encompasses contingencies not foreseen by the
rule's drafters. See MOORE, supra note 3, 60.271] (rule 60(b)(6) applies to situations not
enumerated in rule 60(b) which justify relief from judgment). The only time limitation on a
rule 60(b)(6) motion is one of reasonable time. See Yanow v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 274 F.2d
274, 276 (9th Cir. 1959) (petitioner's delay of eleven months precluded rule 60(b)(6) relief).
Rule 60(b)(3) motions, however, are subject to a one-year limitation and the reasonable time
restriction. See supra note 8 (time restrictions of rule 60(b)(3) motions). If a court granted
rule 60(b)(6) relief in a situation encompassed by rule 60(b)(3) the latter's one-year limitation
would become meaningless. 86 F.R.D. at 137; see Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601,
613-15 (1949) (litigant cannot avoid one-year time limitation of rule 60(b)(1) through use of
rule 60(b)(6) motion); Stancil v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 36, 38 (E.D. Va. 1961) (litigant
cannot avoid one-year time limitation of rule 60(b)(1) through use of 60(b)(6) motion). See
generally MOORE, supra note 3, 60.271].
86 F.R.D. at 137; see supra notes 6 & 7 (explanations of independent action and fraud
on court provisions of rule 60(b)).
" 86 F.R.D. at 137; see Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 461 F.2d 669, 671 (2d Cir.)
(perjured testimony in securities fraud trial does not constitute fraud upon court), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 883 (1972); Dowdy v. Hawfield, 189 F.2d 637, 638 (D.C. Cir.) (perjury insufficient grounds for fraud on probate court), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 830 (1951); Armour & Co.
v. Nard, 56 F.R.D. 610, 612 (N.D. Iowa 1972) (perjury and other third party misconduct do
not constitute fraud on court). But see Toscano v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir.
1971) (taxpayer's perjured testimony constitutes strong enough showing of fraud on tax
court to require hearing); Dausuel v. Dausuel, 195 F.2d 774, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (wife's perjury, if substantiated, would constitute fraud on divorce court).
31 86 F.R.D. at 138; see MOORE, supra note 3, 60.33 (attorney involvement dispositive
in distinguishing fraud upon court from fraud between parties); see also Hazel-Atlas Glass
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jury and fabricated evidence were intrinsic 2 rather than extrinsic"
forms of fraud and would not support an independent action for relief.u
The district court, therefore, denied the union relief from Great
Coastal's liability verdict.
The union appealed3 6 the denial of relief to the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals. 7 The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court
for specific findings of fact.' In a memorandum of law, the district court
provided the Fourth Circuit with the details of Great Coastal's fraud. 9
The district court found the company responsible for certain of the
violent acts." The district court also disclosed a scheme in which Great
Coastal had paid the principals behind the violent acts for their silence."'
The district court, therefore, concluded that Great Coastal was responsi-

Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 241 (1944) (attorney involvement in fraud upon
court); H.K. Porter Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 536 F.2d 1115, 1118-19 (6th Cir.
1976) (attorney conduct involving misrepresentation and perjury would constitute fraud on
court); Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 461 F.2d 699, 702 (2nd Cir.) (absent attorney involvement, no fraud upon court), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 883 (1972); Kupferman v. Consolidated Research & Mfg. Corp., 459 F.2d 1072, 1078 (2nd Cir. 1972) (since attorneys are officers of court their dishonest conduct constitutes fraud upon court); United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 349 F. Supp. 22, 26 (D. Conn. 1972) (attorney involvement in the
fabrication of evidence could constitute fraud on court), aff'd without opinion, 410 U.S. 919
(1973).
a 86 F.R.D. at 137; see supra note 4 (definition of intrinsic fraud).
3 86 F.R.D. at 137; see supra note 4 (definition of extrinsic fraud).
86 F.R.D. at 138. The district court noted that perjury and fabricated evidence are
traditional forms of intrinsic fraud. Id.; see supra note 6 (fraudulent instruments and perjured testimony are insufficient to support independent action for relief).
1186 F.R.D. at 138.
36 675 F.2d at 131; see Siberell v. United States, 268 F.2d 61, 62 (9th Cir. 1959)
(per
curiam) (abuse of discretion is the appellate standard of review for rule 60(b) motions); Title
v. United States, 263 F.2d 28, 31 (9th Cir. 1959) (review of rule 60(b) motion limited to sound
discretion of district court).
" 675 F.2d at 1352.
38 Id.
3 Id.
40 Id. The district court found that the company had ordered employees
to vandalize
company property. Id. The district court found that Great Coastal's terminal manager had
ordered a company employee to vandalize a company truck. Id.; see supra note 26 (damage
to company truck attributable to company). In addition, the district court found the company responsible for other acts of vandalism against company property. 675 F.2d at 1352. In
light of the evidence supporting the company's responsibility for certain of the acts of
violence, the district court concluded that Great Coastal was responsible for manufacturing
a substantial amount of testimony in the first trial on the acts of violence. Id.
4' Id. The district
court memorandum opinion revealed a scheme in which Great
Coastal's president had paid the company employee responsible for damaging the company
truck $500 for "a job well done." Id. The company did not record the $500 payment on its
books. Id. The district court also found that Great Coastal had paid the terminal manager,
who had ordered the vandalism, $12,000 from the manager's share of profits and that the
payment of the terminal manager's share of profits violated the company's policy regarding
profit-sharing. Id.
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ble for manufacturing a substantial amount of testimony in the first trial
on the alleged acts of violence.42
In passing on the merits of the union's appeal, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that if the union had brought a timely motion4 3 for fraud between the parties under rule 60(b)(3)," relief would have been forthcoming. 5 The six years that passed between the entry of Great Coastal's
judgment and its motion to set aside judgment, however, placed the
union's cause beyond the one-year limitation of rule 60(b)(3)."6 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court's ruling that the
union could not avoid rule 60(b)(3)'s one-year time limitation through the
use of a rule 60(b)(6) motion."
The Fourth Circuit also rejected the union's motion for relief under
rule 60(b) for fraud on the court." The union based its fraud on the court
motion for relief on the Supreme Court's decision in Hazel-Atlas Glass
Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co. 9 In Hazel-Atlas, Hartford-Empire Co. sought
a patent for a "gob-feeding" process employed in the manufacture of
glass bottles." In an effort to help along the patent application, counsel
for Hartford-Empire Co. had prepared an article praising the revolutionary benefits of the gob-feeding process.5 ' Counsel for Hartford"2Id.

at 1351-53. Although the company never denied the district court's conclusion

that the company had committed fraud, Great Coastal did assert that the misrepresentations were harmless since the directed verdict in the first trial had eliminated the violence
claim. Id. at 1352. Great Coastal argued that the judgment being assailed was the secondary
boycotting issue which the Fourth Circuit had affirmed already. Id. at 1353; see 511 F.2d at
844-45 (abundant evidence existed to support jury's verdict on illegal secondary boycotting);
see also supra note 18 (abundant evidence existed in support of jury's conclusion on the
union's responsibility for illegal secondary boycotts).
The Fourth Circuit, however, refused to accept Great Coastal's argument that the
directed verdict in the first trial eliminated any impact the fraud might have had on the
court. 675 F.2d at 1354. The Fourth Circuit, on the contrary, held that the jury instructions
given at the first trial permitted the jurors to consider the acts of violence as part of the
totality of circumstances surrounding the union's liability for secondary boycotting. Id. The
court also noted that Great Coastars brief on appeal from the secondary boycott judgment
contained repeated references to the alleged acts of violence. Id. In light of the jury instructions at the first trial and Great Coastal's reliance on the acts of violence on appeal, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that Great Coastal's fraud had sufficient impact upon the secondary boycott judgment to allow the court to reach the merits of the union's rule 60(b) claim
for relief. Id.
675 F.2d at 1355; see supra note 8 (time limitations on rule 60(b)(3) motions).
" 675 F.2d at 1355; see supra note 5 (analysis of fraud between parties).
's 675 F.2d at 1355; see supra note 5 (analysis of fraud between parties).
675 F.2d at 1355.
'7 Id.; see supra note 28 (litigants cannot avoid rule 60(b)(3) time limitation through use
of rule 60(b)(6) motions).
675 F.2d at 1355.
" Id.; see Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 240-46 (1944)
(fraud on the court doctrine); see also ProposedAmendments, supra note 8, at 479 (committee charged with amending rules cited Hazel-Atlas as an example of fraud on court).
322 U.S. at 239.
Id. at 240.
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Empire Co. then sought out a disinterested expert to fraudulently
author the publication.2 The fraudulent article influenced the patent office's decision to award Hartford-Empire Co. a patent on the gob-feeding
process.53 The fraudulent article also influenced an appellate court in
upholding Hartford-Empire's patent in a patent infringement suit with
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. 5 4 Ten years after the patent infringement suit,
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. discovered the fraud behind the publication and
brought suit for relief. 5 The Supreme Court granted Hazel-Atlas Glass
Co. relief on the grounds that the fraudulent publication constituted
fraud on the patent and appellate courts.56 The Court classified HartfordEmpire Co.'s fraud as a deliberately planned and carefully executed
scheme to defraud not only the patent office but also the court of appeals. 7 The Court, furthermore, referring to the legal monopoly created
by a patent, noted that the fraud concerned issues of great public
significance which transcended the interests of the litigants involved.,
The Supreme Court therefore granted Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. relief from
the fraudulent judgment which had been entered ten years earlier. 9
The Fourth Circuit held Hazel-Atlas dispositive on the union's motion for relief under the fraud on the court provision of rule 60(b)." The
court wrote that Great Coastal's fraud had not presented the two prerequisites of a successful fraud on the court motion. 1 First, Great
Coastal's fraud had not involved a deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme to subvert the judicial process.2 Second, Great Coastal's
fraud had not involved an issue of public significance which transcended
the interests of the individual litigants.' The court, in addition, noted
that fraud on the court normally consisted of only the most egregious
forms of fraud which are not discoverable in a judicial proceeding.u Perjury and fabricated evidence, the court stated, historically are not
grounds for relief under the fraud on the court provision of rule 60(b). 65

Id.

52

Id. at 241.
SId.
55 Id.

Id. at 245.
" Id. at 245-46.
' Id. at 246.
' Id. at 251.
675 F.2d at 1356-57.
' Id. at 1356.
62 Id.; see supra text accompanying note 57 (Hazel-Atlas fraud characterized by
deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme to defraud court).
' 675 F.2d at 1356; see supra text accompanying note 58 (Hazel-Atlas fraud involved
issue of great moment which transcended interests of individual litigants).
" 675 F.2d at 1357; see supra note 7 (examples of egregious conduct constituting fraud
on court).
' 675 F.2d at 1357; see supra note 30 (perjury and fabrication of evidence historically
do not constitute fraud on court).
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The Fourth Circuit therefore held that Great Coastal's perjury and
fabrication of evidence did not rise to the level of fraud upon the court.6
The Fourth Circuit also rejected the union's independent action for
relief under the second savings provision of rule 60(b).17 The Fourth Circuit held the Supreme Court's decision in Throckmorton v. United
States68 dispositive of the union's independent action for relief. 9 In
Throckmorton, the Court held that perjured testimony and fraudulent
instruments were insufficient grounds for an independent action for
relief from a fraudulent judgment."0 According to the Throckmorton
Court, only fraud extrinsic to the issues litigated in the original judgment supported relief by independent action.' The Fourth Circuit concluded that the union's independent action for relief failed since Great
Coastal's perjury and fabrication of evidence were not frauds extrinsic
to the issues litigated in the original judgment."
The dissent in Great Coastal took exception with the majority's
analysis of the union's fraud on the court motion. 3 The dissent stated
that Great Coastal's fraud involved an issue of public importance that
transcended the interests of the individual litigants since the fraud
debased the laws enacted to ensure the free flow of commerce. 4 The dis675 F.2d at 1357.
" Id. at 1357-58; see supra note 6 (independent actions for relief).
" 98 U.S. 61, 65-71 (1878); see supra note 6 (Throckmorton analysis).
11675 F.2d at 1358; see supra note 6 (Throckmortonis seminal case on independent actions for relief from fraudulent judgments).
70 98 U.S. at 66; see Durham v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 208 F.2d 342, 345 (4th
Cir. 1953) (perjured testimony does not constitute grounds for annulling a judgment in independent proceeding); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Abbott, 130 F.2d 40, 43-44 (4th Cir.
1942) (perjured testimony does not constitute ground on which court can deny enforcement
of prior judgment in independent action); Chrysler Corp. v. Superior Dodge, Inc., 83 F.R.D.
179, 186 (D. Md. 1979) (same); Prickett v. Duke Power Co., 49 F.R.D. 116, 118 (D.S.C.) (false
affidavits employed to secure summary judgment did not constitute grounds for setting
aside order), affd, 429 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1970).
" 98 U.S. at 66; see supra note 4 (intrinsic extrinsic distinction).
675 F.2d at 1358. The Fourth Circuit relied on the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Addington v. Farmer's Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., in determining whether Great Coastal's fraud
constituted intrinsic or extrinsic fraud. Id.; see 650 F.2d 663, 667-68 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 672 (1981); supra note 4 (intrinsic and extrinsic fraud defined). Under Addington, a
litigant must prove five factors in order to prevail in an independent action. 650 F.2d at 668.
First, a litigant must allege and prove the existence of an unconscionable judgment. Id. Second, a litigant must possess a good defense to the alleged cause of action on which the trial
court had founded the judgment assailed. Id. Third, a litigant must prove fraud, accident, or
mistake which prevented petitioner from obtaining the benefit of his defense. Id. Fourth,
the litigant must prove the absence of fraud or negligence on his part. Id. Finally, the
litigant must prove the absence of any adequate remedy at law. Id.; see Bankers Mortgage
Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 79 (5th Cir.) (identical analysis employed), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 927 (1970); Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Callicotte, 267 F. 799, 805-10 (8th Cir. 1920)
(same), cert. denied, 255 U.S. 570 (1921).
71 675 F.2d at 1358-65 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
", Id. at 1364; see supra text accompanying note 58 (issue of great moment present in
Hazel-Atlas).
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sent also stated that the facts underlying Great Coastal's fraud
established that Great Coastal had engaged in a deliberate scheme to
defraud the National Labor Relations Board, the district court, and the
appellate court. 5 The dissent, therefore, concluded that the court should
have overturned the secondary boycotting judgment since the litigation
culminating in the judgment for Great Coastal satisfied the two requirements of Hazel-Atlas fraud on the court. 6
The Fourth Circuit's ruling that the union would have succeeded if
the union had brought a timely motion under rule 60(b)(3) is in complete
accord with established authority.7 Perjury and the fabrication of
evidence are adequate grounds for rule 60(b)(3) motions for relief.78 The
union, therefore, would have succeeded in obtaining relief from Great
Coastal's judgment if the union had brought a timely motion. 9
The Fourth Circuit properly rejected the union's motion for relief
under the fraud on the court provision of rule 60(b).8 The committee
charged with amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure cited HazelAtlas8' as an example of fraud on the court.2 In addition, courts addressing the fraud on the court issue have relied consistently on the Supreme
Court's decision in Hazel-Atlas. 3 Only frauds directed at subverting the
S 675 F.2d at 1365; see supra text accompanying note 57 (deliberately planned and

carefully executed scheme to defraud court present in Hazel-Atlas).
" 675 F.2d at 1366.
" 675 F.2d at 1355. The district court in which the union filed its motion to set aside
the judgment had jurisdiction to adjudicate the rule 60(b) motion since the district court was
the forum that had rendered the original judgment. See Aigner v. Shaughnessy, 175 F.2d
211, 213 (2d Cir. 1949) (only forum that rendered original judgment has jurisdiction over rule
60(b)(3) actions). Compare 350 F. Supp. at 1337 with 86 F.R.D. at 131 (both original suit and
motion to set aside filed in Eastern District Court of Virginia). The evidence uncovered at the
evidentiary hearing established that Great Coastal had committed perjury in securing the
judgment against the union. 675 F.2d at 1351; see Peacock Records, Inc. v. Checker Records,
Inc., 365 F.2d 145, 150 (7th Cir. 1966) (perjured testimony constitutes fraud within rule
60(b)(3)), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 975 (1967); Parker v. Checker Taxi Co., 238 F.2d 241, 244 (7th
Cir. 1956) (applicant for 60(b)(3) relief has burden of proving fraud within rule 60(b)(3) by
clear and convincing evidence), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 922 (1957). See generally MOORE, supra
note 3, 60.24[5].
" See supra note 5 (perjury and fabricated evidence constitute grounds for rule
60(b)(3) relief).
675 F.2d at 1352.
Id. at 1358.
notes 48-59 (Hazel-Atlas
" 322 U.S. 238 (1944); see supra text accompanying
discussion); supra note 7 (discussion of fraud on court motion under rule 60(b)).
ProposedAmendments, supra note 8, at 479.
8 See Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 461 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir.) (court held that
perjury in securities fraud trial did hot constitute fraud on court), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 883
(1972); Wilkin v. Sunbeam Corp., 466 F.2d 714, 717 (10th Cir.) (attorney's misstatements did
not constitute fraud on court since jury had not credited attorney's testimony), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1126 (1972); United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 349 F. Supp. 22, 29 (D.
Conn. 1972) (government's failure to disclose details of settlement decree did not constitute
fraud on court), aff'd without opinion, 410 U.S. 919 (1973); Jungersen v. Axel Bros., Inc., 121
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judicial process, involving issues of great public significance will constitute fraud on the court under Hazel-Atlas.'
The Fourth Circuit's analysis of Great Coastal's fraud is consistent
with Hazel-Atlas.' Great Coastal's fraud did not involve an issue of
great public importance since a decision by the court in Great Coastal
would only affect the interests of the litigants involved."6 The only individuals that stood to benefit from a favorable judgment in Great
Coastal were the union or the company. Hartford-Empire's fraud in
Hazel-Atlas, on the other hand, involved the interests of the public at
large since the fraud concerned a patent which is nothing more than a
government sanctioned and enforced monopoly.' The Supreme Court,
therefore, precluded Hartford-Empire Co. from subjecting the public to
an illegal monopoly solely on account of Hazel-Atlas Co.'s failure to un.cover the fraudulent publication within a year of judgment." In Great
Coastal, the absence of an issue of public significance precluded the
Fourth Circuit from granting the union relief under the fraud on the
court provision of rule 60(b)."
The union's fraud on the court motion for relief also failed since
Great Coastal's fraud did not present a deliberate scheme aimed at
defrauding the court." Discrediting the union in order to extract a larger
damage award from the union was the sole object of Great Coastal's
fraud.9 In Hazel-Atlas, on the other hand, defrauding the patent office
and appellate courts into granting and upholding a patent on the gobfeeding process was the sole object of Hartford-Empire Co.'s fraud. 92
Hartford-Empire Co. had not conceived the fraudulent article after the
fact in order to ensure its patent infringement judgment against HazelAtlas Co.93 On the contrary, Hartford-Empire Co.'s fraud had involved a

F. Supp. 712, 717-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (perjury in patent invalidity suit did not constitute
fraud on court), affd, 217 F.2d 646 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955);
Porcelli v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 78 F.R.D. 499, 501 (E.D. Wisc.) (perjury did not constitute fraud on court), affd without opinion, 588 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1978); Petry v. General
Motors Corp., 62 F.R.D. 357, 360 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (false and misleading answers to interrogatories did not constitute fraud on court); Lockwood v. Bowles, 46 F.R.D. 625, 630 (D.D.C.
1969) (perjury did not constitute fraud on court since perjury did not involve court or officer
of court). See generally MOORE, supranote 3, 60.33; WRIGHT & MILLER, supranote 3, § 2870.
" 322 U.S. at 245-46; see supra text accompanying notes 55-58 (two requirements of
Hazel-Atlas fraud on court).
' 675 F.2d at 1352; see supra text accompanying notes 55-58 (two requirements of
Hazel-Atlas fraud on court).
675 F.2d at 1352.
322 U.S. at 245.
322 U.S. at 245-46.
675 F.2d at 1352.
90 Id.
91 Id.

322 U.S. at 245-46.
Id. at 240-42.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:459

deliberately planned scheme to defraud the patent office and the appellate courts. 4 Since the object of Great Coastal's fraud was the union
rather than the court, the Fourth Circuit's decision to deny the union's
fraud on the court motion was correct.95
The Fourth Circuit also properly rejected the union's independent
action for relief. 96 Although the merits of an independent action for relief
in certain circuits turns on the unconscionability of the judgment
assailed," grounds for an independent action in the Fourth Circuit exist
only when the original judgment had involved extrinsic rather than intrinsic fraud."' Perjury and fabricated evidence are classic forms of intrinsic fraud. 9 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, correctly denied the
union's plea for equitable relief by independent action.'
The dissent, in failing to distinguish the nature of the fraud involved
in Hazel-Atlas from the fraud present in Great Coastal, was incorrect. 1

11Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 55-58 (two requirements of Hazel-Atlas fraud

on court).
"' 675 F.2d at 1352.
96

Id.

1 See Marshal v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891). The Supreme Court in Holmes granted a
litigant equitable relief from a judgment which had been procured by intrinsic fraud. Id. at
592. The fraud consisted of a forged letter purportedly signed by the petitioner granting an
agent authority to enter into agreements on petitioner's behalf. Id. Even though the alleged
fraud, fabricated evidence, constituted intrinsic fraud pursuant to Throckmorton, the Court
granted relief. Id. at 596. According to the Holmes Court, the dispositive element in
weighing the merits of an independent action for relief is whether or not the judgment, as it
stands, is unconscionable, and not upon the Throckmorton distinction between intrinsic and
extrinsic fraud. Id.; see ProposalFor General Reform, supra note 2, at 545 (dichotomy exists between Throckmorton and Holmes); Moore & Rogers, supra note 2, at 657-58 (Holmes

decision contradicts Throckmorton). But see Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Callicotte, 267 F.
799, 802-03 (8th Cir. 1920) (Eighth Circuit views Holmes as consistent with Throckmorton),
cert. denied, 255 U.S. 570 (1921).

In Publicker v. Shallcross, 106 F.2d 949 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 624 (1939), the
Third Circuit adopted the Holmes analysis of an independent action over the Throckmorton
approach. Id. 960. The fraud in Publickerconsisted of perjury. Id. Specifically rejecting the
Throckmorton distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud, the Third Circuit in
Publicker found the Holmes approach to independent actions controlling. Id.; see Schum v.
Bailey, 578 F.2d 493, 508 (3rd Cir. 1978) (Holmes rather than Throckmorton controlling in
Third Circuit).
"' 675 F.2d at 1352; see Durham v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 208 F.2d 342, 345
(4th Cir. 1953) (only fraud extrinsic or collateral to issue already tried supports independent
action for relief in Fourth Circuit); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Abbott, 130 F.2d 40, 43-44
(4th Cir. 1942) (same); Chrysler Corp. v. Superior Dodge, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 179, 186 (D. Md.
1979) (same); Prickett v. Duke Power Co., 49 F.R.D. 116, 118-19 (D.S.C. 1970) (same).
" See supra note 82 (perjury and fabrication of evidence are frauds intrinsic to issue
already tried and do not support independent actions for relief); supra note 4 (perjury and
fabrication of evidence constitute intrinsic frauds).
675 F.2d at 1352.
"o'Id. at 1358-65; see supra text accompanying notes 84-94 (Great Coastal's fraud did
not involve a deliberately planned scheme to defraud a court on an issue of public
significance).
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Great Coastal's fraud presented a deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme to defraud the union, not the court, and therefore was
distinguishable from Hazel-Atlas."2 In addition, the dissent's assertion
that Great Coastal's fraud involved an issue of public significance was
also incorrect since the only parties involved and affected by the fraud
were Great Coastal and the union."3 The dissent, consequently, misapplied the Hazel-Atlas decision.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Great Coastal Express, Inc.
v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters establishes guideposts for
the Fourth Circuit practioner seeking equitable relief from a fraudulent
judgment."4 The number of years that have passed between entry of a
fraudulent judgment and a petition for relief is of principal concern to
the practioner since the timeliness of a plea for relief determines which
provision of rule 60(b) to proceed under."' Regardless of the type of
fraud involved," 6 if a petition for relief is made within a reasonable time,
not exceeding one year from the entry of the original judgment, a rule
60(b)(3) motion is in order." 7 The exact nature of the fraud involved in the
original judgment becomes dispositive once the one-year limitation applicable to rule 60(b)(3) expires."' In the Fourth Circuit, Throckmorton
remains dispositive of equitable relief by independent action."' Only
fraud extrinsic to the issues litigated in the original judgment will support an independent action for relief."' Hazel-Atlas, on the other hand,
remains dispositive of the definition of fraud on the court in the Fourth
Circuit."' The presence of a deliberately planned and carefully executed
scheme to defraud a court on an issue of great public significance remains the foundation for equitable relief from a judgment based upon
the grounds of fraud on the court."2 Such fraud will include bribery of a
judge, juror, or any fraud involving an attorney as an officer of the

"0 See supra text accompanying notes 89-94 (object of Great Coastal's fraud was union

not court).
" See supra text accompanying notes 84-88 (Great Coastal's fraud affected only union
and company).
675 F.2d at 1353-58.
"3 See supra note 1 (rule 60(b)).
See supra notes 4 & 5 (any type of fraud, misrepresentation, or other wrongful acts
committed by prevailing party in attainment of inequitable judgment constitutes grounds
for rule 60(b)(3) relief); supra text accompanying notes 76-78 (if union had brought timely
60(b)(3) motion court would have granted union relief).
" See supra note 8 (time limitations of rule 60(b) petitions for relief from fraudulent
judgments).
"' See supra text accompanying note 9 (significance of allowing fraud on the court
relief when basis of petition for relief is fraud between parties).
"3 See supra note 6 (Throckmorton); supra text accompanying notes 95-99 (Throckmorton controlling in Fourth Circuit).
"' See supra note 97 (only extrinsic fraud supports independent action).
" See supra text accompanying notes 84-94 (Hazel-Atlas controlling in Fourth Circuit).
" See supra text accompanying notes 84-94 (elements of Hazel-Atlas fraud on court).
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court."' Perjury and
the fabrication of evidence alone will not amount to
1 14
fraud on the court

WILLIAM RANDALL SPALDING

D.

Rule 63: Disability of a Judge

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the rules) function to ensure
efficiency, economy, and fairness in civil trials.' Occasionally, however,
the death or illness of a judge may impede the usual course of civil litigation.' Rule 63 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (rule 63) provides
for the substitution of judges when the original judge cannot complete
the court's duties in a lawsuit.' Rule 63 specifies that substitution of

",

See supra notes 7 & 31 (egregious frauds which constitute fraud on court).
supra note 82 (perjury and fabrication of evidence do not constitute fraud on

114 See

court).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (courts should interpret Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to ensure fair, speecy, and inexpensive proceedings); Markham v. Holt, 369 F.2d 940, 943 (5th
Cir. 1966) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require just, speedy, and inexpensive results).
2 See St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Henwood, 157 F.2d 337, 342 (8th Cir. 1946) (substitution of judges interrupts trial). When a judge becomes disabled during a trial, litigation will
either cease altogether or slow down while a new judge familiarizes himself with the record.
Id.
, FED. R. Civ. P. 63. If the court has returned a verdict or made findings of fact or conclusions of law before the original judge becomes disabled, a substitute judge may exercise
discretion to decide whether he should complete the trial. Id.
Rule 63 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (rule 63) superseded the Act of June 5,
1900. Act of June 5, 1980, ch. 717, 31 Stat. 270 (formerly codified as 28 U.S.C. § 776). The
1900 statute permitted a substitute judge to sign a bill of exceptions when the judge who
presided at trial was unable to sign due to sickness, death, or some other disability. See id.
A bill of exceptions, which preserves a party's exceptions to issues of law, is valid only
when a judge's signature appears on the bill. See Avery v. Bender, 119 Vt. 313, -,
126
A.2d 99, 108 (1956) (parties preserve exceptions to rulings of law by filing bill of exceptions);
Keeshin Motor Express Co. v. Glassman, 219 Ind. 538, -,
38 N.E,2d 847, 849 (1942) (bill of
exceptions not valid unless judge signed bill). A judge's mere absence did not constitute a
disability that would permit a substitute judge to sign the bill under the 1900 act. See
Walton v. Southern Pac. Co., 53 F.2d 63, 67 (9th Cir. 1931) (when original trial judge was absent from circuit, substitute judge could not sign bill of exceptions). Moreover, the
substitute judge had to state in the bill of exceptions the reason that the original judge was
unable to sign the bill. See Ulmer v. United States, 266 F. 176, 181 (2d Cir. 1920) (bill of exceptions invalid because substitute judge failed to explain on certificate why trial judge did
not sign).
Prior to the Act of June 5, 1900, bills of exception required the signature of the judge
who presided at the trial. See Malony v. Adsit, 175 U.S. 281, 288 (1899) (appellate court
would not consider bill of exceptions without signature of trial judge); see Act of June 1,
1872, ch. 255, § 4, 17 Stat. 197 (judge who sat at trial must sign bill of exceptions). The adoption of rule 63 significantly expanded the 1900 statute. The current rule permits substitute
judges to complete all of the court's duties when the original judge filed findings of fact and
conclusions of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 63.
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judges may occur after the first judge has filed findings of fact and conclusions of law or after the court has returned a verdict.4 Although a
judge's role is more active in nonjury trials than in jury trials,5 rule 63
does not distinguish between the two types of trials in allowing judge
substitution.' Traditionally, however, courts have applied the rule only
to situations in which a judge tried the case without a jury.7 The Fourth
Circuit considered the application of rule 63 to a jury trial in Whalen v.
Ford Motor Credit Co.8
In Whalen, Judge C. Stanley Blair died unexpectedly after the parties had completed three weeks of testimony.' Ford Motor Credit Company (Ford Credit) subsequently moved for a mistrial on the basis of rule
63.10 Judge Herbert F. Murray, substituting for Judge Blair, denied the
motion and heard two additional weeks of testimony before the trial
ended." On appeal, Ford Credit contended that rule 63 mandated a new
trial due to the improper substitution of Judge Murray.'2 A Fourth Cir-

FED. R. Civ. P. 63. Rule 63 does not specify whether a judge or jury must return the
verdict before a substitution occurs. Id.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 52 (judge shall find facts in nonjury trials); Gupta v. East Tex.
State Univ., 654 F.2d 411, 415 (5th Cir. 1981) (requirement that judge in nonjury trial find
facts specially ensures that judge is careful when ascertaining facts); Address by Judge
James C. Turk, Proceedings of Seminar for Newly Appointed United States District Judges
(Sept. 14, 1976), reprintedin 75 F.R.D. 131, 131 (1978) (judge in nonjury trial must find facts
and determine credibility of witnesses).
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 63.
Compare Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 267-69 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (new trial

necessary when trial judge sitting without jury died before filing findings of fact and conclusions of law) and Arrow-Hart, Inc. v. Philip Carey Co., 552 F.2d 711, 713 (6th Cir. 1977) (absent stipulation by parties, judge could not substitute for another judge during nonjury trial
when original judge died before filing findings of fact and conclusions of law) with Lever v.
United States, 443 F.2d 350, 351 (2d Cir. 1971) (when judge died after filing findings of fact
and conclusions of law, new judge permitted to handle posttrial motions).
' Whalen v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 684 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (plurality opinion),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 216 (1982).
' Id. at 273.
10Id.
" Id. In Whalen, the substitute judge interpreted rule 63 as a grant of authority for
substitute judges to exercise discretion when considering motions for mistrial. Id. at 273-74.
Substitute Judge Murray reasoned that since rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (rule 25) permits judge substitution before the jury returns a verdict, substitute
judges in civil trials should be able to continue trials when the trial judge dies before the
end of testimony. Id. at 273.
12 Id.
at 274. Although judges may grant mistrials for a variety of reasons, judges
usually grant mistrials because of some flaw in the proceedings. Hoffer v. Burd, 7 N.D. 278,
- 49 N.W.2d 282, 292 (1951); see, e.g., Beck v. Wings Field, Inc., 122 F.2d 114, 117 (3rd
Cir. 1941) (prejudicial statement of witness is ground for mistrial); Jones v. Anderson, 404 F.
Supp. 182, 186 (S.D. Ga. 1974) (trial judge may declare mistrial when juror appears biased
against party), affd, 522 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1975); Baker v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 269
S.W.2d 78, 84-88 (Mo. 1959) (misconduct of counsel in opening argument is ground for
mistrial); Printed Terry Finishing Co. v. Lebanon, 247 Pa. Super. 277, 299, 372 A.2d 460, 471
(1977) (new trial necessary when counsel communicated with juror without proving
harmlessness of communication).
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cuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed the trial court decision to deny the
mistrial motion. 3 Yet upon en banc review, a Fourth Circuit plurality
reversed the panel's decision and ordered a new trial. 4
The Whalen plurality, in the en banc review, reasoned that rule 63
prohibits judge substitution prior to the filing of findings in both jury
and nonjury trials since rule 63 does not specify either type of trial. 5
The plurality stated that the phrase "after return of verdict" implies
that rule 63 applies to jury trials. 6 To support its-position, the plurality
cited some personal records of the Advisory Committee on the Civil
Rules 7 and undertook a comparison of rule 63 with rule 25 of the Federal

" See Whalen v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 32 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 678, 679 (4th
Cir. 1981). A circuit court of appeals may direct that a panel of three circuit judges hear a
case on appeal from a district court. 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). A majority of the
circuit judges in active service, however, may order that the court rehear an appeal en
banc. FED. R. App. P. 35(a). Usually, a circuit court will hear an appeal en banc to avoid inconsistent decisions or to address an extremely important issue. Id.
In Whalen, a Fourth Circuit panel majority reasoned that rule 63 is inapplicable to
cases in which the judge dies before the court returns a verdict. 32 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) at 679-80. The panel majority pointed to the history of rule 63 to support its
position. Id.; see supra note 3 (rule 63 represented expansion of powers of substitute judge).
Consequently, the panel majority held that rule 63 did not require a mistrial in Whalen. 32
Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 678. The Whalen dissent in the en banc opinion adopted the
reasoning of the panel majority. Whalen v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 684 F.2d 272, 280 (4th
Cir. 1982) (Butzner, J., dissenting) (en band); see infra notes 26-42 and accompanying text.
Similarly, the en bane plurality opinion represents the view of the panel dissent. 684 F.2d at
272 (plurality opinion) (en banc); see infra notes 15-25 and accompanying text.
14 684 F.2d at 274 (plurality opinion) (en banc). A plurality opinion represents the principal rationale of a court that fails to reach a majority opinion. See Note, The Precedential
Value of Supreme Court PluralityDecisions,80 COLUM. L. REv. 756 n.1 (1980) (plurality opinions occur when majority agrees on judgment but not rationale). Since plurality opinions do
not reflect the view of a majority, plurality decisions are not as authoritative as majority
opinions. See Alaska v. Troy, 258 U.S. 101, 111 (1922) (only majority opinions are binding on
other courts).
684 F.2d at 274 (plurality opinion) (en banc); see FED. R. Civ. P. 63.
684 F.2d at 274 (plurality opinion) (en bane). The Whalen plurality contended that
the language of rule 63 suggests that the rulemakers intended rule 63 to apply to both jury
and nonjury trials. Id.; see supra note 3 (rule 63 permits judge substitution "after a verdict
is returned or findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed").
" 684 F.2d at 275-78 (plurality opinion) (en bane). The Whalen plurality relied on personal records of the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, which met 25 years after the
enactment of rule 63. Id. at 275-77. According to the plurality, the Committee understood
rule 63 to prohibit judge substitution, absent consent of all parties, when a judge dies before
filing findings of fact or conclusions of law. Id. The Committee records are available at four
law libraries, Yale University, Harvard University, University of Chicago, and Tulane
University. Id. at 275 n.8. The materials include records of a 1953 Committee meeting at
which members recommended changing rule 63 to allow a substitute 'judge to continue a
trial in which the original judge had not reached a decision. Id. at 275. The proposed amendment did not allow substitute judges to determine the credibility of witnesses, but would
provide, nevertheless, for appropriate substitution in jury trials when the credibility of
witnesses is an issue for the jury to decide. Id. According to the plurality's account of the
meeting, the Committee members concluded that since parties often stipulate that a
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Rules of Criminal Procedure (rule 25).11 The court noted that originally,
neither rule permitted judge substitution prior to a verdict. 9 In 1966,
however, the Judicial Conference of the United States changed the
criminal rules to allow substitution of judges during the course of a
criminal trial. 0 According to the plurality, the lack of similar action by
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules indicates that the Committee did
not intend to provide for a similar substitution during civil trials.2
Finally, the plurality considered whether rule 83 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (rule 83) permitted judge substitution in
Whalen.' The plurality noted that rule 83 allows judges to use discretion

substitute judge may continue a trial that is in its final stages, amendment to rule 63 was
unnecessary. Id. at 276. The plurality also quoted from a 1938 letter to Douglas Arant, Esq.
from Professor James William Moore. Id. at 277. According to Moore, who served on the
Advisory Committee to the Civil Rules, rule 63 allows substitution only if the original judge
had filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. The plurality found the opinions of the
Committee members to be convincing evidence that rule 63 would not permit preverdict
judge substitution absent consent of the parties. Id.
18Id. at 277. Rule 25 permits judge substitution during the course of a criminal trial
before the jury returns a verdict. See FED. R. GRIM. P. 25(a) (substitute judge, after certifying familiarity with trial record, may continue criminal trial); FED. R. CRIM. P. 25(b)
(substitute judge may continue criminal trial when original judge becomes disabled after
court returns verdict).
1 684 F.2d at 277 (plurality opinion) (en bane); see Orfield, Disability of the Judge in
Federal CriminalProcedure,6 ST. Louis U.L.J. 150, 150 (1960) (original rule 25, which was
virtually identical to rule 63, permitted judge substitution in criminal trial after verdict or
finding of guilt).
684 F.2d at 277 (plurality opinion) (en banc). The Judicial Conference of the United
States added paragraph 25(a) to rule 25 in 1966. See 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 391 at 55 n.1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]. According to the Whalen
dissent, the addition of subsection (a) to rule 25 was a reaction to Freeman v. United States,
277 F.732 (2d Cir. 1915). See 684 F.2d at 284 (Butzner, J., dissenting) (en banc). In Freeman,
the appellant claimed that the substitution of judges during his criminal trial had denied him
the sixth amendment right to trial by jury. Id. at 742. The Second Circuit noted that the
substitute judge was unable to instruct the jury regarding the testimony of witnesses which
the judge had read but not heard. Id. at 759. Although one of the judges was present at all
stages of the trial, the Freeman court stated that defendants have a right to have the same
judge preside throughout the trial. Id. 759-60. Moreover, the court held that neither the
government nor the accused may consent to substitution of judges in a criminal trial. Id. at
759; see infra note 32 (Freeman held that both jury and judge must remain unchanged
throughout trial).
Although the dissent attributed the 1966 amendment of rule 25 to Freeman, the Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 amendment points to the increase in the number of long
criminal trials as the reason for the amendment. See FED. R. CRIn. P. 25 advisory committee
note (substitution of judges accommodates increasing number of long trials).
2 684 F.2d at 278 (plurality opinion) (en banc). The Whalen plurality noted that the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules was aware of the amendment to rule 25. Id.; see supra
notes 18-20 and accompanying text (1966 amendment to rule 25 permits judge substitution
during criminal trial). Thus, according to the plurality, the Committee's inaction evidences
an intention not to allow judge substitution during civil jury trials. 684 F.2d at 278 (plurality
opinion) (en banc).
684 F.2d at 278-79 (plurality opinion) (en banc); see infra text accompanying note 28
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in situations for which the rules provide no specific guidance, provided
that judges do not act inconsistently with the rules.' The plurality interpreted rule 63, however, as a positive prohibition on judge substitution
during a civil trial.24 Accordingly, the plurality deemed the application of
rule 83 inappropriate to the present case since judge substitution would
be inconsistent with the rules.'
The Whalen dissent contended, however, that rule 63 contains no
positive prohibition against substitution of judges in jury trials.26
Rather, the dissent stated that since rule 63 simply allows susbstitution
after the jury returns a verdict, the rule is silent on whether substitution is improper before the jury returns a verdict." The dissent reasoned
that since rule 63 does not prohibit expressly the substitution of judges
before the jury returns a verdict, rule 63 would permit substitution as a
matter within the trial court's discretion.28 In addition, the Whalen dissent noted that judge substitution in jury trials would have less impact

(Whalen dissent argued that rule 83 permits judge substitution in jury trials); FED. R. Civ.
P. 83 (when judges confront situations for which Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
provide guidance, judges may act in any way not inconsistent with rules).
684 F.2d at 278 (plurality opinion) (en banc).
Id. at 274.
Id. at 278-79. In refusing to accept the argument that rule 83 permitted substitution,
the Whalen plurality noted that a similar rule exists in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 278. Rule 57(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the
court may act in a manner not inconsistent with the criminal rules when no rule applies to a
particular situation. FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b). Notwithstanding rule 57(b), the Judicial Conference believed an .amendment to rule 25 was necessary to provide adequately for situations in which a judge's disability arises during trial. 684 F.2d at 278-79 (plurality opinion)
(en banc); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 25 advisory committee note (Judicial Conference amended
rule 25 to provide for judge substitution during criminal jury trials). The Fourth Circuit concluded that if amendment to rule 25 was necessary to permit substitution during criminal
trials, the absence of a similar amendment for civil trial substitution indicates that substitution during trial is impermissible. 684 F.2d at 278-79 (plurality opinion) (en banc).
684 F.2d at 281 (Butzner, J., dissenting) (en bane); see supra note 3 (discussion of rule
63).
684 F.2d at 281 (Butzner, J., dissenting) (en band). The Whalen dissent noted that
since the judge has a less active role in jury trials than in nonjury trials, nonjury trials interpreting rule 63 are not appropriate precedent for jury trials. Id. at 280. Moreover, the
dissent criticized the plurality's use of unofficial records of the Advisory Committee. Id. at
281; see supra note 17 (Whalen plurality relied on unofficial records of Advisory Committee
to prove purpose of rule 63). The dissent, relying on a Supreme Court case that warned
against the use of unofficial legislative history, stated that the published notes of the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure are the only appropriate source of
legislative intent. 684 F.2d at 282 (Butzner, J., dissenting) (en banc); see Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13 (1980) (informal subsequent
legislative history is unreliable source of legislative intent). The dissent concluded that the
plurality inappropriately relied on a Committee meeting held 25 years after rule 63's inception. 684 F.2d at 282 (Butzner, J., dissenting) (en banc).
684 F.2d at 282 (Butzner, J., dissenting) (en banc).
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on the outcome of the trial than in nonjury trials in which the judge
makes the factual findings.'
The dissent criticized the plurality's position on several grounds."
First, the dissent pointed out that an analogy to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure demonstrates that preverdict substitution is permissible in-civil jury cases." The dissent noted that the adoption of rule
25(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was a reaction to
Freemanv. United States.' The Freeman court held that the death of a
trial judge during a criminal trial mandates a mistrial.' Since no court
has made a similar ruling in a civil case, the dissent suggested that the
Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules has had no reason to amend rule
63.4
Second, the dissent analogized rule 63 to rule 48 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (rule 48) and concluded that rule 63 does not imply
prohibition of judge substitution in jury trials. 5 The Supreme Court held
6
in Colgrove v. Battin"
that rule 48, which states that parties may agree
to have a jury of less than twelve persons, does not imply that civil
juries must consist of twelve jurors unless the parties stipulate."

I Id. at 280; see FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (judge sitting without jury must find facts); see
supra note 5 (judge in nonjury trial must find facts and assess credibility of witnesses).
See infra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
3, See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
has had no reason to amend rule 63 because no court has held that substitute judge must
order mistrial when original judge becomes disabled before jury returns verdict).
" 227 F. 732 (2d Cir. 1915). In Freeman, a criminal case, judge substitution occurred
after the government finished presenting its evidence. Id. at 759. The government had
presented 106 witnesses, and the substitute judge familiarized himself with the testimony
by reviewing court minutes. Id. According to the Freeman court, a trial judge should hear
the same evidence that the jury hears, and reading testimony is not equivalent to hearing
witnesses in person. Id. The Freeman court, therefore, held that both the jury and the
judge must remain the same throughout the trial. Id. at 759-60; see supra note 20 (Freeman
court held that neither government nor defendant may consent to judge substitution during
criminal trial).
227 F. at 759.
684 F.2d at 284 (Butzner, J., dissenting) (en banc).
Id. at 282; see FED. R. CIv. P. 48 (rule 48) (parties may agree to jury consisting of any
number less than 12).
413 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1973).
684 F.2d at 282 (Butzner, J., dissenting) (en bfnc); see Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S.
149, 163-64 (1973) (rule 48 does not require 12 person jury). In Colgrove, the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a Montana statute that provides for a 6 person jury in
civil trials. Id. at 149-50. The Court held that while the seventh amendment preserves the
right of trial by jury, the seventh amendment does not require that juries consist of 12 persons. Id. at 157. The Supreme Court reasoned that the difference between the results of a 6
person jury and a 12 person jury would not be significant. Id. at 158. In addition, the Colgrove Court stated that rule 48 merely permits parties to stipulate to juries of less than 12
persons. Id. at 164. Rule 48, therefore, does not require a 12 person jury when parties fail to
consent to a jury of less than 12. Id.
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Similarly, the dissent argued, the plurality should not imply that rule 63
prohibits judge substitution when parties fail to agree to the substitution.'
Finally, the dissent dismissed an argument Ford Credit made that
the plurality did not address. 9 Ford Credit contended that the seventh
amendment entitled the parties to a mistrial because the seventh amendment right of trial by jury includes the right to have the same judge
preside throughout the trial.' The dissent reasoned that the seventh
amendment does include the right to a supervised jury, but that the
same judge need not preside throughout the entire trial.41 Furthermore,
the dissent concluded that the seventh amendment does not require that
the same judge preside throughout a civil jury trial any more than the
seventh amendment requires a jury of twelve persons.42
The majority of courts that have considered rule 63 agree that the
death of a trial judge after he has filed findings of fact and conclusions of
law does not require a mistrial.4 3 In nonjury trials, courts generally re684 F.2d at 282 (Butzner, J., dissenting) (en banc). The Whalen dissent contended
that the logic of Colgrove dictated that courts should not draw implications from the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.; see Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1973) (rule
48 does not imply that juries must consist of 12 persons).
" 684 F.2d at 285 (Butzner, J., dissenting) (en banc); see infra note 41 and accompanying text (seventh amendment does not require same judge to preside throughout trial).
40 684 F.2d at 285 (Butzner, J., dissenting) (en banc). In a criminal case prior to the 1966
amendment to rule 25, the Ninth Circuit held that the same judge must preside throughout
a criminal trial. See Simons v. United States, 119 F.2d 539, 544 (9th Cir. 1941) (defendant in
criminal trial has right to have same judge preside throughout trial); see also Patton v.
United States, 281 U.S. 276, 289 (1930) (right to trial by jury includes right to judicial supervision of jury); Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1899) (right to trial by jury includes right to trial by jury under direction of judge).
" 684 F.2d at 285 (Butzner, J., dissenting) (en banc). In Colgrove v. Battin, the
Supreme Court stated that the seventh amendment right to trial by jury is not a right to
the procedure of 1791, when all juries consisted of 12 persons. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S.
149, 156 (1973). The seventh amendment guarantees the substantive right to trial by jury
rather than a right to any particular procedure. Walker v. Southern Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593,
596 (1897). The substantive aspects of trial by jury include the right to have a jury decide
factual issues. Id. Since the size of a jury does not affect the jury's reliability, the Colgrove
Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute permitting juries of 6 persons. 413 U.S.
at 157-60.
" 684 F.2d at 285 (Butzner, J., dissenting) (en banc). The Whalen dissent reasoned that
the court is a continuous institution. Id. at 282. When one judge cannot complete a case,
therefore, a substitute judge should continue the case unless judge substitution would prejudice the parties. Id. at 283. The Whalen dissent relied on St. Louis SouthwesternRailway
Co. v. Henwood, a bankruptcy case in which the Eighth Circuit concluded that a substitute
judge could continue the trial unless judge substitution would impair justice. Id. at 282-83;
see St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Henwood, 157 F.2d 337, 342 (8th Cir. 1946). In St. Louis, the
original judge died after counsel had completed their arguments. Id. at 340. The substitute
judge concluded that the parties did not have a right to a new trial. Id. Instead, the
substitute judge viewed the issue of mistrial as a matter within the court's discretion. Id.
4' See U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Schiavo Bros., Inc., 32 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1419,
1423 (3rd Cir. 1981) (substitute judge may reconsider legal conclusions of judge who re-
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quire new trials when a judge dies before filing findings of fact and conclusions of law.4 Virtually all courts agree that when credibility of
witnesses is an issue, the importance of first-hand impression by the
trial judge outweighs the general policy of judicial economy."
The Whalen court is the first court to consider rule 63 in the context
of a civil jury trial in which the judge died before the jury returned a
verdict."6 As the Whalen decision clearly indicates, rule 63 does not

signed after filing judgment); Villareal v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, 545 F.2d 978, 979-80
(5th Cir. 1977) (substitute judge may rule on motions for reconsideration when original
judge died after filing findings of fact and conclusions of law); Lever v. United States, 443
F.2d 350, 351 (2d Cir. 1971) (when original judge has filed findings of fact and conclusions of
law, substitute judge may rule on posttrial motions); Bangor & Aroostook R.R. v. Bhd. of
Locomotive Firemen & Engineermen, 314 F. Supp. 352, 355-56 (D.D.C. 1970) (substitute
judge may complete court's duties after original trial judge has stated conclusions of law).
" See supra note 7 (new trial necessary when judge dies before filing findings of fact
and conclusions of law); see also Ten-O-Win Amusement Co. v. Casino Theatre, 2 F.R.D. 242,
243 (N.D. Cal. 1942) (substitute judge may not finish case if original judge did not file findings of fact or conclusions of law). But see Bromberg v. Moul, 275 F.2d 574, 576 n.1 (2d Cir.
1960) (court approved substitution of new judge after original judge died without making
any findings). According to the Bromberg court, rule 63 does not address the situation in
which a trial judge dies before filing findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. Consequently, the Bromberg court stated that rule 63 did not prohibit judge substitution when the
original judge died before reaching a decision. Id. In absence of an express prohibition on
judge substitution, the Bromberg court approved the substitute judge's power to grant
summary judgment to one of the parties. Id. at 576.
" See, e.g., Anaya v. Romero, 627 F.2d 226, 227-28 (10th Cir. 1980) (absent stipulation
by parties, original magistrate in hearing must determine any findings involving credibility
of witnesses), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 926 (1981); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Siraco, 174 F.2d
360, 364 (2d Cir. 1949) (even when parties stipulated that substitute judge should continue
case, new trial necessary because credibility of witnesses was issue); Sunshine v. Sunshine,
488 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Colo. App. 1971) (nothing in text of Colorado rule 63, which is same
language as federal rule 63, gives successor judge power to judge credibility of witnesses).
But see St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Henwood, 157 F.2d 337, 342-43 (8th Cir. 1946) (court permitted judge substitution when substitute judge determined witness' credibility by comparing record of oral testimony with witness' written statements prior to trial).
46 See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text (facts of Whalen). The Fourth Circuit in
Whalen was the first court to interpret rule 63 as a prohibition against judge substitution
when a judge sitting without a jury died before the jury returned a verdict. But a district
court in Burrill v. Shaughnessy considered the effect of rule 63 on civil jury trials when a
judge died after the jury returned a verdict. See Burrill v. Shaughnessy, 9 Fed. R. Serv.
(Callaghan) 918, 919 (N.D.N.Y. 1946). In Burrill,the original judge died after the jury returned a verdict but before the judge filed any findings of fact or conclusions of law. Id.
Although the Burrill court found that the jury had returned a verdict within the meaning of
rule 63, the court ordered a mistrial on issues that the jury did not determine. Id. Thus, the
Burrill court was reluctant to permit judge substitution even though the jury had returned
a verdict in accordance with rule 63. Id.
Other courts have considered the effect of rule 63 on posttrial motions. See Miller v.
Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 161 F. Supp. 633, 636 (D.D.C. 1958) (when trial judge died after jury
returned verdict, another judge properly ruled on motion for new trial); Lashbrook v. Kennedy Motor Lines, 119 F. Supp. 716, 717 (W.D. Pa. 1954) (substitute judge ruled on motion
for new trial when original judge died after jury returned verdict).
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distinguish between jury and nonjury trials." Yet the differences between the two types of trials are too significant to disregard. 8 Unlike
the judge sitting without a jury, the judge in a jury trial does not make
factual findings or determine credibility of witnesses. Although fairness
to the parties may require a mistrial in some jury cases in which the
judge is unable to finish the trial,49 a requirement of mistrial in all jury
cases would result in unnecessary litigation. Interestingly, the concurrence in Whalen, which enabled the plurality to prevail on the substitution issue, stated that rule 63 should treat jury trials differently than
nonjury trials. 0
Under the Whalen dissent's interpretation of rule 63, a successor
judge may order a mistrial only to prevent potential prejudice to a party."
The dissent, therefore, would promote a balancing test in judge substitution disputes that would weigh the policy of judicial economy against the
potential prejudice to the parties. The balancing test would result in
more equitable resolutions of the substitution problem than the Whalen
plurality's rigid rule will produce. 2 Since criminal trials afford protections to the defendant that generally exceed the protections which civil
actions require, and since rule 25 allows judge substitution during
criminal jury trials,53 no practical reason exists for prohibiting judge
substitution during all civil jury trials.5 4 In addition, the Supreme Court
has established that the substantive right to trial by jury in civil cases

'" See FED. R. Civ. P. 63 (substitute judge may complete trial when original judge dies
after court returns verdict or judge files findings).
4' See supra note 5 (rules require judge to find facts and determine credibility of
witnesses in nonjury trial).
'
See supra note 20 (substitute judge could not instruct jury on credibility of
witnesses). If a judge's absence from part of the trial hinders the judge's ability to instruct
the jury, perhaps fairness to parties would require a mistrial.
' 684 F.2d at 279-80 (Winter, C.J., concurring) (en banc). Chief Judge Winter's concurrence with the plurality enabled the court to reach a decision. Id. The Chief Judge stated
that his support for the plurality opinion stemmed from the unseemliness of the Whalen
facts and the potential for confusion should the court fail to reach a decision. Id. at 279. In
hopes of avoiding similar conflicts, Chief Judge Winter has asked the Advisory Committee
on the Civil Rules to reconsider an amendment to rule 63. Id. at 280. The subject of amendment to rule 63 is currently on the agenda for the next meeting of the Advisory Committee
on the Civil Rules. Letter from Walter R. Mansfield, Chairman of Advisory Comm. on the
Civil Rules, to Joy Rattray (September 20, 1982).
51 684 F.2d at 284 (Butzner, J., dissenting) (en banc).
52 See supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text (Whalen plurality held rule 63 required mistrial when judge died before jury returned verdict or court filed findings of fact
and conclusions of law).
' See supra note 20 (criminal rules permit judge substitution when substitute judge
certifies familiarity with record).
I See Brief for Appellee at 53, Whalen v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 684 F.2d 272 (4th
Cir.) (plurality opinion) (en banc) (since criminal rules permit judge substitution when defendant's liberty is at stake, civil rules should permit judge substitution when only money is at
stake), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 216 (1982).
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does not include the right to a particular procedure or form of jury
trial."5 Thus, judge substitution during jury trials presents no constitutional problem."
In light of the Whalen decision, however, an amendment to rule 63 to
clarify its scope is the only way to avoid similar rigid decisions when
judge substitution is necessary. Absent an amendment to rule 63, parties under similar circumstances may cite Whalen as direct authority for
a mistrial even when the interests of judicial economy and fairness to
the parties suggest a different result.57 Rule 63, therefore, should
distinguish between jury and nonjury trials. 8 The death of a presiding
judge in a jury trial usually will have little effect on the jury's verdict.
Yet a retrial is both costly and time-consuming for all parties. Considering the congestion in the federal court system, courts should not grant
mistrials indiscriminately. 5 Perhaps the Advisory Committee on the
Civil Rules will react to the Whalen decision by amending rule 63.6o In
the meantime, Fourth Circuit attorneys should be prepared to begin a
new trial whenever a judge becomes disabled in the course of a civil jury
trial.
JOY MALLICK RATTRAY

E.

Supersedeas Bond Necessary for 28 U.S. C. § 1963

Before Congress enacted section 1963 of title 28 of the United States
Code (section 1963), a creditor wishing to enforce a judgment against a
debtor with assets in a foreign district had to obtain a separate judgI See Walker v. Southern Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897) (Supreme Court held
seventh amendment provides only substantive right to trial by jury).
-"See supra note 41 and accompanying text (dissent's argument that seventh amendment does not prohibit judge substitution during trial); see generally Henderson, The
Backgroundof the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289, 337 (1966) (courts should not
interpret seventh amendment as mandating specific procedure).
" See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text (Whalen plurality held that rule 63 prohibited judge substitution when judge died before jury returned verdict).
See supra note 4 (rule 63 does not specify jury or nonjury trial).
" See CIVIL TRIAL MANUAL 2, 3-5 (2d ed. 1981) (United States court system is overcrowded and number of cases is increasing); Federal Courts; Still Slow and Expensive, 28
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 7 (Jan. 14, 1980) (backlog of cases partly due to increase in
number of long, complex trials).
I See supra note 50 (subject of amendment to rule 63 is on agenda for Advisory Committee on Civil Rules).
' 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976). Section 1963 provides that a judgment creditor who has
secured a judgment in an action for the recovery of money or property in a federal district
court may register the judgment in a foreign federal district by filing with the foreign
district court a certified copy of the judgment. Id. Under § 1963, however, registration is
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ment in the foreign district.2 Courts required an independent action in
the foreign district on the theory that a debtor had the right to contest
the validity of the judgment according to the laws of the enforcing
state.' Congress enacted section 1963 to streamline the procedure judgment creditors must employ to execute a judgment in a foreign district
Section 1963 accomplishes the streamlining function by allowing a judgment creditor who has secured a judgment in an action for the recovery
of. money or property in a federal district court to register that judgment in a foreign district by filing with the foreign district court a certified copy of the judgment.' Under section 1963, however, a creditor can
register the judgment only if the debtor has not filed an appeal of the
judgment or if the judgment debtor's time for appeal has expired.' Since
the wording of the statute permits registration only when the judgment
is "final by appeal or by the expiration of time for appeal,' 7 section 1963
provides the judgment debtor a stay of execution of the judgment either
until the appellate court has affirmed the district court judgment or until the thirty day time limit for appeal elapses.'

not permissible unless the judgment has become final by appeal or the time for appeal has
elapsed. Id.; see infra note 8 (28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1976) allows a party thirty days to appeal
from district court judgment). A registered judgment has the same effect in the foreign
district as the original judgment has in the district of trial. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976).
2 See Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1942) (enforcement of judgment rendered in foreign state court usually depends upon separate judgment in action to
enforce foreign judgment), reh'g denied, 315 U.S. 829 (1942); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,
227-28 (1895) (judgment creditor must obtain second judgment in local federal court to enforce judgment of foreign district court).
' See James v. Allen, 1 U.S. [1 Dall.] 188, 191 (1786) (local court can retry action
according to local law although foreign court previously rendered independent judgment).
' See Urban Indus., Inc. of Ky. v. Thevis, 670 F.2d 981, 985 (11th Cir. 1982) (section
1963 is streamlined alternative to bringing second suit in foreign district); Bros, Inc. v. W.
E. Grace Mfg. Co., 261 F.2d 428, 433 n.4 (5th Cir. 1958) (section 1963 provides extraterritorial enforcement machinery for enforcing judgments in foreign districts); infra text
accompanying notes 54-70 (discussion of Thevis and Bros); infra text accompanying notes
37-42 (intent of Supreme Court Advisory Committee that drafted language of § 1963); cf.
Juneau Spruce Corp. v. International Long & Warehouseman's Union, 128 F. Supp. 697, 700
(D. Hawaii 1955) (Congress designed registration statute to relieve both creditors and debtors of additional cost and harrassment of further litigation that otherwise would be incident
to action on judgment in foreign district).
28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976); see supra note 1 (language of § 1963).
6 28 U.S.C. § 1963.
7Id.

' See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976) (language of § 1963 does not require filing of supersedeas
bond); 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1976) (party must file notice of appeal from district court judgment
within thirty days after entry of final judgment). A supersedeas bond is a bond that a court
requires of a judgment debtor who petitions to set aside a judgment and that makes the
other party whole if the debtor's action is unsuccessful. See Ransom v. City of Pierre, 101 F.
665, 669 (8th Cir. 1900) (supersedeas bond merely operates to stay execution or other final
process on judgment but does not vacate judgment, nor prevent either party from invoking
judgment as estoppel); Louisville Trust Co. v. National Bank of Ky., 3 F. Supp. 925, 926
(E.D. Ky. 1933) (supersedeas bond is bond to pay damages that appellee may sustain by
reason of an unsuccessful appeal); Wheeler v. Rea, 306 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Ky. 1957)
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In contrast to section 1963, rule 62(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 9 and rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, °
which relate to execution of a creditor's judgment in the district of trial,
permit a judgment debtor to stay the effects of an adverse judgment
pending appeal only by filing a supersedeas bond. 1 Although the
debtor's filing of a supersedeas bond is not mandatory, failure to file a
bond allows the creditor to proceed with execution of the judgment
against assets located in the district of trial regardless of the pending
appeal.12 In Kaplan v. Hirsh,3 the Fourth Circuit considered whether
(supersedeas bond is covenant to perform judgment and to pay all damages and costs); cf.
Anderson v. Pickrell, 115 Ariz. 589, 590, 566 P.2d 1335, 1336 (1977) (superior court acted
beyond its authority in staying execution of debtor's judgment pending appeal on basis of
written understanding with court as substitute for filing of supersedeas bond).
' FED. R. Civ. P. 62(d). Rule 62(d) provides that when a debtor appeals a judgment, the
debtor can obtain a stay of execution of the judgment only by filing a supersedeas bond in
the district court. Id.; see infra note 10 (procedure for filing bond and staying execution of
judgment). Rule 62(d) states further that the debtor may file the bond at or after the time of
filing the notice of appeal or at the time of procuring the order allowing the appeal. FED. R.
Civ. P. 62(d). Rule 62(d) provides that the stay is effective only when the district court approves the supersedeas bond. Id. Rule 62(d) does not set a statutory amount for a
supersedeas bond. See id.; 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FED. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2905, at 327 (1973). Unless local rules in a district regulate the amount of a bond, courts
tend to follow guidelines described in now rescinded Civil Rule 73(d). Id. Congress rescinded
rule 73(d) in 1968 when Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id.
Former rule 73(d) provided that the bond amount should equal the amount of the judgment
and any costs, interest, and damage that the appellate court deems appropriate. Civ. R.
73(d). If the judgment is for money not otherwise secured, the bond amount should cover the
whole amount of the judgment remaining unsatisfied as well as costs on appeal, interest,
and damages for delay. Id.
"0 FED. R. App. P. 8. Rule 8 provides the procedure for obtaining a stay of execution of
a judgment from a district court. Id. Rule 8 states that a debtor initially must file an application for a stay of the judgment or for approval of a supersedeas bond in the district court.
Id. The debtor also must file in the district court an application for an order of the court
pending appeal or an order modifying an injunction while an appeal is pending. Id.
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 62(d) (debtor can gain stay on execution of judgment in local
district only by filing supersedeas bond in local district court); FED. R. App. P. 8 (same);
supra note 8 (defining supersedeas bond).
" See Sterling v. Blackwelder, 405 F.2d 884, 884 (4th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (failure to
comply with rule 62(d) resulted in dismissal of judgment debtor's appeal of order confirming
judicial sale of appellant's property); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Davis, 127 F.2d 780,
782 (4th Cir. 1942) (dictum) (bond required if debtor desires to stay execution of judgment
pending appeal); see also 9 J. MOORE, B. WARD & J.D. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
208.03 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE]; 7 J. MOORE & J. D.
LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
62.06 (2d ed. 1981) (judgment debtor's failure to file
supersedeas bond permits prevailing party to treat judgment of district court as final
despite the pendancy of an appeal). But see Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v. American
Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 636 F.2d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (power to grant stay within discretion of district court even if no bond filed); 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE supra, 208.06[1]
at 8-18 (although rule 62(d) requires debtor's filing of supersedeas bond, district court may
stay execution of judgment without requiring bond in absence of irreparable harm to appellee).
13 33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1570 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3538
(U.S. April 26, 1982) (No. 81-1789).
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courts should avoid the apparent inconsistency between section 1963
and the Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure (rules) by interpreting
section 1963 as implicitly requiring a debtor to file a supersedeas bond to
stay the execution of the judgment. 4
Dr. Harry Kaplan obtained a judgment against Samuel Hirsh in the
5
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Although
Hirsh filed a timely notice of appeal, he failed to file a supersedeas bond
to stay execution of the judgment. 6 Kaplan then attempted to register
the judgment in the United States District Court in the District of
Maryland pursuant to section 1963." The Maryland district court,
however, refused to register the judgment on the theory that the judgment was not final by appeal under section 1963.8 The Maryland district
court effectively granted Hirsh a stay of execution by refusing to
register the judgment even though Hirsh had failed to post a
supersedeas bond. 9 Kaplan, the judgment creditor, appealed to the
Fourth Circuit. 0
TIie Fourth Circuit relied on ITT Independent Credit Co. v. Lawco
Energy Inc.2' in reversing the district court's holding.22 In Lawco, the
" 33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1570.
15

Kaplan v. Hirsh, 91 F.R.D. 106, 107 (D. Md. 1981).

"sId.; see supra text accompanying notes 8-11 (necessity of debtor's filing of
supersedeas bond to stay judgment pending appeal).
"791 F.R.D. at 106. The Maryland district court in Kaplan considered the sole issue to
be whether a district court could register judgment in a foreign court while an appeal was
pending. Id. at 107; see supra note 1 (judgment creditor's registration procedure under §
1963).
,' 91 F.R.D. at 106-07. In Kaplan the district court determined that section 1963 expressly required a judgment to be final by appeal before registration was permissible. Id. at
107. The Kaplan court determined that although Congress enacted § 1963 as a streamlined
enforcement procedure for federal judgments, Congress intentionally limited the statute's
application to judgments that are "final by appeal or expiration of time for appeal." Id. at
109. Since Hirsh had filed a timely notice of appeal and the appeal still was pending, the
district court held that the judgment was not final by appeal under the requirements of §
1963. Id. The Kaplan district court concluded that final judgments were the most suitable
subjects for a streamlined enforcement procedure because no danger existed that an appellate court later would reverse the original judgment, and the problem of collateral attack
by the debtor was minimal. Id.
"9Id. at 107. But see infra text accompanying notes 21-29 (Fourth Circuit's reasoning in
reversing Maryland district court).
Kaplan v. Hirsh, 33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1570. In Kaplan the sole issue on
appeal before the Fourth Circuit was whether a creditor could register a judgment in a
foreign district when the debtor failed to file a supersedeas bond pending appeal. Id.
2 86 F.R.D. 708 (S.D. W.Va. 1980). In Lawco the judgment creditor registered a judgment in a foreign district after the time had expired for the debtors to appeal the initial
decision. Id. at 709-10. The debtors then attempted to quash registration of the judgment on
the basis that an appeal of a motion denied by the original district court to set aside the
judgment under rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was pending at the circuit
court level. Id. at 710. Although the Lawco court held that a rule 60(b) motion cannot qualify
as an appeal under § 1963, the court noted the inconsistency between registration of a judgment in a foreign district under § '1963 and execution of a judgment in the local district
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District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia stated in dicta
that courts should interpret section 1963 consistently with the rules.'
The Lawco court held that an interpretation of section 1963 that allows a
stay of execution in a foreign district, regardless of whether the debtor
filed a supersedeas bond, was inconsistent with the rules' allowing a
judgment creditor to levy against a judgment debtor in a local district
unless the debtor has filed a supersedeas bond.24 Applying the Lawco
court's rationale, the Kaplan court held that courts should interpret section 1963 as requiring a supersedeas bond to avoid an unconstitutional
disparity in rights between judgment debtors based solely on the location of the debtor's assets.' The Kaplan court noted that under the rules
a debtor with assets in the district of trial must file a supersedeas bond
to gain a stay of execution pending appeal, while debtors with assets in a
foreign district receive an automatic stay until expiration of the time for
appeal.28 The Kaplan court therefore reasoned that a supersedeas bond
also was necessary under section 1963 to provide equal protection to
debtors with assets within the district of trial.'
In Kaplan, the Fourth Circuit also expressed concern that a strict interpretation of the language of section 1963 might permit a debtor to
escape creditors by filing a frivolous appeal without filing a supersedeas
bond and then transferring property to another district.' The Kaplan
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a).
Id. at 712; see supra notes 8-11 (necessity of debtor's filing of supersedeas bond to stay execution of judgment pending appeal in judgment district).
33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1572.
' 86 F.R.D. at 712 (dicta); see supra note 21 (holding of Lawco).
86 F.R.D. at 712.
33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1571; see 86 F.R.D. at 712 (consistency with rule
62(d) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure demands debtor file bond under § 1963). In determining that a debtor must post a supersedeas bond to stay execution of a judgment under
§ 1963, the Kaplan court followed the constitutional analysis that an Alabama district court
applied in Dorey v. Dorey, 77 F.R.D. 721 (N.D. Ala. 1978), rev'd in part on other grounds,
609 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1980). See 33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1571 n.1. In Dorey, a
divorcee moved for execution of judgment for overdue alimony payments from her exhusband in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. 77 F.R.D.
at 721-22. The debtor husband attempted to avoid payment on the overdue alimony by filing
a frivolous appeal and by switching his property and residency to Texas without filing a
supersedeas bond under § 1963. Id. at 724. In finding for the creditor, the Dorey court held
that a judgment creditor has a constitutional right to collect on the judgment against a debtor in any district in which the debtor's assets are located if the debtor has failed to file a
supersedeas bond. Id. at 723. The Dorey court noted that a literal reading of § 1963 would
give a resident of a nonjudgment district a "super-right" to escape execution of judgment
without having filed a supersedeas bond. Id. at 723. But see infra note 56 (Thevis court's
constitutional interpretation refuting Dorey court).
' 33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1571; see supra notes 1, 9, & 10 (difference between registration procedure and procedure for securing stay of local judgment).
33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1571.
2 Id.; see Dorey v. Dorey, 77 F.R.D. 721 (N.D. Ala. 1978) (debtor attempted to avoid
paying overdue alimony payments by filing frivolous appeal and by moving property and
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majority concluded that interpreting section 1963 as implicitly including
the rules' bond requirement would be the most effective way of preventing a debtor from escaping enforcement of the judgment through abuse
of the appellate process.29 The Fourth Circuit noted that the congressional purpose in enacting section 1963 was to provide a summary enforcement mechanism that would allow successful judgment creditors to
levy against the assets of debtors in foreign districts without having to
file independent actions in the foreign district." The Kaplan majority
reasoned that an interpretation of section 1963 which was consistent
with the rules would advance the legislative purpose underlying section
31
1963.
Judge Murnaghan dissented, arguing that the statutory language of
section 1963 clearly provides that a judgment is not "final by appeal" if
an appeal is pending.2 Judge Murnaghan reasoned that any judgment
which an appellate court could reverse is not final even though the judgment debtor has posted a supersedeas bond. 3 The dissent argued that
the majority incorrectly interpreted the congressional intent underlying
section 1963.1' The dissent reasoned that Congress placed a higher value
on finalizing judgments than on facilitating a creditor's collection of
judgments in foreign districts. 5 Judge Murnaghan argued that an exresidence without filing supersedeas bond or seeking stay of execution, which are unnecessary under § 1963), rev'd in part on other grounds, 609 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1980); supra
note 25 (discussion of Dorey).
' 33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1571; see supra notes 1, 9 & 10 (application of rules
and § 1963).
1 33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1571-72; see ITT Indus. Credit Co. v. Lawco, 86
F.R.D. 708, 712 (S.D. W.Va. 1980) (dicta) (unjust not to interpret § 1963 as requiring filing of
supersedeas bond); Dorey v. Dorey, 77 F.R.D. 721, 723 (N.D. Ala. 1978) (under § 1963,
creditor can register judgment where judgment debtor has not filed bond), rev'd in part on
othergrounds, 609 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1980). The Kaplan court noted that an interpretation
of § 1963 as requiring the filing of a supersedeas bond was important to creditors who not
always are able to bring an independent action on the judgment. 33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1571 n.3. The Fourth Circuit noted that if the creditor is unable to find the judgment
debtor in the same district as the property, the debtor has frustrated service of process and
has rendered collection impossible until the appellate process is complete. Id.
3, 33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1571.
z Id. at 1572 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1572; see infra note 48 (majority of courts interpret § 1963 strictly to grant
stay of execution despite judgment debtor's failure to file supersedeas bond).
33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1572 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
Id. The Kaplan dissent noted that rule 62(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allows a prevailing creditor to levy on the debtor's assets ten days after judgment. Id.; see
FED. R. Civ. P. 62(a) (creditor cannot execute judgment or institute proceedings for enforcement until expiration of ten days after entry of judgment). In contrast to rule 62(a), § 1963
clearly implies that a judgment creditor cannot register a judgment before expiration of the
thirty day time limit for appeal. 33 Fed. R. Serv, 2d (Callaghan) at 1572-73. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1963 (§ 1963 language requires that creditor cannot execute judgment until expiration of
time for appeal). A foreign district court will allow a debtor's stay of execution of judgment
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amination of the drafting process of section 1963 demonstrates that Congress never intended to permit the registration of a judgment while an
appeal is pending."'
The dissent noted that the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on
Rules of Civil Procedure originally drafted the provisions that would
become section 1963 as proposed rule 77 of the original Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure." In deference to rule 77's potential influence on the
substantive rights of both judgment debtors and judgment creditors,
Congress enacted proposed rule 77 as section 1963.38 Judge Murnaghan
reasoned that since Congress did not change proposed rule 77 materially, an examination of the rule's evolution in the advisory committee provides insight into the legislative intent underlying section 1963.11
The dissent noted that in redrafting the language of rule 77, the
Supreme Court Advisory Committee modified the focus of the rule." Instead of emphasizing only the collection of the debt, the revised rule, as
evidenced by the final proposed draft, also emphasized the finality of the
judgment.4 In addition to tracing the evolution of rule 77's language, the
dissent cited a note accompanying the 1938 amendment of rule 77 in
which the committee reemphasized that registration of a judgment in a
foreign district was inappropriate if any change existed that an appeal
would modify the judgment.42 Judge Murnaghan concluded that the
Kaplan majority's opinion conflicted with the legislative intent of section
even though the debtor's failure to post a supersedeas bond within ten days following judgment would have made collection possible in the district where the court rendered judgment. 33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1572-73; see supra note 8 (under § 2107 party must
file notice of appeal from district court judgment within thirty days after entry of
judgment).
33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1573 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1963 reviser's note (1976) (§ 1963 follows recommendation of the
Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1937 which includes proposed rule 77).
"' See Memorandum in Support of Rule 77, 14 U.S. Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure (1934-1939) (Papers of Edgar B. Tolman, University of
Chicago Law School) [hereinafter cited as Tolman Papers].
33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1573 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
40 Id.
at 1574.
" See Tolman Papers, supra note 38. A 1936 tentative draft of rule 77 stated that if a
stay of execution or a supersedeas bond was not in force, a district court could enforce the
judgment in a foreign district. Tentative Draft II, Rule A 31 (January 15, 1936), 3 U.S.
Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules For Civil Procedure, (1934-1939). The 1937
final proposed draft of rule 77 stated that a court may register a judgment entered in any
district court which has become final through the expiration of time for appeal or by mandate on appeal. Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Rules (November, 1937), Tolman
Papers, supra note 38.
42 33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1574 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The note accompanying the final amendment of rule 77 stated that the Advisory Committee believed that
the courts should not register a judgment in another district while any chance of modification on appeal exists. Tolman Papers, supra note 38.
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1963 and resulted in an interpretation that the Supreme Court Advisory
Committee intentionally had declined to adopt. 3
In addition to disagreeing with the Kaplan majority's interpretation
of the congressional intent underlying section 1963, the dissent also
disagreed with the majority holding that section 1963 would be unconstitutional without a bond requirement because section 1963 would
afford disparate treatment to debtors whose assets were located in
foreign districts." Judge Murnaghan noted that although a creditor
could not register a judgment for execution in a foreign district if an appeal of the judgment were pending, the creditor nonetheless could obtain execution by filing an independent suit on the judgment in the
foreign district and obtaining a judgment based on the prior judgment."
The dissent reasoned that no inequity existed in requiring a judgment
creditor to secure a judgment in the foreign district in which the judgment debtor had property, since other creditors residing within the
district where the debtor's assets were located also had to obtain a judgment against a debtor in that district prior to collection of the debt.
Judge Murnaghan argued that requiring a creditor to secure a judgment
in a foreign district when appeal was pending on the original judgment
constituted no real hardship for the creditor.47 The dissent concluded
that the Kaplan majority should have upheld the Maryland district
court's refusal to register the Kaplan judgment until the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals acted on Hirsh's appeal.48
" 33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1574 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1575; see supra text accompanying note 25 & 27 (Kaplan majority reasoning
that § 1963's disparate treatment of debtors is unconstitutional).
,1 33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1574 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); see Bros, Inc. v.
W. E. Grace Mfg. Co., 261 F.2d 428, 433 n.4 (5th Cir. 1958) (summary judgment based on
judgment in another district is enforceable even though appeal is pending and will remain
enforceable until appellate court reverses original judgment); Juneau Spruce Corp. v. International Long & Warehouseman's Union, 128 F. Supp. 697, 700 (D. Hawaii 1955) (creditor
always can enforce foreign judgment by bringing suit on judgment, even when § 1963 is
unavailable because appeal of original judgment is pending); Slate v. Dickinson, 82 F. Supp.
416, 418 (W.D. Mich. 1949) (pendency of appeal from judgment of foreign district does not
bar local suits based on foreign judgments); see also 7B, J. MOORE, M. WAXNER, H.B. FINK &

D.M.

EPSTEIN, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

56.07 (2d ed. 1982) (section 1963 does not pre-

vent judgment creditor from bringing action on judgment, and action may be advantageous
when creditor cannot register original judgment because appeal still is pending). But see
ITT Indus. Credit Co. v. Lawco Energy, Inc., 86 F.R.D. 708, 711 (S.D. W.Va. 1980) (because
independent action in foreign district is impractical due to expense and high mobility of persons and property, interpreting § 1963 as requiring supersedeas bond provides practical
solution to problem).
33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1576 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
, Id.; see supra text accompanying note 45 (since every creditor within district must
obtain judgment against debtor, no inequity in requiring creditor with prior judgment from
foreign district also to gain independent judgment).
4' 33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1576 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The Kaplan dissent argued that even if disparate treatment of debtors or creditors exists, disparate treatment does not necessarily imply unconstitutionality. Id. The dissent reasoned that unless a
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The Fourth Circuit majority's holding that section 1963 requires a
judgment debtor to file a supersedeas bond is inconsistent with the
holdings of the majority of courts that have interpreted the statutory
language of section 1963."9 The majority of courts considering the issue
0
have followed the precedent of Abegglen v. Burnham,"
in which the
United States District Court for the District of Utah held that courts
must interpret the word "final" according to the ordinary, usual, and
natural meaning of the word 1 Courts following A begglen therefore hold
that a case remains pending until an appellate court disposes of the
case. 2 The majority of courts conclude that courts should not regard the
judgment as final in any ordinary sense until the time limit for appeal
has elapsed.53
court suspects that a legislature created a classification as a means of discrimination, a
statute should survive judicial scrutiny if the statute rationally promotes a legitimate
government interest. Id.; see, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
55 (1973) (constitutional standard under equal protection clause is whether challenged state
action achieves legitimate state purpose or interest), reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973);
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973) (Supreme Court will not challenge classification that rationally furthers legitimate articulated government purpose). The Kaplan dissent concluded that § 1963 promotes legitimate governmental interests by achieving the
congressional goal of providing a procedural shortcut to registering creditors' final
judgments in foreign districts. 33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1576.
' See In re Professional Air Traffic Controllers, 18 BANKR. 894, 903 (Bankr. D.D.C.
1982) (since language of § 1963 is clear and unambiguous, judgment-creditor must await outcome of appeal to register judgment); Goldsmith v. Midwest Energy Co., 90 F.R.D. 249, 250
(N.D. Ohio 1980) (court may not register judgment in another district until judgment has
become final by appeal or by expiration of time for appeal); Lipton v. Schmertz, 68 F.R.D.
249, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (§ 1963 bars creditor's registration of judgment in foreign district as
long as appeal is pending); cf. United States ex rel. Goldman v. Meredith, 596 F.2d 1353,
1356 (8th Cir.) (noting without comment that clerk had refused to register judgment
that debtor had appealed but not stayed), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 838 (1979); Olympic Ins. Co.
v. H.D. Harrison, Inc., 413 F.2d 973, 974 (5th Cir. 1969) (although debtor failed to file
supersedeas bond, plaintiff could not execute judgment outside district of trial until judgment became final); Gulf & S. Transp. Co. v. Jordan, 257 F.2d 361, 363 (5th Cir. 1958)
(despite appellant's failure to file supersedeas bond, appellee could not collect or register
judgment in other districts pursuant to § 1963).
0 94 F. Supp. 484 (D. Utah 1950). In Abegglen a judgment creditor assigned a
favorable judgment obtained in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho.
Id. at 485. The assignee then sought to register the judgment in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah and succeeded in filing the judgment with the clerk. Id.
Because an appeal of the Idaho judgment still was pending, the Utah district court granted
a motion of the defendant debtors to strike the registration from the records and to quash
execution on the judgment. Id. The Abegglen court held that courts should interpret § 1963
according to the statute's ordinary, usual, and natural meaning. Id. at 486. Additionally, the
Abegglen court held that under the language of § 1963, a case remains pending until an appellate court disposes of the case, and courts should not regard the judgment as final in any
ordinary sense until the disposition of the case occurs. Id.; see supranote 49 (cases following
Abegglen).
94 F. Supp. at 486.
See supra note 49 (cases following Abegglen).
3 Id.
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In addition to the Fourth Circuit, two other circuit courts have considered whether section 1963 requires a judgment debtor's filing of a
supersedeas bond, and both circuits have taken a position contrary to
the Fourth Circuit. 4 In Urban Industries,Inc. of Kentucky v. Thevis,55
the Eleventh Circuit held that under the language of section 1963 a
district court judgment is not "final by appeal" as long as an appeal is
pending. In Thevis a creditor obtained a judgment against a debtor in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. 7
Thevis, the judgment debtor, appealed the judgment but failed to file a
supersedeas bond to obtain a stay of execution. 8 While Thevis' appeal
was pending in the Sixth Circuit, the creditor registered the Kentucky
judgment in the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia pursuant to section 1963 in an attempt to levy execution of any of Thevis'
assets within the district. 9 Subsequent to Urban Industries' registration
of judgment in the Northern District of Georgia, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) assessed penalties against the judgment debtor for unpaid
taxes and interest." The judgment creditor then filed an action in the
Georgia district court seeking a declaratory judgment, arguing that the
creditor rather than the IRS was entitled to the debtor's property.6 ' The
Georgia district court held that the plaintiffs registration of the
Kentucky judgment in the Northern District of Georgia was invalid
because the registered judgment, which was still pending in the Sixth
2
The Eleventh Circuit concurred with
Circuit, was not final by appeal.
3
holding
court's
the district
See Urban Indus., Inc. of Ky. v. Thevis, 670 F.2d 981, 985 (11th Cir. 1982) (court must
read § 1963 strictly to determine that judgment is not final while appeal is pending); Bros,
Inc. v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 261 F.2d 428, 433 n.4 (5th Cir. 1958) (same).
" 670 F.2d 981 (11th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 985. In holding that § 1963 does not require a supersedeas bond, the Thevis
court repudiated the constitutional analysis of the district court in Dorey v. Dorey. 670 F.2d
at 985; see Dorey v. Dorey, 77 F.R.D. 721, 724-25 (N.D. Ala. 1978) (Doreycourt holding that
judgment creditor has constitutional right to collect on judgment against debtor in any
district if debtor has failed to file supersedeas bond), rev'd in part on different grounds, 609
F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1980); supra note 25 (same). The Thevis court held that because § 1963's
requirement of finality clearly is reasonable and rationally related to the purpose of making
nonappellate judgments easily enforceable, § 1963 is constitutional. 670 F.2d at 985.
11 670 F.2d at 983. In Thevis a creditor attempted to levy against Thevis, a convicted
pornography dealer who had escaped from prison. Id. The FBI later captured Thevis with
$11,400 in cash and with jewels estimated at a value of $1,000,000. Id. Urban Industries obtained a judgment in the amount of $681,655 plus interest against Thevis in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. Id.
' Id.; see supra note 11 (necessity of debtor's filing of supersedeas bond to stay execution of judgment in local district pending appeal).
5' 670 F.2d at 983.
The IRS assessed Thevis and his former wife for unpaid income taxes, penalties,
5' Id.
and interest in the amount of $5,004,100.96 for the years 1972 through 1975. Id.

Id.
I1
62 Id. at 983-84.
Id. at 984.
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Similarly, in Bros, Inc. v. W. E. Grace Manufacturing Co., 4 the Fifth
Circuit stated in dicta that courts should interpret section 1963 as barring registration of a judgment in a foreign district while an appeal is
pending." In Bros the plaintiff patentee obtained a judgment for patent
infringement against a subsidiary of W. E. Grace Manufacturing Company
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio."
Because the debtor's assets were located in Texas, the patentee attempted to enforce the Ohio judgment by moving fot summary judgment in a
Texas district court. 7 The Texas district court granted summary judgment on the basis of the Ohio judgment. 8 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
upheld the Texas district court's holding, noting that considerations of
res judicata supported granting summary judgment.69 In addition, the
Fifth Circuit distinguished summary judgment from a "mere" registration of the judgment under section 1963, which the Fifth Circuit considered invalid in Texas because an appeal was pending in Ohio."°
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Kaplan ignored the express language
of section 1963."' The Fourth Circuit rejected a literal interpretation of
section 1963 on the ground that a literal interpretation would create an
unconstitutional disparity in the rights of judgment debtors based on
the location of the debtors' assets.72 As the Kaplan dissent pointed out,
however, courts traditionally have forced creditors to institute separate
actions to reach debtors' assets in foreign districts.73 If section 1963 is
unconstitutional because the statute allows disparate treatment of debtors, then the procedure employed before the passing of section 1963 also
was unconstitutional.4
The Fourth Circuit also based the Kaplan decision on the ground
that section 1963 presented the potential for abuse of the appellate proc261 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1958).
Id. at 433 n.4 (dicta).
Bros, Inc. v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 158 F. Supp. 786, 787 (N.D. Tex. 1958). In Bros the
patentee obtained a judgment against Gibson-Stewart Company, an Ohio distributor of
W.E. Grace's machines. Id.
67 Id.
'Id.

261 F.2d at 433.
Id. at 433 n.4 (dicta).
71 See supra note 1 (statutory language of § 1963); supra note 49 (courts applying strict
interpretation of language of § 1963).
7 33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1571; see supra text accompanying notes 25 & 27
(Kaplanmajority found that a strict reading of § 1963 created unconstitutional disparity in
treatment of debtors depending on whether debtor resides in judgment district).
7' 33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1575 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); see supra note 2
(cases holding that enforcement of judgment rendered in foreign district depends upon local
judgment to enforce foreign judgment). But see supra note 31 (if creditor is unable to find
judgment debtor in same district as property, debtor has frustrated service of process and
rendered collection impossible in foreign district).
",33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1575 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (if § 1963 is unconstitutional, traditionally employed enforcement procedures also are unconstitutional).
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ess by a debtor who files a frivolous appeal without posting a bond and
subsequently transfers his property outside the district.' Courts,
however, have sufficient procedural remedies to curb the abuse of the
appellate process by debtors intent on avoiding creditors' judgments."6
Section 1912 of title 28 of the United States Code, 7 for example, empowers a federal court of appeals to award the prevailing party in a
lawsuit damages, or single or double costs, for delay in enforcement of
the judgment on account of frivolous or dilatory appeals.78 The appellate
courts also can curb abuse of section 1963 through application of rule 38
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 9 which allows a federal
court of appeals to award damages and single or double costs to the appellee if the court determines that an appeal is frivolous." The appellate
courts' proper application of their punitive powers should provide an effective deterrent to debtors intent on abusing the appellate process and
render the Fourth Circuit's liberal reading of section 1963 unnecessary."
Although the majority opinion failed to examine thoroughly the
legislative intent behind section 1963, the dissent demonstrated that the
drafters intended section 1963 to allow for execution of a creditor's judgment in a foreign district only on the condition that the initial judgment
no longer was subject to appeal. 2 The majority of courts agree that sec" Id. at 1571; see supra text accompanying note 25 (creditor attempted to abuse appellate process by filing frivolous appeal and moving property from district without having"
to post supersedeas bond under § 1963).
78 See notes 72 & 74 (methods of curbing debtors who attempt to abuse appellate process by frivolously appealing without filing supersedeas bond and then transferring property
from judgment district).
77 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1976). Section 1912 provides that whenever the Supreme Court or a
court of appeals affirms a judgment, the court has discretion to award to the prevailing party
fair damages for delay and single or double costs. Id.
8 See id. (Congress delegates power to award damages for delay to appellate courts
through § 1912).
'9 FED. R. App. P. 38. Rule 38 allows a court of appeals to award fair damages if the
court determines an appeal is frivolous. Id.
80 Id.
S1 See A/S Siljestad v. Hideca Trading, Inc., 678 F.2d 391, 392 (2d Cir. 1982) (per
curiam). In Hideca,Siljestad gained a "supplemental expansion" allowing for the payment of
interest on cash awarded in arbitration with Hideca Trading for the wrongful cancellation of
a voyage. Id. at 391. Hideca contended that the original award was final and that the arbitrators had no power to make a supplemental award of interest. Id. Although payment of
interest was the sole issue on appeal, Hideca previously had refused to pay its share of costs
of the arbitration, had refused to post a supersedeas bond pending appeal, and successfully
had resisted an attempt by Siljestad to have the district court enforce the judgment under
§ 1963. Id. at 392. The Siljestad court held that the appeal was frivolous and exercised its
discretion under § 1912 and rule 38 by awarding the creditor interest on the district court
judgment, double costs, and $1000 or the attorney's fees of the creditor, whichever sum was
less. 678 F.2d at 392.
" 33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1573-74 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); see supra text
accompanying notes 36-40 (history of § 1963 reveals drafters' interest in finality of judgment
as well as streamlined method of executing judgment in foreign district).

